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Abstract
Just war theory is a family of views that has undergone many important changes
throughout its development in the Western philosophical tradition. The following is an
historical analysis of the transition from a religious to a secular conception of just war
theory in the Early Modern period. My main argument is that the secularization of the
theory led to the separation of jus ad bellum from jus in bello, a major change that had
positive consequences on the theory and its application. One important consequence of
this change was to place combatants on both sides of a conflict on an equal moral footing,
applying the principles of jus in bello equally to all.
But the progress made since the theory’s secularization is threatened to be reversed.
Michael Walzer’s “supreme emergency” exemption allows jus in bello to be sacrificed
under certain extreme conditions, and Jeff McMahan promotes the view that just and
unjust combatants do not have the same rights in war. Furthermore, a popular idea in the
social sciences is that if the nations of the world all adopted a democratic mode of
governance there would be few to no wars. This democratic peace theory, while not
explicitly condoning the use of violence to achieve the result of a lasting peace, has had
profound policy implications among democratic states. The United States, for example,
has used the justification of spreading democracy abroad to promote its military
ambitions for the last century. I put forward a number of arguments against these views
and instead promote the adoption of a Kantian program for gradually moving towards a
more peaceful international realm based on mutual trust and cooperation.
Religious justifications for going to war are no longer popular as a lasting peace was not
achieved but rather contradicted by the massive violence caused by religious wars. If the
religious justifications for going to war put forward in the Middle Ages were fallacious
then I believe we should be skeptical of similar arguments put forward today in the name
of political structure.
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Introduction
The just war tradition begins with the question, ‘is it ever just to wage war’?
Wars obviously have devastating consequences for adversaries in terms of lives lost,
resources spent, and destruction of property, not to mention other externalities such as
disease and population displacement. Given the huge material costs and the loss of
human life, how then can war ever be the just way to resolve a dispute between
adversaries? Just war theory is a family of views that exists in many different versions.
However, what all versions of just war theory have in common is that they develop sets
of ethical principles that apply in the context of war. As such, all versions of just war
theory accept the basic idea that war is a sphere of human action to which principles of
morality can and should be applied.

Just war theory, then, is contrasted with and

occupies a median position between two alternatives. On the one hand we have pacifism,
which holds that wars are never justifiable and cannot be conducted morally. And on the
other hand we have realism, which holds that war is a special situation that exists outside
of morality. I will not take it upon myself to argue for the merits of just war theory
against its pacifist and realist alternatives. I will take for granted that some version of just
war theory is correct and argue for its adoption against other versions of just war theory.
Just war theorists generally divide the theoretical landscape into three parts.
Although this has only been explicitly done in recent times these categories have their
beginnings in the earliest versions of the theory. Jus ad bellum, or the justice of war,
concerns the principles guiding the resort to war. Temporally this is the first part of just
war theory as it concerns the principles related to the beginning of war. Some of the
1

persistent principles of jus ad bellum include :
•
•
•

Just Cause: What purposes can war be waged for?
Right Authority: Who has the right to declare war?
Right Intention: Even if there is a just cause in play, is this the actual cause
being fought for?

1

The following lists are my formulations of the principles of just war theory. For similar lists and an
overview of these principles see: Nicolas Fotion, War and Ethics: A New Just War Theory, ed. James
Garvey and Jeremy Stangroom, Think Now (New York: Continuum, 2007), 19-22; Brian Orend, The
Morality of War (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006), 62-65.

1

•
•
•

Reasonable Hope of Success: Is fighting the war at all likely to meet with
success?
Last Resort: Are violent means the only ones possible to achieve the just
cause? All other options must be exhausted before engaging in warfare.
Macro Proportionality: Are the costs associated with waging the war
proportionate to the just cause?

The second part of just war theory is jus in bello, or the justice in war. The principles
guiding this second category include:
•
•

Micro Proportionality: Are the costs of pursuing each military manoeuvre
proportionate given the aim of the attack?
Discrimination: Are the people and or installations under attack the proper
objects of military operations?

The final part of just war theory is jus post bellum, or the justice after war. This is the
area of just war theory that is currently undergoing the most development and that also
has the least consensus. The following is a list of potential principles of jus post bellum
as it has been developed by Larry May:
•
•
•
•
•
•

2

Retribution: How can we bring those who waged an unjust war to justice?
Reconciliation: How do we ensure a lasting peace between former enemies?
Rebuilding: Who is responsible for rebuilding after war has ended?
Restitution: What if anything is due to those who had just cause for war?
Reparations: What is owed to those against whom an unjust war was fought?
Meta-Proportionality: How can we make sure that the application of the
3

other principles of jus post bellum does not do more harm than good?

The various principles of just war theory listed above have been around for centuries.
Authors disagree as to how these questions, as I have described them, should be answered
but not that these are the kinds of questions that any complete account of just war theory
must seek to answer.
One persistent criticism levelled at just war theory is that the principles have been
developed by potentially well-meaning jurists, politicians and academics, but that they do
2

Larry May, "Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, and Meionexia," in Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative
Foundations, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 16-18.
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Meta-Proportionality is my term for proportionality applied to jus post bellum.
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not serve their intended purpose because realist considerations trump good intentions on
the battlefield. In spite of the attractiveness of this sceptical position, numerous historical
and contemporary accounts suggest that the laws of war that have been developed have
had a profound effect on the types of wars that are waged and the ways in which they are
fought. It is possible to see how the laws of war have changed over time, through their
application on the battlefield. One period in which the historical record is particularly
clear is during the early days of the United States of America. The US went to war
frequently in its early days against a number of rival nations including France, Britain,
Mexico, Spain, and Canada, not to mention native tribes across the continent. Because of
the frequency of wars that the US was engaged in, there was continual discussion among
politicians and military leaders regarding the proper application of the laws of war as they
were handed down by European scholars and experiences. American leaders debated the
merits of various positions regarding possible justifications for war and particular policies
surrounding a number of issues from the treatment of prisoners of war to the rights of
combatants and enemy non-combatants, which then directly influenced what happened on
the ground. For example, on December 29, 1837 a British attack on an American ship
carrying arms, supplies and men to a Canadian revolutionary faction seeking
independence from Britain caused diplomatic outrage. Britain and America almost went
to war over the incident, which would see the American ship the Caroline torched and set
adrift to careen over Niagara Falls. In the aftermath of the attack the Secretary of State of
the US, Daniel Webster complained that the British had led an unjustifiable attack on US
soil. The standard to which the British were to be held in assessing the situation,
according to Webster, was whether or not there was “necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” The
Caroline was not a military vessel, it was carrying supplies for a possible campaign
against the British, but it was not even located in British controlled waters and could not
have launched an attack against the British. Moreover, it was surprise-attacked at night
without a declaration of war between Canada and Britain. Webster’s formulation of what
came to be known as the Caroline dictum became the world’s standard as the test of

3

lawful self-defence ever since the end of World War II and was used at Nuremberg to
conclude that the Nazi’s had waged a war of aggression.

4

The British attack on the Caroline raised a further puzzle regarding the laws of
war that was even more controversial than the justification of the attack itself. During the
attack, American passenger Amos Durfee was shot and killed. Afterwards the Americans
sought to bring his killer to justice for what they viewed as murder. Several years after
the attack a Canadian supporter of the British, Alexander McLeod, was charged with the
murder of Durfee. McLeod’s trial raised the long-standing question of whether soldiers
at war were individually responsible for the actions that they took on behalf of their
political communities. In other words, even if it was granted that the British had no right
to attack the American vessel, there was still a separate question of whether it was right to
charge McLeod with murder. At the time a British minister, Henry Fox, argued that:
“making soldiers individually responsible for the consequences of military action
authorized by their home states undid a century’s progress in the laws of armed
5

conflict.” He contended that, “[a]bsent immunity, a soldier facing criminal prosecution
6

and a possible death sentence might be willing to fight to the bitter end.” In the end the
Americans agreed with the British that allowing soldiers to be prosecuted for actions
7

taken on behalf of their state would open the door to “impassioned and all-out war” for
personal protection as opposed to a more measured and rational war for a common
national purpose. The debate regarding the rights of combatants in war continues today
and has been around since the beginnings of just war theory but one standard answer has
been to argue that there is a difference between murder and killing in war. The eventual
release of McLeod is evidence that the seemingly un-influential debates about the laws of
war have a direct effect on policy. These are not unimportant consequences; Britain and
the US were making preparations to go to war against one another over the results of the
4

John Fabian Witt, Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History (New York: Free Press, 2012),
111-13.
5
6
7

Ibid.
Ibid., 113.
Ibid., 115.
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McLeod trial, essentially over the proper interpretation and application of the laws of war
developed by enlightenment thinkers.
One of the first major debates in the history of just war theory concerned exactly
this issue of the difference between killing in war and murder. St. Augustine was worried
that Christians could not become soldiers because they would be involved in murdering
other people and would thereby compromise the eternal salvation of their souls by going
against divine law. However, Augustine came out against the popular pacifist position of
the early church and argued that we have a moral obligation to preserve our own lives
against violent attack. His view went against the prominent Christian doctrine of “turn
the other cheek”, which seemed to require that the practicing Christian allow harm to
befall him even up to the point of loss of life so as not to commit a sin himself. His
argument opened up the theoretical terrain to arguments for self-preservation and the
defense of others who require assistance but he didn’t stop with arguments for selfdefence. He also argued that violence could be undertaken as punishment to rectify
wrongs already done. Augustine’s arguments were directed at a Christian audience who
were largely concerned with whether or not waging wars and punishing wrongdoing
could be done by earthly agents, or whether punishment was the sole job of God at the
final judgment.

In spite of the Christian orientation of his arguments, Augustine’s

arguments were taken up again and again in the just war literature and modified to make
sense of the conditions of new time periods and new problems.
This work seeks to trace the history of just war theory from its Christian
beginning in Augustine through its most prominent defenders up until the present day.
What I hope to show is that the theory has undergone important changes as the political
landscape has changed. Some of these changes, especially the secularization of the
theory that took place in the Modern period, have resulted in great shifts in its focus,
which I believe have produced positive outcomes if we consider policies that aim to
reduce political violence. What I hope to convince my readers of is that the move from a
theory that focuses on jus ad bellum and that places a concern for these principles above
those of a fully developed jus in bello runs the risk of working to corrupt the basic spirit
of just war theory, which is to limit the destructiveness of warfare and to create the

5

conditions necessary for a lasting peace between nations. The version of just war theory
that I favour does not depend on any particular political or religious ideology for its
applicability. This will become clearer as my argument develops, but for now suffice it
to say that there is a conceptual link between the subordination of jus in bello to jus ad
bellum and the belief that a particular religion or governmental form has “got things
right” and ought to use its positive influence to lead others towards more peaceful
coexistence.
In the Modern period, Hugo Grotius and his followers elaborated a version of just
war theory that sought to detach the Christian justifications for going to war from what
would come to be known as the Natural Law theory which would root the right of nations
to go to war in our common humanity and the derived rights that we all have to the
defense of our own bodies against attack. With this shift in focus, the natural law theory
allowed for the elaboration of a coherent body of law related to just conduct in war, or jus
in bello, which had previously been secondary to questions about the justification of the
war itself. In other words, for the Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages, the important
question of just war theory was which side in a conflict was justified to wage war, and
this question was answered by the side that had God’s blessing or God’s purpose. If your
side had a God given purpose to wage a war against an enemy, in the way that the
Hebrews had been given the right to go to war directly by God in the Old Testament, then
short of committing otherwise sinful acts in the war, whatever means were necessary to
win against an unjust adversary were allowable. In the Modern version of just war theory
advanced by Grotius and others, having just cause to go to war is still an important
consideration, however, just cause is not given by divine authority nor is it decided based
on who won after the fact. What is most important after the war is over is not the
question of who had justice on their side but whether the war was waged in a way that
minimized damages and promoted a future peace between those who previously fought.
This shift in focus and what has come to be known as the separation of jus ad
bellum from jus in bello (and jus post bellum) is extremely important from the point of
view of international law and public policy making. If we think that what matters most is
who has justice on their side in a war, then international law will reflect this value and

6

allow exceptions to be made for the sake of justice prevailing in the application of the
laws of jus in bello. For example, regardless of whether a just war theorist holds that jus
ad bellum and jus in bello should be separate or ordered hierarchically, most agree that
intentionally targeting non-combatants, or civilians, in order to achieve a military goal is
not allowed. This is the jus in bello principle of discrimination. However, those who
think that what matters most is just cause and not adherence to the principles of jus in
bello may be willing to allow the intentional harm of non-combatants in cases where it is
the only way for the just combatants to avoid losing the war or suffering extreme losses.
One contemporary just war theorist who makes exactly this argument with respect
to violating certain principles of jus in bello is Michael Walzer. In his famous 1977 book
Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer argues for principles of jus ad bellum such as just cause
and right intention alongside jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality.
However, when he confronts the question of whether the principles of jus in bello can be
violated in order to prioritize those of jus ad bellum, Walzer comes down on the side of
jus ad bellum. The specific case Walzer has in mind when making this concession to jus
ad bellum is the British use of terror bombing in World War II prior to 1941. After 1941,
Walzer judges that other options were possible and so it became untenable to use terror
bombing as a tactic.

8

Walzer’s position on this matter has been hotly debated and there are many
independent reasons for thinking that the “Supreme Emergency Exemption” is not worth
adopting in this case (which is the only incidence of the supreme emergency that Walzer
condones). There are the practical concerns of its efficacy, some arguing that it was not
worth adopting because it did not actually stall a Nazi victory. More important are the
ethical reasons for contesting this strategy. On a “Grotian” interpretation, adopting a
campaign of terror bombing is not only wrong because it violates that principles of jus in
bello, it also undermines the possibility that current enemies will behave peacefully
towards one another in the future. The principles of jus in bello serve a dual purpose for
Grotius; first they accord with his conception of the natural law and are ultimately
8

For a full description of Walzer’s example see: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral
Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 255-63.
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justified based on our interpersonal relationships. Moreover, they serve the secondary
purpose of reinforcing the bonds of trust between people, even if they are currently
fighting one another. Current enemies may be engaged in a battle over territory or
natural resources but regardless of the justifiability of their actions as regards jus ad
bellum they may still respect the principles of jus in bello, for example, by not targeting
civilians or by respecting the rights of prisoners of war. Enemies who fail to respect
these principles are likely to hold grudges owing to the mistreatment of their citizens and
are less likely to come to a lasting peace, even if hostilities end temporarily. As Hobbes,
Kant and others have pointed out, an end to present hostilities is not the same thing as
peace. Conditions of peace exist when there is a reasonable hope that fighting will not
happen in the future. This work seeks to contribute to the current debate regarding the
correct version of just war theory and the interpretation of its various principles. Next I
will summarize the content of the chapters that contribute to the particular version of just
war theory that I believe holds the greatest hope of leading to a lasting peace.

Chapter 1:
In the first chapter I lay out some of the popular versions of just war principles
espoused by a number of Christian thinkers. I begin with and spend the most time on St
Augustine’s views, not only because his principles lay the groundwork for the Christian
thinkers who followed him but because many survive in contemporary versions of just
war theory. Other figures include Gratian, a 12th Century monk who canonized existing
law and whose work, the Decretum inspired generations of Christian thinkers and framed
legal debate in his time.

His followers, the Decretists and Decretalists continue to

elaborate the laws of war, working up to the views of St Thomas Aquinas and his circle
who synthesized existing Christian thinking handed down from Augustine with the newly
rediscovered Aristotelian texts popular in the 13th Century. James Turner Johnson argues
that, by the end of this period, a kind of theological consensus had been reached with
regards to warfare, a consensus that did not exist in earlier periods.

Warfare was

increasingly viewed as being a tool for the defense of the political community and a way
to achieve the common goal of peace through the spread of Christianity. Just wars were
those waged in defense of the Christian faith or to punish wrongdoing on the part of an
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adversary, which was sometimes taken to include sins of idol worship or heresy.
Augustine’s concern, as we saw above, was with whether a good Christian could go to
war and kill without sinning against God, in opposition to the popular pacifist view of
many theologians at his time. By the end of the Middle Ages, the question driving just
war thinking had been turned on its head. It was generally accepted that a Christian could
fight in defense of his life or for territorial sovereignty. The question being asked in the
13th century was whether a Christian state could initiate offensive wars against potential
enemies in order to convert the uncivilized to Christianity and thereby save their souls
and move closer to the goal of achieving a lasting peace on earth. The question was
answered in the affirmative, with the added bonus of eternal salvation for any soldiers
carrying out the work of God on earth. Far from fearing eternal damnation for fighting in
a war, even one of defense, by this time soldiers were being promised martyrdom if they
participated in wars sanctioned by the Church.

Chapter 2:
By 1625, when Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius first published his On the Rights of War
and Peace the religious and political climate in Europe had undergone a profound
transformation. Instead of the hegemony of Roman Catholicism as the one authorized
religion, Europe and the rest of the Empire had splintered into independent Princedoms
and countries. Improved naval capacities had allowed European settlers to travel to the
Americas and to spread Western power to the far reaches of the globe.

New

opportunities for territorial conquest as well as interaction with a diversity of religious
views and cultures previously unknown were now available. Grotius’ writings marked a
shift in thinking about international relations and the principles of just conduct in war.
Instead of a theory focused on religious teachings and biblical interpretations, Grotius’
theory started from the assumption that men are natural creatures endowed with the
ability to rationally discover the principles of right action without requiring recourse to
any specific holy texts.

This was a radical shift because it meant that all people

regardless of their religious faith were capable of discerning right from wrong. Grotius
held that there were certain supererogatory divine laws that only Christians were held to
9

but that the basic underlying morality of all human beings was the same and based on
what he called the “natural law”.
In this chapter I show how the derivation of the principles of right action in war
and international relations from the principles of the natural law reversed the focus of just
war theory from one most concerned with jus ad bellum to one that looked primarily to
jus in bello and secondarily towards jus post bellum. In other words, while the previous
religious thinkers were most concerned with who had a right to wage war and for what
reasons, Grotius switched the emphasis of the theory to right conduct in war with a view
towards establishing a peace between those currently fighting. Grotius’ lasting impact
was to formulate rules of right conduct in human nature instead of religious teachings.
On top of having an effect on international relations, this secularized perspective also
changed how we think about sovereignty and political authority.

Chapter 3:
In the centuries following Grotius, political thinkers moved from characterizing
sovereignty in terms of group adherence and social cohesion and began to make the
individual citizen the center of attention. In the new wave of thinking that ran up through
the Enlightenment, thinkers focused on the need for citizens to consent to the political
power being placed over them. With this new emphasis on individuals and their rational
capacity for self-governance, the social contract tradition had to balance tensions arising
from opposing the need for social controls with individual autonomy and freedoms. In
many ways we are still living with these tensions today. Depending on the governmental
structure of the countries we live in, we are under varying degrees of social control.
Democracy is widely viewed by many theorists as the most legitimate governmental form
because it takes seriously the rights of individual members of the political community to
have a say in how they are governed. Democracies have also been relatively successful
at maintaining peaceful relations between diverse and multicultural groups over
significant periods of time. However, in the international sphere there are no democratic
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institutions that are tasked with keeping the peace between the almost 200 nation-states
currently in existence.
Even in the 1700’s, Immanuel Kant was well aware of the failings of the state system,
which was just in its infancy at the time, and he predicted many of the political problems
that still plague international politics today. He argued that just war theorists, including
Grotius, were “sorry comforters” because they did not address the systemic lack of
coercive power that, he believed, rendered their principles ineffective in the real world.
In this chapter I lay out Kant’s program for perpetual peace and show how it attempts to
transcend the limits of the use of force between nations. Kant believed that stronger
nations could be predicted to use force in situations where this would be to their
advantage and that the only way to escape this power dynamic would be to gradually
move towards a system where the use of force would not be in the interests of the more
powerful. While some of what Kant says regarding international relations would seem to
place him firmly within the just war tradition, his later work on perpetual peace moves
beyond the just war categories towards a theory of cosmopolitan cooperation and
voluntary pacification between a widening league of nations.

Chapter 4:
Kant’s political works have gained renewed popularity in recent years and have
inspired social scientists. One of the most noteworthy influences that Kant’s political
thought has had is on democratic peace theory. The basic idea behind democratic peace
theory is that there is something special about democracies that makes them less likely to
go to war against one another. This explains why no two democracies (or at most very
9

few) have gone to war against one another in the past 200 years. In his essay “Perpetual

9

See: John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," in Debating the Democratic Peace,
ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press,
1994); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,"
Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (1983); A. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen, "Sanctioning for
Democracy," in Democratic Peace in Theory and Practice, ed. Steven W. Hook (Kent, Ohio: Kent State
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Peace”, Kant predicted that spread of republicanism would lead to peaceful relations
between nations.

10

This assertion has been adopted by democratic peace theorists in

support of their theory. They equate Kant’s conception of republicanism with their
preferred definition of democracy and then argue that he predicted the democratic peace.
In this chapter I present democratic peace theory and argue that Kant’s position does not
support it. I show how Kant’s vision of perpetual peace differs markedly from the vision
of the democratic peace and why we should prefer a Kantian approach. Following this
argument I also reject democratic peace theory on the basis that it is internally flawed,
whether Kant would have hypothetically endorsed it or not. Democratic peace theory
creates dangerous ideological grounds for going to war similar to those that the late
Medieval Christian thinkers thought justified the resort to violence.

Chapter 5:
Following the rejection of democratic peace theory as a viable political theory I
turn to examining the similarities between the argument structures of democratic peace
theory and the late Medieval versions of just war theory that placed a great deal of
importance on the authority of religious leaders and religious causes for going to war.
What I hope to show is that if we have good reasons for being sceptical of religious
justifications for going to war, we should be equally sceptical of other ideological
justifications that assume there will be an obvious way of judging who the just and unjust
enemies will be in cases of armed conflict. This matters greatly for just war theory
because if one side to a conflict can be obviously labeled the unjust opponent, because it
fails to conform to a certain governmental form like democracy, then any actions
undertaken by this unjust (authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist, communist…) opponent will
by default count as unjust and vice versa for the just side. Moreover, if you are fighting a
war with the explicit aim of spreading democracy and the human rights protections that
University Press, 2010); Jörg Fisch, "When Will Kant's Perpetual Peace Be Definitive," Journal of the
History of International Law 2 (2000).
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follow to non-democratic nations, then actions taken to this end will be considered just.
Having adopted this ideological stance, there is a risk that the jus in bello restraints on
legitimate actions in war will be disregarded or suspended whenever the aggressor judges
that the native population will suffer less in the future than under present and otherwise
unjustifiable attacks.

In the end, the native population will benefit from having been

released from the bonds of an unjust governmental form. Current losses will thereby be
minimized in importance after the fact.
In this chapter I examine Michael Walzer’s argument in favour of what he calls
the Supreme Emergency Exemption and show how it fits the model of prioritizing one
side in a conflict over another in order to judge the rightness of a given course of action
in war.
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Walzer’s Supreme Emergency Exemption is not the only evidence in the just

war literature of contemporary theorists promoting an ends-justify-the-means mode of
reasoning. More recently, Jeff McMahan has argued that jus ad bellum concerns should
trump jus in bello in the interest of protecting “just combatants” against “unjust
combatants” who do not have the right to attack adversaries in armed conflict.
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McMahan explicitly rejects Grotius’ prioritization of jus in bello in favour of a just war
theory that recognizes the differences between opposing sides to a conflict. He argues
that we cannot claim that an unjust combatant ever acted justly in war. This is an
unfortunate development for just war theory because it moves away from motivation of
creating a lasting peace between current opponents and further legitimizes offensive
actions aimed at punishing those viewed as unjust combatants for being on the wrong
side in a conflict. Adopting this kind of a view has profound policy implications. For
one, it justifies the increased development and stockpiling of weapons on the grounds that
they may be needed one day against an unjust enemy. Additionally, if Michael Walzer’s
argument for the Supreme Emergency Exemption is combined with this view then not
only is it rational to keep a stockpile of weapons, even those weapons which could never
be used discriminately against an opponent, are now given a justification. Far from
11
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moving in the direction of a pacific union of republican states, as Kant argued for, this
line of thinking makes it rational to abandon the goals of gradual disarmament and the
development of strategies for peaceful deliberations between states.
What I hope to have shown is that just war theory has failed to learn the lessons provided
by its rich history and that it is moving further and further away from transcending the
problems that plague the state system as we know it.

14

1

Early Christian Conceptions of the Just War

Thinking about the nature of warfare and whether the resort to war can ever be
considered just is not unique to the Christian tradition. However, Christian thinking
about the just war is especially important from the perspective of contemporary Western
philosophy because of its lasting influence on the terms of debate. The legacy that
Christian thinking has left on just war thinking is mixed in with a number of other
influences including the chivalric code, Roman law, as well as the ancient Greek
tradition. Although many theorists speak as though there was a traditional just war theory
that began with Augustine in the 5th century, James Turner Johnson makes a convincing
argument that there was no “classic” just war theory until the 1500s. Before that the
various streams of just war thinking were proposed by theorists of different stripes and
there was no consensus as to the structure and content of a single theory. Johnson argues
that by the end of the Middle Ages, around 1300, there was a real consensus that emerged
among Christian thinkers, however, due to the amalgamation of inherited ideas that
constituted this consensus, it already contained within it the seeds of its dissolution that
would happen less than 200 year later. As Johnson argues:
A systematic just war theory came only some time later [than Augustine],
beginning with Gratian’s Decretum in the middle of the twelfth century,
maturing through the work of two generations of successors, the
Decretists and the Decretalists, and taking theological form in the work
of Thomas Aquinas and others in the latter part of the thirteenth century.
Later in the Middle Ages, and particularly during the era of the Hundred
Years War, this canonical and theological conception of just war was
further elaborated by incorporation of ideas, customs, and practices from
the chivalric code and the experience of war, from renewed attention to
Roman law, especially the jus gentium, and from the developing
13
experience of government.
Although it is possible to read back the modern conception of a unified just war theory
into earlier thinkers it would be wrong to attribute to any single thinker a comprehensive
theory that is a coherent body of work on the question of the justice of and in war prior to
the later Middle Ages.
13
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The first goal of this chapter is to trace the development of thinking about the problems
relating to justice in war in the Christian tradition from St. Augustine up until the late
Middle Ages with Aquinas and his followers. This historical picture will do a number of
things. First, it will set up the terms of debate upon which questions of the ethics of war
are based. Second, I hope to show that just war theory did not spring out of Augustine all
neatly packaged and with all its problems already worked out. Just war theory has been
evolving along with the societies and political structures that it developed alongside.
Following the historical exposition what will be argued is that there was a profound shift
that occurred in just war thinking between the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern
period. In spite of the fact that the theorists writing about just war theory were still
deeply religious themselves, a secularization of the theory took place which led to a shift
in focus from the problems of legitimacy that occupied early Christian thinkers, to one
about the means of fighting. What I will argue is that in order for a full account of the
permissible means to be developed, the secularization of the theory had to happen first.
This does not mean that earlier, what I will call “religious”, versions of the theory are
totally unconcerned with the means used for pursuing just ends, but that these questions
are subsumed under questions of legitimacy and authority in a way that is absent in the
later secular versions of the theory.

The argument of this chapter will proceed

chronologically starting with Augustine’s elaboration of the just war then moving to his
influence on later commentators such as Gratian and his followers and ending with
Aquinas’ treatment through this inherited tradition of thought. Augustine’s contributions
will receive the bulk of attention because he set up the terms of the debate for those who
came after him. While the goal of this chapter is to set up the terms of debate to frame
the differences between secular and religious versions of just war theory, it is important
to note from the outset that these theories were interconnected through the entirety of the
middle ages, which makes the task of teasing apart the various strands of thinking about
just war a formidable task for any student of this period.
Frederick H. Russell has accomplished the difficult task of retracing the tradition
of just war theory that emerged through the middle ages. He is quick to point out the
difficulty of separating out the holy war from the just war in this period and states the
following at the beginning of the introduction to The Just War in the Middle Ages:
16

In Christian thought two types of war have been seen as permissible, the
holy war and the just war. The holy war is fought for the goals or ideals
of the faith and is waged by divine authority or on the authority of some
religious leader. [...] Content with the achievement of more concrete
political objectives the just war stops short of countenancing the utter
destruction of the adversary and tends to limit the incidence of violence
by codes of right conduct, of non-combatant immunity and by other
humanitarian restraints lacking in the holy war. In the holy war Christian
participation is a positive duty, while in just wars participation is licit but
14
restricted.
This passage already points to some of the differences in the broad ways of thinking
about the problems of justice in war. These two ways of thinking about just war were
often held by the same authors depending on the nature of the war being fought. For
example, the same author may countenance the use of violence against a foe for
transgressions that would be allowable by the just war tradition and then at the same time
see victory against this same enemy as proof that God had authorized the war. The
following is an example of the principles of the just war set in a religious context where
the religious and secular aspects are not kept perfectly separate:
Peace was the desirable condition, while resort to war must only be in
case of necessity. Military prowess, itself a gift from God, and warfare
were instrumentalities of peace; for this reason warriors must be pacific
even in warfare, for their goal is to return their enemy by conquest to a
15
state of peace.
In this case, the permissibility of the war may be couched in the language of just war
theory but the understanding that victory depends upon God’s grace may shift the
understanding of conditions of victory into a more religious conception. The religious
justification for warfare may require restraint if facing an enemy, such as another
Christian foe, but shift if the enemy is non-Christian, as was frequently the case for many
Medieval thinkers. Through the following sections these tensions will be made more
evident.
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1.1 Augustine on the Just War
Augustine is often thought of as the father of just war theory, but he makes no
attempt to systematically talk about just war. Instead, we find a number of ideas related
to just warfare throughout his works. In City of God, Augustine is careful to explain why
the belief that the Roman Empire was able to expand and prosper due to worship of the
correct Roman deities is false. He also states that it is the implicit observance of some of
the virtues associated with proper worship of the Christian God that actually led to the
prosperity of the Empire for as long as it lasted. If all people worshipped Christ as a
collective body then there would be an everlasting peace, however this everlasting peace
is not one that we can hope for in this fallen world. The best that we can hope for in this
world is that those who hold power manage to maintain the peace against those who
would disturb it. He is sceptical of a lasting peace or of the possibility of just wars more
generally as is made clear by the following remark in Book XIX:
For though there have never been wanting, nor are yet wanting, hostile
nations beyond the empire, against whom wars have been and are waged,
yet, supposing there were no such nations, the very extent of the empire
itself has produced wars of a more obnoxious description – social and
civil wars – and with these the whole race has been agitated, either by the
actual conflict or the fear of a renewed outbreak. If I attempted to give
an adequate description of these manifold disasters, these stern and
lasting necessities, though I am quite unequal to the task, what limit
could I set? But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he
would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he
remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage
them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the
wrong-doing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage
just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to no war,
would still be matter of grief to man because it is man’s wrong-doing.
Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so
16
horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery.
Human relations are fraught with violence and the fear of violence, but these are not due
to the failures of Christianity. Augustine was taken with the task of defending
Christianity against its critics who blamed the new religion for the fall of Rome, which
16
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occurred only three years before he began writing The City of God. According to
Augustine, the sins of not obeying the principles of modesty and charity commanded by
the true God are what led to the sack of Rome in 410 AD. On Augustine’s account, not
only is it wrong to blame Christianity for the fall of Rome, Christianity was the reason
why the destruction that did occur was not as bad as it could have been. In the beginning
of the very first chapter he reminds critics of Christianity that:
Many of them, indeed, being reclaimed from their ungodly error, have
become sufficiently credible citizens of this city [of God]; but many are
so inflamed with hatred against it, and are so ungrateful to its Redeemer
for His signal benefits, as to forget that they would now be unable to
utter a single word to its prejudice, had they not found in its sacred
places, as they fled from the enemy’s steel, that life in which they now
boast themselves. Are not those very Romans, who were spared by the
barbarians through their respect for Christ, become enemies to the name
of Christ? The reliquaries of the martyrs and the churches of the apostles
bear witness to this; for in the sack of the city they were open sanctuary
for all who fled to them, whether Christian or Pagan. To their very
threshold the bloodthirsty enemy raged; there his murderous fury owned
17
a limit.
In this work, Augustine lays out his metaphysical program in which he details the world
order and how humans fit into God’s plan for the universe. A noteworthy aspect of
Augustine’s metaphysical system is the separation between the rules that apply to the
earthly and heavenly realms. In the earthly realm, things are necessarily imperfect and
corrupted due to the fall from grace in the garden. However, in the heavenly realm there
is peace and tranquility owing to the absence of sin. Because there can never be perfect
tranquility in the earthly realm, it is incumbent upon Christians to conceptualize the
morality of warfare. On the perfection of the eternal realm Augustine writes:
And thus we may say of peace, as we have said of eternal life, that it is
the end of our good; and rather because the Psalmist says of the city of
God, the subject of this laborious work, “Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem;
praise thy God, O Zion: for He hath strengthened the bars of thy gates;
He hath blessed thy children within thee; who hath made thy borders
peace.” For when the bars of her gates shall be strengthened, none shall
go in or come out from her; consequently we ought to understand the
17
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peace of her borders as that final peace we are wishing to declare. For
even the mystical name of the city itself, that is, Jerusalem, means, as I
have already said, “Vision of Peace.” But as the word peace is employed
in connection with things in this world in which certainly life eternal has
no place, we have preferred to call the end or supreme good of this city
18
life eternal rather than peace.
Augustine is engaged with the problem of whether it is possible to fight a just war, in
spite of his pessimism towards just war theories expressed above, and he engages the
problem from the perspective of the actual material conditions that people are faced with
living in the earthly realm. Of course if pacifism were possible in this realm that would
be the morally preferable option, but since we live in a corrupt environment we have to
make our moral judgments from this position. This concern with determining what
morality requires given the inevitability of conflict persists in contemporary just war
theory while today’s pacifists continue to put forward the view that all wars are
necessarily unjust.
Augustine was concerned with whether wars could be fought by true Christians
who were trying to live their lives in accordance with the teachings of Jesus and the
Bible. War is a bloody affair in which soldiers are commissioned to kill their adversaries
and it is not obvious that someone trying to live according to the precepts of Christianity
could voluntarily engage in a pursuit in which he would be killing other people.
However, in spite of the fact that the New Testament has a decidedly pacifist message at
certain points, as is evidenced by the “turn the other cheek” doctrine as well as the often
quoted “all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword,” (Matthew 26:52) there
are also passages that condone violence under certain circumstances. The famous “turn
the other cheek” passage states:
Ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a
tooth: But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man
will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have [thy] cloak
also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.
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Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee
19
turn not thou away. (Matthew 5:38-42)
At other points this seemingly stringent obligation of charity towards one’s enemies is
lifted. The Apostle Paul warns in Romans 13:4, "For [the ruler] is God's minister to you
for good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain. He is God's
minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him that does evil." Augustine interprets these
passages to mean that there is a general rule against shedding blood, but that in extreme
circumstances this prohibition may be lifted without sinning. The circumstances that
Augustine clearly has in mind as exceptions to the commandment “thou shalt not kill” are
political and not personal ones.

By this I mean that Augustine sees the cases of

interpersonal relationships between individuals as being governed by a different set of
laws than those of the political collectivity. As we will see later, Grotius and other
natural law theorists derive the laws governing political bodies from those that apply in
the interpersonal case. It is precisely because we know what is required of us in the
individual case that we can discover the rules that apply to the larger political unit. Not
only do Grotius and Augustine differ on what is required of the individual, they differ on
how to move from the personal to the political in morality. For Augustine, when we are
faced with a violent attacker in an individual case, we are required to give the attacker the
benefit of the doubt and to face the attacker without succumbing to violence ourselves,
even if this would result in our own death. Even in the case of rape, he forbids engaging
in an evil act because the rapist is the one who will be judged for his misdeed. On this
point Augustine states: “since purity is a virtue of the soul, and has for its companion
20

virtue the fortitude which will rather endure all ills than consent to evil.”

He interprets

our duties towards one another as requiring strict adherence to the pacifist teaching to
“turn the other cheek” because God will decide our fate. Grotius, we will see, is far more
permissive with respect to individuals, arguing that we have a natural desire for selfprotection that can be defended with violence in extreme situations, and that the rights of
the political community to self-preservation are derivative of the individual right to self19
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defence. On this view, there is no contradiction between the rights of individuals and
collectivities that needs explaining away.

Augustine explains away the apparent

contradiction between the rules that apply to individuals and political groups in the
following way.
In apparent contradiction with his views on what is required of individuals he
claims that there is still room for justifiable attacks by people on their enemies resulting
in their deaths. There are two exceptional cases in which a person may kill another
without violating “thou shalt not kill” and “turn the other cheek”; these are in the case of
a general rule that permits the use of violence, or a temporary exception granted to one
individual for a specific reason. After explaining how the commandment “thou shalt not
kill” applies to the killing of men and not to the killing of plants or lower animals,
Augustine explains these exceptions. He states:
However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its
own law, that men may not be put to death [for killing another]. These
exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by
a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this
latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword
in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he
deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the
divine command, or in conformity with His laws have represented in
their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this
capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means
21
violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill."
And he goes on to say:
With the exception, then, of these two classes of cases, which are
justified either by a just law that applies generally, or by a special
intimation from God Himself, the fountain of all justice, whoever kills a
22
man, either himself or another, is implicated in the guilt of murder.
So, if God commands a war through his earthly delegate in government those who carry
out the war are not committing murder because they are merely the instruments that God
21
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is using to punish those who may disobey his divine command. While it might seem
strange to think of people as mere instruments doing God’s work, this way of thinking
about instruments is still prevalent today. For example, this type of thinking is especially
prevalent in arguments about the morality of weapons.

23

If a man uses a gun to kill

another, we do not say that it is the gun that is responsible for the death (aside from
metaphorically) so too in the case of God waging a war, we cannot say that the individual
soldiers he commissions are responsible for the deaths that occur in battle because they
are merely instrumental from the perspective of God. There are, of course, relevant
disanalogies between the case of the weapon and the soldier. For one, weapons cannot be
held morally responsible because weapons are not moral agents at any time, even if they
were specifically designed to kill of harm other human beings. When we say that a
soldier is not a responsible moral agent we have to be careful of the nature of the claim
we are making. For the physical weapon what we are saying is that it is a category
mistake to attribute moral blame to this object. In the case of the soldier what we are
saying is that there is a particular action for which the soldier is not morally
blameworthy, not that soldiers are not the kinds of agents who can answer to charges of
moral blame or praise. The notion, however, that a person can be released from moral
blame or praise by the actions of another agent is a fairly uncontroversial one. In the
individual case, if someone coerces me into some morally blameworthy action we usually
hold the person who committed the act of coercion to account, not the one who was
coerced. Of course, reality is much messier than hypothetical situations so it may be the
case that both parties are in some way to blame for the situation at hand, but leaving
complexity aside for the moment, coercion is usually a viable way of removing or
mitigating blame in a moral or legal context.
The example that Augustine asks us to consider is different from one of coercion.
It is different because it depends upon the supposition that the person who performs the
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normally blameworthy action is not an authority on this matter and cannot understand the
workings of the world from God’s point of view. Therefore, whenever God (or God’s
chosen authority on earth) commands something you are required to obey because the
types of judgments that you would normally apply to human action are not necessarily
applicable in this case.

It is an exception that requires the application of a totally

different sphere of thought than we normally employ in our judgments of the world; it
requires the application of faith and not reason. This is the core of the exception to the
rule against killing. In our normal day-to-day relations we use reason and the dictates of
morality to discover what we ought to do. This is why we can never kill another person,
even if that person is attempting to take our own life. If this is what was meant to
happen, then God is behind it and we cannot know what plans He has for us. It is better
to die having refrained from sinning by spilling the blood of another. If, on the other
hand, God commands you to fight in a war you must do so because there is something
more important than what you can discover from your limited mortal perspective going
on. But this in itself is not an answer to the question of why it is that soldiers can go to
war and kill without sinning because it does not reveal God’s purpose for waging war in
the earthly realm.

Next we will investigate Augustine’s metaphysics in order to

understand how God uses death as a way of punishing sinners.
That God can use violence as a punishment for sin is obvious to Augustine owing
to the use of death as a punishment for original sin in the garden. However, in order to
understand how death can be a punishment for sin without totally negating the act of
creation (since death is the opposite of the act of creation) we must look at Augustine’s
understanding of the nature of life and death more carefully. Augustine distinguishes two
types or instances of death that humans can undergo because of our fallen natures. In the
garden prior to the fall man was not subject to the same laws as the rest of the natural
world. The other animals would die and regenerate but man was immortal. As a
punishment for the sin of eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil man had
reduced himself to the level of the beasts and would now die in the manner of the beasts.
However, man was still distinguished from the beasts in that he had a soul. The second
death of this soul could still be avoided if man lived free of sin and according to God’s
law. Augustine explains the two different kinds of death as follows:
24

For if we look at the matter a little more carefully, we shall see that even
when a man dies faithfully and laudably for the truth’s sake, it is still
death he is avoiding. For he submits to some part of death, for the very
purpose of avoiding the whole, and the second and eternal death over and
above. He submits to the separation of soul and body, lest the soul be
separated both from God and from the body, and so the whole first death
be completed, and the second death receive him everlastingly.
Wherefore death is indeed, as I said, good to none while it is being
actually suffered, and while it is subduing the dying power; but it is
meritoriously endured for the sake of retaining or winning what is good.
And regarding what happens after death, it is no absurdity to say that
death is good to the good, and evil to the evil. For the disembodied
spirits of the just are at rest; but those of the wicked suffer punishment
till their bodies rise again, - those of the just to life everlasting, and of the
24
others to death eternal, which is called the second death.
This section clarifies a familiar idea in the metaphysics of death. The death of the body is
inevitable given flawed human nature but the death of the soul is something that can be
avoided if you live the proper kind of life. For Plato for example, this meant gradually
preparing the soul for its departure from the body in death, while for Augustine, it means
living a life free of sin and/or repenting from the sins you have committed so as to be
pardoned by God.

25

Augustine takes pains to argue against the Platonic idea that what

we need to do in this life to achieve immortality is to properly detach the soul from the
body but that is of little concern for us here.

26

Instead, what is still puzzling about

Augustine’s account is that earthly rulers would be in a position to punish those who sin
against God. In order to answer to this worry we will need to examine Augustine’s
account of how wars could potentially be in the service of justice. By understanding how
and why certain people can wage wars justifiably in the earthly realm we will be able to
better understand the nature of Augustine’s claim that “it is therefore with the desire for
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peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike
nature in command and battle.”

27

In order for a war to be just it is commonly held that there must be some political
authority capable of declaring the war and taking responsibility for its consequences.
Without a legitimate political authority in place wars would be indistinguishable from
violent clashes between individuals.

Wars cannot be the resort to violence by two

individuals or groups because violence of this kind would always be sinful due to
Augustine’s commitment to pacifism at the individual level.

28

Having a justifiable war

means that it has to have some features that distinguish it from the unjustifiable resort to
force that would be incompatible with the end of peace. The feature that Augustine
distinguishes as essential in differentiating justifiable wars from other forms of violence
is that justifiable wars are punishment for sin. How exactly this works depends on the
metaphysical view sketched above. Because all men will face the first death as an
inevitable consequence of original sin it is not particularly horrendous when any man
dies. What is terrible is the second death of the eternal damnation of the soul. Therefore,
if people can be redeemed through punishment in this life but it will result in their eternal
salvation it is not a harm but a benefit to them, as was made clear in the passage quoted
above. So those who seek to create peace on earth by making themselves the agents of
God’s will are authorized in using violence because they use it not for their own ambition
but in order to restore God’s place of authority in the world against sin. The following
passage makes the distinction between justified and unjustified political authority, which
then renders the use of force either justified or unjustified:
How much more powerfully do the laws of man’s nature move him to
hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies,
since even wicked men wage war to maintain the peace of their own
circle, and wish that, if possible, all men belonged to them, that all men
and things might serve but one head, and might, either through love or
fear, yield themselves to peace with him! It is thus that pride in its
27
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perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men under Him; but,
instead of His rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals. It
abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust
peace; but it cannot help loving peace of one kind or other. For there is
no vice so clean contrary to nature that it obliterates even the faintest
29
trace of nature.
Faced with the fact that even the sinful seem to desire war for the sake of peace those
who are justified in wielding political power and waging war must be those who have
God’s ends as their own. Augustine goes on as follows:
He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong, and what is wellordered to what is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not
30
worthy to be called peace in comparison with the peace of the just.
Even if a ruler manages to maintain peace for a time among his subjects, if he does not
rule in accordance with God, he is the justifiable object of attack.

It is better to face

attack in this life and for those now subject to unjust (albeit peaceful) rule to be released
and to fall under the rule of God’s agent on earth than to remain ignorant of God’s law.
This leaves open the question of how some men come to have the authority to rule over
others.
For many religious thinkers, God granted political authority to agents on earth.
This is called the “divine right” view of political authority.
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One famous version of the

divine right view was put forward by Robert Filmer in the 17th Century. Filmer argued
that present political authority was passed down through a hereditary line that could be
traced back to the biblical Adam. Locke took the pains to argue against on this point as
follows:
In his preface he [Filmer] tells us, That Adam being Monarch of the
whole World, none of his Posterity had any right to possess any thing,
but by his Grant or Permission, or by Succession from him: Here he
29
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makes two ways of conveyance of any thing Adam stood possessed of,
and those are Grant or Succession. Again he says All Kings either are, or
are to be reputed, the next Heirs to those first Progenitors, who were at
first the Natural Parents of the whole People. There cannot be any
Multitude of Men whatsoever, but that in it, consider’d by itself, there is
one Man amongst them, that in Nature hath a Right to be the King of all
the rest, as being the next Heir to Adam. Here in these places Inheritance
32
is the only way he allows of conveying Monarchical Power to Princes.
Locke goes on to argue that by extending the range of possibilities for the derivation of
monarchical authority from Adam, Filmer undoes his own argument “And he might have
spared the trouble of speaking so much, as he does, up and down of Heirs and
Inheritance, if to make any one properly a King, needs no more but Governing by
Supreme Power, and it matters not by what Means he came by it.”
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Augustine did not

derive political authority directly from Adam in this way. Instead, he conceives of some
forms of authority, such as that of men over women, as “natural”, while political
authority comes about only because we live in an imperfect world. This conception of
the origins of political authority in Augustine does not mesh with some of his later
interpreters who tend to take a far more Aristotelian view of politics as a natural byproduct of man’s social tendencies. This tendency to think of politics as a part of man’s
fundamental nature is the backbone for theories of natural law that would reach their
height in the 17th century.

These ideas find a renaissance in Aquinas, with the

rediscovery of Aristotle in the 13th century, so it is not surprising that he and his
contemporaries viewed Augustine through the lens of Aristotle with a thoroughly
Christian worldview. Disentangling the Augustinian view from his later interpreters will
be informative in understanding the early Christian conception of political authority that
underpins the justified resort to war. The 13th century fusion of Christian views of
authority with a naturalised politics produces a view in which the most powerful rule by
the grace of God for the benefit of those who are ruled without recourse to oppose
mistreatment. Under both the earlier Augustinian view and the later secular natural law
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view put forward by Grotius there is still an avenue open for political dissent because for
Augustine power is not natural and can be abused, and for Grotius authority is natural but
not underpinned by God’s authority.
R. A. Markus interprets Augustine as having developed a conception of political
authority that is at odds with his later 13th Century interpreters, such as Aquinas.
According to Markus, Augustine conceives of political authority as a necessary evil in an
earthly realm characterized by sin, while Aquinas, having been influenced by the then
newly rediscovered works of Aristotle, saw political society as a natural by-product of
man’s nature. To elaborate, Augustine saw man’s natural state as one in which no man
was particularly well suited to ruling over others as all men are equals. Men naturally
rule over women and the rest of the animals and the entire natural world, but since all
men are created in the image of God there is no natural ground for one to rule over others.
Augustine explains that men differ from the rest of the animals before the fall in that they
were never meant to suffer the hardships of life and death and that in spite of their
gregarious nature they were created out of one being, namely Adam:
For as to the other animals, He created some solitary, and naturally
seeking lonely places, - as the eagles, kites, lions, wolves, and such like;
others gregarious, which herd together, and prefer to live in company, as pigeons, starlings, stags, and little fallow deer, and the like: but neither
class did He cause to be propagated from individuals, but called into
being several at once. Man, on the other hand, whose nature was to be a
mean between the angelic and the bestial, He created in such sort that if
he remained in subjection to His Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously
kept His commandments, he should pass into the company of the angels,
and obtain, without the intervention of death, a blessed and endless
immortality; but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and
disobedient use of his free will, he should become subject to death, and
live as the beasts do, - the slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal
34
punishment after death.
However, once fallen, it is a lust for power that makes some men aim to rule over others
and there is a need for political authority because men are everywhere desirous of power.
If some were not in a position to rule over others there would be war at all times. So,
34

Augustine, The City of God, XII:21 p. 405-06.

29

men in their natural, read unfallen, state do not require political leaders because they are
inclined towards peace and do not sin. However, once fallen they are in need of powerful
leaders capable of maintaining the social order upon which they depend. Since God does
not simply abandon man once he is fallen He sees to it that there are such leaders capable
of maintaining the social order. This is obvious through scripture, with God making
many appearances and giving instruction to leaders from the initial covenants with
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to Moses and until he eventually sends his own son Jesus to
spread the word of His teachings. After the biblical period the Holy Spirit works through
men to direct sovereigns in the ways of the Lord, albeit in ways that are not clear to us as
mere mortals. As Augustine recounts, after a long explanation of why the Romans had
such success even though they did not worship the one true God:
These things being so, we do not attribute the power of giving kingdoms
and empires to any save to the true God, who gives happiness in the
kingdom of heaven to the pious alone, but gives kingly power on earth
both to the pious and the impious, as it may please Him, whose good
pleasure is always just. For though we have said something about the
principles which guide His administration, insofar as it has seemed to
Him to explain it, nevertheless it is too much for us, and far surpasses our
strength, to discuss the hidden things of men’s hearts, and by clear
examination to determine the merits of various kingdoms. He, therefore,
who is the one true God, who never leaves the human race without just
judgment and help, give a kingdom to the Romans when He would, and
as great as He would, as He did also to the Assyrians, and even the
Persians, by whom, as their own books testify, only two Gods are
worshipped, the one good and the other evil – to say nothing concerning
the Hebrew people, of whom I have already spoken as much as seemed
necessary, who, as long as they were a kingdom, worshipped none save
35
the true God.
According to Augustine then, we cannot know God’s purpose in giving some success in
ruling and wars. There must be a divine purpose at work that places rulers in their
positions and “thus also the durations of wars are determined by Him as He may see
meet, according to His righteous will, and pleasure, and mercy.”

35
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The logic of the holy war from Augustine’s perspective is top down. There is
only one type of justification for shedding blood in this world, and that is for reasons
related to the eternal realm of existence. In matters related to this world the moral law as
it is laid out in the Bible and the teachings of Jesus apply without exception. Aquinas
elaborates his theory of just war in this top down way as well but he talks explicitly about
the duty of the sovereign in maintaining the peace of his political community.
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We will

see how this logic is completely reversed in the secular conception of the just war. To
foreshadow what is to come: just war theory is formulated in terms of individual human
rights and the rights of nations are an extension of the rights of individuals.

For

Augustine this does not hold. Instead, political leaders have rights that are completely
inconsistent with those of individual citizens because they derive from a special
relationship to God’s authority. Only those leaders who have become good Christians
have legitimate authority over their subjects because they use their power for the benefit
of those being ruled.
Augustine’s account of just cause for going to war depends on the authority of
God. Based on this justification alone there is no reason to adopt any particular position
relative to just conduct in war because knowing that the cause for going to war is a
legitimate one does not tell you how you ought to fight for that just cause. It is consistent
with no rules for conduct in war as well as a fully developed place for jus in bello.
Augustine does lay out a preliminary account of just conduct in war, but one that is
subordinate to and dependent upon his elaboration of jus ad bellum. In spite of the fact
that wars are waged against sinners, and so we might imagine that no rules of correct
action would be necessary to limit the destructiveness of wars waged against the wicked,
Augustine cautions that only a minimal amount of violence be used against the enemy.
Augustine’s principle of proportionality is based on the virtue of charity. We must be
charitable to our neighbours, even in times of war, because all people, regardless of their
actions today, are the creation of God and have within them potential for virtuous action.
Among the sinners it is possible that there are some who deserve to be spared.
Augustine’s own life experience as recounted in his Confessions is a case in point.
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Augustine himself was brought back to the way of God after succumbing to sin earlier in
life so there must be hope for everyone to make this positive change.

38

In the usual

course of things sinners are punished at the final judgment and their actions in the
temporal realm are left outside of Godly intervention. Augustine maintained that the time
he was living in was sharply contrasted from the time of the Old Testament and even
Jesus’ time. The God of the Old Testament intervened directly in the affairs of men in
order to change the course of history. The God of the New Testament sent his only Son
to save humanity. Augustine’s age was one in which God intervened not Himself, nor
through his Son, but through the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit does not act on its own but
through people who have taken up God’s cause in their own lives. As John Mark Mattox
explains:
Augustine [is] prepared to honour seership of the kind evidenced by
Moses as a relic of the distant past – a phenomenon to be acknowledged
as operative in ancient times, but not one operative in [his]. In [his]day,
the sovereign acts as God’s lieutenant on earth. That lieutenant may err
in his judgment, but God’s will concerning the war will be
accomplished, either through the sovereign or in spite of the sovereign.
Whatever the case, all subjects are expected to obey God’s lieutenant in
all matters that are not diametrically opposed to God’s will; and even in
the case that the sovereign’s edicts oppose God’s will, the subject
assumes, at least here on earth, the full burden of responsibility for the
39
consequences of disobedience.
Individuals must live according to the laws set down in the Bible and try to get others to
do the same. Because we are all responsible for our own salvation and the salvation of
those around us we must try to bring those who have strayed from the path of God back
onto it. Sometimes this may require people to use violence against those who sin against
God. The goal that using violence is supposed to achieve is a lasting peace among those
who follow in the true path of God. If everyone were truly living in the light of the one
God, then there would be no wars or violence among neighbours. Because we have not
38

Augustine tells of his indulging in sins that he identifies as “sexual offenses” as well as theft and in spite
of his sins is drawn to the path of God to become one of his most outspoken defenders. See Saint
Augustine, Confessions, trans. Garry Wills (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), Book II p. 27-37.
39

John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War (New York: Continuum International
Publishing Group, 2006), 77.

32

yet reached salvation and we do not live in a perfect realm of peace as in the city of God,
the goal of all those who are living in the temporal realm must be to bring this realm
closer to the achievement of this ideal. Sometimes the only way to bring about this
positive change is to use violence.
There is an unsettled inconsistency in the Augustinian account of the just war that
will be an important focus for those following in his footsteps. Augustine requires that
people live in strict accordance with the principles of pacifism in their personal lives but
that they be ready to shed blood for the sake of punishing sinners in the world.
Moreover, individual soldiers are not seen as carrying the moral guilt for the sin of
shedding the blood of others, and punishment guides what ought to be done to enemy
soldiers. Again, it is consistent with Augustine’s theory that the enemy be punished
because they are sinners, so there is nothing standing in the way of punishing them to the
full extent of what is possible. However, Augustine asks soldiers to behave benevolently
towards those they are attacking so that people are killed only in cases of extreme
necessity. In this way Augustine maintains a distinction between the spheres of jus ad
bellum and jus in bello that will be replicated in the modern just war theory. When
discussing whether it is permissible for soldiers to fight wars in general his concern is
with the reasons for going to war. However, when discussing the killing of any particular
enemy, individual soldiers should temper retribution with charity in the hopes that those
who are now enemies will be converted to the way of God. Hartigan remarks on the
following passages from Augustine:
The Christian soldier should always be prepared to temper the "stern
and lasting necessities" of war with mercy, as Theodosius had done
when he spared the sons of his enemies. Augustine insists that
necessity, not choice, should be the reason for killing an enemy: "Just
as violence is meted out to him who rebels and resists, so mercy is due
him who is defeated or captured, especially where no disturbance of
40
peace is to be feared.” Hence, so long as the Christian kills without
feelings of personal rancour or vengeance he not only does not violate
God's law of charity but in reality obeys that law by participating in an
40
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act of retributive justice, which in Augustine's moral philosophy is an
41
aspect of charity.
Focusing only on the sphere of jus ad bellum at present, there are two possibilities for
understanding the characterization of moral viciousness that would constitute a just cause
in Augustine. Sovereigns could go to war with the purpose of punishing sins against
man. Or, the purpose of going to war could be to punish sins against God. These two
possibilities are not mutually exclusive; it is possible for an action to be both a sin against
man as well as one against God. For example, robbery is prohibited in the bible, and it is
also obviously an affront to the person being stolen from. Not all sins are of this dual
nature. For example, the sin of taking God’s name in vain is not obviously related to a
sin against man. If wars can be undertaken only for the purposes of punishing sins
against man, these are usually easily identified and they do not require a particular
religious authority or scriptural basis in order to understand the act of retaliation. If, on
the other hand, wars can be waged for sins of idolatry and the like, which for Augustine
they can, then the justification for going to war can take on a particular religious
meaning.

For Augustine and other Christian thinkers, wars to punish sinners were

justifiable, and these sins included things that would be justifiable under non-religious
versions of jus ad bellum, such as wars fought in self-defence against an aggressor.
When they have the scriptural basis to back them up all wars can have a religious basis
because the sins against man that would justify defensive resort to war have scriptural
grounding, but they need not be religious in this way. As we will see, the modern just
war theorists abandon the purely religious justifications that have no basis without
scripture in favour of only those justifications that can find a basis in our common
morality. As such, the salvation of the enemy’s souls can no longer be a valid political
objective.
To sum up Augustine’s views relative to just war theory, the following is a list of
the principles that Augustine puts forward with the associated modern terminology. On
the jus ad bellum: wars had to be authorized by a sovereign authority in order to punish
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sinners, whether the sins are those against God or against other men, and disputes should
be resolved by means other than war wherever possible (right authority and last resort).
Furthermore, the balance of the good effects of the war must outweigh the negative costs
of going to war (proportionality 1). On the jus in bello: only the minimal amount of force
necessary to achieve the objective in question ought to be used consistent with the virtue
of charity (proportionality 2). Mercy should be shown to all captives and non-combatants
(discrimination).

42

The reasons for allowing wars in the first place for Augustine, as we

have seen, is because they serve some higher eternal purpose that is beyond the grasp of
individuals. However, the limits on destruction may come as a surprise when the goal is
eternal salvation and punishment of sin. The reason for having a jus in bello at all in
Augustine’s thought is not for the benefit of those who are being fought against (or at
least not primarily so). The reason lies in the possible sins of those carrying out the war
on the side of justice. Because wars have the potential to enliven sins in those carrying
out God’s wars, those doing this work must take pains to remain pious Christians while
simultaneously killing others.

The true Christian is held to the strict standards of

pacifism in his personal life, as we saw earlier, and so as not to stray from the true path he
must not glory in the deaths of those who he kills. The injunction to cause the least
43

destruction possible is to stem the possible tide of sin in those fighting for God.

While

there is a hint of the jus in bello to be elaborated by future theorists, it is always
subsumed to questions of who has the authority to wage wars. As we will see later, the
thrust of jus in bello for later theorists will come from its independence from questions of
authority and just cause.

1.2 Gratian
Gratian was a 12th century canonist who undertook the task of consolidating and
systematizing Christian cannon law. This “Decretum” was such an influential text that it
became the standard text of canon law for the Roman Catholic Church until the 20th
century.
42
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originality of his treatment as in his conscientious montage of texts bearing on problems
44

of Christian morality and Church discipline.”

His texts were commented upon by the

generations of scholars who came after him, notably by the students of the Decretum
called “Decretists” and the commentators on the Decretists, the “Decretalists”.
Gratian, like Augustine before him, walks a fine line between just war theory and
holy war. Gratian’s most succinct statement of the definition of just war theory is stated
45

by Russell as follows: ‘A just war is waged by an authoritative edict to avenge injuries.’

Gratian followed Augustine in emphasizing legitimate authority as a main criterion for
the just war and his major concern in this regard was to limit the resort to war to officials
who would be able to curb the violent inner attitudes of private persons who might
engage in warfare for reasons of vengeance. However, Gratian does not provide an
adequate account of the conditions necessary to satisfy the principle of legitimate
authority across a variety of cases. What is clear is that "Wars should only be undertaken
46

on the command of God or some legitimate imperium.”

This statement does not make

clear how the authority from God is supposed to manifest itself in the world or what other
legitimate authorities look like but what is important about this statement on authority is
that Gratian tacitly “extended divine authority to ecclesiastical authority.”
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Because

Augustine was sceptical of humanity’s ability to wage wars on God’s behalf, or for any
profound positive changes to be achieved in the earthly realm, he did not extend this kind
of authority to ecclesiastical officers. Russell maintains that for Gratian, however:
This extension meant that Christians, as God’s latter-day Chosen People
directed on earth by the Church hierarchy, could legitimately wage war
against its visible enemies; moreover, it transferred the still-inchoate
notion of the just cause to the realm of defense of the faith against its
enemies. Thus the just war became a licit and even laudable form of

44
45
46
47

Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, 8, 55.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 69.
Ibid., 73.

36

Christian aggression, and military service became not merely tolerable
48
but even pleasing to God.
What was particular about Gratian’s treatment of religious reasons for going to war was
that these were positive duties and not merely permissible wars which, in turn, meant that
there were no barriers to what could be done to the enemies of the faith in pursuit of
punishment. While Augustine had emphasized charity and benevolence towards one’s
enemies, Gratian emphasized the persecution of the enemies of the faith, in particular
heretics but also, schismatics, idolaters and infidels. These enemies were guilty of
injuries for which punishment could be exacted, although they must be punished not by
the Church directly but by the secular authority acting at the behest of the Church.
Gratian’s conception leaves room for two versions of theory attaching to two
different kinds of wars. On the first conception he emphasises the avenging of injuries
such as defense against an enemy attack while on the second conception he allows for the
avenging of injuries against the Church by people who had not necessarily taken up arms
against anyone, namely: idolaters, heretics, and other enemies of orthodox Christianity.
At their base both conceptions rested on the same basic principles, authority and the
avenging of injuries, but the interpretations afforded to these principles change depending
on the enemy being faced.
Since there was widespread agreement on the judgement that wars could be
fought to counter enemies of the Church at this historical juncture, Gratian’s followers
took to discussing more controversial topics, such as whether Church officials could
themselves participate in warfare and particularly who had the right to authorize wars
both religious and secular. Gratian’s own opinion on the matter was that Church officials
who held no regalia could themselves participate in wars but that only secular officials
with authority over some jurisdiction could authorize wars.

These wars could be

demanded at the behest of religious leaders but the secular officials would be more or less
bound to carry out the demands depending on the status of the religious official. These
judgements were influential but the most lasting of his judgments on just war theory was
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that authority held the central place of importance in deciding the justice of a war.
Because he is unclear as to what authority amounts to in real terms his followers took to
answering this question.

1.3 The Decretists and Decretalists
Because the Decretists and Decretalists were a diverse group of commentators this
section can only hope to point to some trends that developed over the period of their
writing. Like those who came before them they emphasized the need for proper authority
in order to declare a war. However, in contrast with earlier thinkers they tended to move
towards the identification of particular offices that were imbued with the proper authority
to wage war. For example, Huggucio, one of the later Decretists, explicitly named
princes as the authorities with the legitimacy to declare wars.
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In addition, they required

wars to be declared either by order or permission, adding a more formal institutional
mechanism to the requirement of authority making it more transparent. While the office
of a prince was not one that had a particular institutional pedigree to insure that all
princes were created equal, the mere identification of an office with authority was a move
towards later conceptions that would rest authority in the hands of heads of state in the
modern state system. That this trend was emerging at this time of consolidation of power
that would see the modern state system gradually emerge is not all that surprising. While
there was a gradual shift towards the consolidation of political power throughout the
Empire, this was accomplished with the help of the Church, and at many times the line
between secular and religious authority was blurred. Because many princes also held
religious offices as bishops, saying that princes were the ones who could legitimately
declare wars was not a way of distinguishing secular and religious authority, as we might
be tempted to read back. This conflation of authority posed a number of problems for
Gratian’s followers.
Johnson points to one particularly troublesome point regarding clerical
participation in war. As we saw, Gratian maintained, following Augustine, that religious
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authorities could not participate in wars as shedding blood ran contrary to the spirit of
their offices. However, given the dual nature of many political offices Johnson remarks
that the Decretists were forced to ask:
How could a bishop at one and the same time be able to authorize war
and be defined as a non-combatant? Were men of the Church permitted
to take up arms under any circumstances (say in a holy war against
infidels or heretics), or were they prohibited from all bloodshed by the
50
same definition that made them non-combatants?
These questions were generally answered in an arbitrary way and with the continued
insistence that religious leaders could not engage in warfare themselves, even if they
themselves authored the war in their capacity as secular authorities.
One important outgrowth of the ban on clergy fighting, sometimes referred to as
the Peace of God,

51

was that it separated out a whole category of people from the realm

of fighting and thereby attempted to insulate them from the ravages of warfare. This was
the beginning of thinking about what would later develop into a full-blown account of
non-combatant immunity, which is one of the central notions of jus in bello. While not
fully developed here, the inclusion of certain categories of people into those who should
not be involved in fighting sets certain limits on what can justifiably be done once wars
have started. Gratian included in the category of non-combatants: “clerics, monks, friars,
52

other religious, pilgrims, travelers, merchants, and peasants cultivating the soil.”

Other

categories of people traditionally exempted from wars by the Roman canonists and by the
Chivalric code included: women, children and the elderly, and their lack of explicit
inclusion in the later writings may be owing to their having been generally accepted and
not in need of further treatment.
This attempt to limit the destructiveness of warfare through the inclusion of
certain limits on who can be attacked was more or less useful in practice, as were other
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attempts by Gratian and his followers to limit warfare to certain days of the year (by
excluding Holy days). However, one main reason for the lack of adherence to these
principles was that they applied only to Christian enemies. Once an enemy was an infidel
or a heretic group no consideration of the status of the individuals being fought was
made. Even the use of weapons, otherwise deemed illicit if used on Christian foes, was
permissible in countering a non-Christian enemy. The difference of treatment between
Christian and non-Christian enemies was a symptom of the dual nature of just war theory.
On the one hand you had the Holy war, which had the positive goals of preserving the
Christian faith against its enemies, and on the other the just war, which had limitations to
the immediate goals of repelling and attacker or reclaiming what was wrongfully taken.
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These just wars may have been possible against non-Christians, but it is more than likely
that the just war categories applied to fights between rival Christian princes, while the
Holy war principles applied to wars against non-Christians.
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Holy wars authorized by

God also had the added benefit that those fighting on behalf of their religious cause
would be sure to gain salvation in the afterlife for their sacrifices in war. As Gratian
notes in his Decretals, Canon 9, it was commonly held that:
Having relinquished all fright and terror, do combat with all your strength the
enemies of the holy faith and the adversaries of all religions. For, if anyone of
you dies, the Almighty knows that he dies for the truth of the faith, for the
salvation of the country and the defense of the Christians, and he will therefore
55
obtain celestial reward.
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Because the categories of holy war and just war were not completely distinct but
overlapped the religious and secular reasons for going to war could be entertained at the
same time with all of the arbitrariness in application that we are accustomed to in
political discourse today. Nevertheless, in theory there was a marked difference between
wars fought for the faith and those fought for less lofty goals. For example, when two
Christian princes fought over territory they were at least held to certain standards such as
observing holy days and not fighting during certain periods of the year, such as Lent.
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Against other enemies, these considerations would not apply.
The Decretalists were left with the arbitrariness and inconsistencies of the earlier
Decretists, such as Huggucio, and attempted to clarify the inconsistencies they inherited.
Their main contribution was to assert that only the Pope could declare wars for the
purpose of avenging injuries to the Church, while bishops could initiate wars if they held
some secular office that would allow them to do so on grounds of self-defence or to
avenge an injury.

57

In keeping with this idea that only the highest authority could

legitimately declare a war, the Decretalists maintained that only those secular authorities
with no superior could authorize and declare a war. Contra Augustine however, all
people could act to defend themselves from a violent attack that was ongoing without a
formal declaration being made, but this was not a just war, merely the resort to violence
that every person (including clerics) had the right to when under direct attack. This
distinction marks the difference between public and private forms of violence. Any
person had the right to use violence in the private realm to defend herself against attack,
but only publicly authorized violence was properly called a war. This is one of the first
distinctions that we will see Grotius make with respect to warfare, as the distinction was
not always so clearly marked in the historical literature.
To sum up the view that became dominant in the 13th century: Wars were defined
as the public authorization of violence for the avenging of some injury. Two types of just
cause were recognized; self-defence and the righting of wrongs fall on the just war side,
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while defense of the Church against its enemies and the punishment of sin fall on the holy
war side. Because of the two categories of just cause there were also two types of
authority, the Pope for the holy war and the highest secular authority for the just war.
The overview that I have just sketched of the theory of justice in war that developed from
Augustine through to the Decretalists is the bringing together of a variety of authors who
wrote about justice in war through their encounters with other moral and legal problems.
As we turn to Aquinas we find a much more systematic attempt to deal with warfare than
his predecessors, and although he does not add much to the theory that had not been
stated in some form or another in the past, his approach has the benefit of clarity and
coherence that earlier accounts were lacking.

1.4 Aquinas on the Just War
Aquinas is by far the best known of the Christian thinker to take up the question
of the justice of warfare, but there were a number of other sources that weighed heavily in
these debates in the centuries following his writing. In order to get a firm grip on the
classic doctrine as it was in the 1500s it will be important to understand Aquinas’ role in
synthesizing the centuries of debate that had been ongoing in the Catholic Church since
the time of Augustine. One major difference between Aquinas and those who came
before him was that he had been heavily influenced by the newly rediscovered works of
Aristotle in his treatment of ethics. Owing largely to this fact, Aquinas reinterpreted the
classical doctrines of ethics as they had been handed down from the Church fathers in
light of a highly systematized natural philosophy. Aquinas was far more systematic in his
writing about just war and explicitly mentions three necessary conditions that must
maintain in order for a war to be just; as Johnson summarizes, these are the still central
conditions of: “sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention”.
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On the topic of sovereign authority, Aquinas makes clear that whatever rights an
individual may have to use violence in his own life disappear as soon as there is a
sovereign who has jurisdiction over that individual.
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The influence of the newly

"Just War, as It Was and Is," 16.
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rediscovered works of Aristotle is clearly evident in the naturalization of political
machinery. Aquinas was unique in that he:
Fused the Aristotelian political theory to the traditional Augustinian
outlook of his predecessors. His comprehensive treatment incorporated
such Aristotelian tenets as the naturalness of political authority, the
teleology of communal life, and the superiority of the common good over
59
the good of the individual.
While for Augustine we saw that political authority was a necessary evil in the fallen
world, for Aristotle political authority was a natural by product of man’s sociable nature
combined with his desire to live in peace with his neighbours.
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It is the duty of the

sovereign to make sure that the political order is a realm of peace and the sovereign is the
only one who is legitimated in using force against anyone once he is given power. This
monopoly over the use of force extends both to internal as well as external threats of
violence.
Aquinas elaborates on the three principles necessary for a war to be just as
follows in section 40 of the Summa Theologiae:
1. First, the authority of the prince by whose command war is to be
waged. For it does not pertain to a private person to declare war,
because he can prosecute his right at the tribunal of his superior;
similarly, it does not pertain to a private person to summon the people
together, which must be done in time of war. Rather, since the care of
the commonwealth is entrusted to princes, it pertains to them to
protect the commonwealth of the city or kingdom or province subject
to them...
2. Second, a just cause is required: that is, those against whom war is to
be waged must deserve to have war waged against them because of
some wrongdoing. Hence Augustine says in the book Quaestiones in
heptateuchum: ‘A just war is customarily defined as one which avenges
injuries, as when a nation or state deserves to be punished because it
has neglected either to put right the wrongs done by its people or to
restore what it has unjustly seized.’
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3. Third, it is required that those who wage war should have a righteous
intent: that is, they should intend either to promote a good cause or
avert an evil. Hence Augustine says: ‘Among true worshippers of God,
those wars which are waged not out of greed or cruelty, but with the
object of securing peace by coercing the wicked and helping the good,
61
are regarded as peaceful.’

All three principles: Right authority, just cause and right intention, had already been
expressed in the centuries of literature on the just war. Where Aquinas departs from his
predecessors is in providing a comprehensive doctrine in which all of the explanations for
the principles espoused fit into a wider political framework. For example, while there
was always an emphasis on right authority from Augustine onward, Aquinas is the first to
explicitly state the reason for deferring to sovereign authority in the case of war. His
explanation rests on an understanding of the political community as being a natural way
of meeting the interests of people. However, as opposed to Aristotle’s understanding of
the interests of men, Aquinas clearly has two sets of interests in mind. Aristotle argues
for development of the virtues in the service of living the good life, whereas for Aquinas
the virtues are in the service both of this life but more importantly for the eternal
salvation of the soul. Frederick Copleston explains these “two ends” as follows:
St. Thomas distinguishes two ends, a supernatural end, the consideration
of which he assigns to the theologian, and a natural end, the
consideration of which he assigns to the philosopher. [...]This distinction
if of great importance and it has its repercussion both in morals, where it
is the foundation of the distinction between the natural and the
supernatural virtues, and in politics, where it is the foundation of the
distinction between the ends of the Church and the state and determines
the relations which should exist between the two societies; but it is not a
distinction between two ends which correspond to two mutually
exclusive orders, the one supernatural, the other that of ‘pure nature’: it is
a distinction between two orders of knowledge and activity in the same
62
concrete human being.
Here we see the interrelation of the just war and the holy war in a new way. The natural
goal of the political community are subsumed to its supernatural goals, thereby making it
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imperative that they be sacrificed to the more important goal, just as the individual can
sometimes be sacrificed for the goals of the community. To make this more concrete, the
goal of the lasting peace and justice is of such a great importance that other intermediary
duties, such as the duty not to kill can be waived if the goal is important enough. Russell
reminds us that “Aquinas held that one can do harm to enemies to avoid greater evils or
to support greater goods such as justice, and in the Summa contra Gentiles he viewed
punishment of wickedness as a divinely authorized means of restoring moral order and
concord.”
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This is where just cause and right intention surface in the service of

punishing sin. The sins may be natural ones, such as the sin of having engaged in a
campaign of territorial expansion, but they may be supernatural, as in the failure to
worship the one true God. When sins are committed those who have committed them
may be coerced into being saved, “even against their own wishes.”
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The principle of just cause is lifted directly out of Augustine and, again
according to Johnson, has two possibilities: “recovery of that which has been wrongly
65

taken, and punishment of evil.”

Johnson points out that the most often cited just cause,

self-defence, is not listed in these possibilities but that given the logic of Aquinas’
account this could easily fall under the “punishment of evil”. That self-defence could fall
under punishing evil is not surprising because self-defence would be in the service of
some attack, which would automatically count as a violation of the law of God, as was
mentioned above. That “recovery of that which has been wrongly taken” was listed as a
separate reason though raises the question of why this particular kind of evil should be
singled out. Theft is already covered in the Ten Commandments and so it is obviously an
evil that would fall under those things fit for punishment. Why then do Augustine and
Aquinas following him list “recovery of that which is wrongly taken” as a separate just
cause? One possible answer is that in the context of war the things being recovered may
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not be material things that are normally stolen. In civil matters, property in the form of
land is not the kind of thing that is easily lost to theft. However, in international
relations, often the cause being fought for is land that is under dispute. Aquinas may be
making room for the reclaiming of land that was lost in previous battles so long as those
fighting can show that they have a legitimate claim to the land. If punishing evil were the
only legitimate cause for going to war, then it might be restricted to ongoing evils that
need to be taken care of, as in the case of immediate self-defence. If on the other hand,
“recovery of that which is wrongly taken” is a different kind of condition, then it may
allow for the righting of wrongs that were committed in the past and that would no longer
fall under the heading of evils to be punished.

66

The requirement of right intention for Aquinas is not merely the reinforcing of the
just cause.

It contains both a positive and a negative requirement.

The negative

requirement rules out what is actually wrong in war as described by Augustine in the
Contra Faustum:
What is evil in war? It is not the deaths of some who will soon die anyway. The
desire for harming, the cruelty of avenging, an unruly and implacable
animosity, the rage of rebellion, the lust of domination and the like—these are
67
the things which are to be blamed in war.
On the positive side, the principle of right intention requires that, as Augustine puts it:
68

"We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace."

Beyond having a cause that meets the requirements of punishing evil or restoring what
was wrongly taken, the ultimate goal must not be merely to right the wrong of the
particular moment but to achieve a lasting peace. What this means then is that if this is
not believed to be a possible or likely result of the present struggle, then the war is not
permitted even if there is a just cause that is being pursued for its own sake. It is within
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this definition of right intention that the structure of a jus in bello lies hidden. It is
obscured by the religious thinkers we have considered because, as we have seen, they are
committed to the view that the lasting peace among nations is something that cannot be
achieved by fallen humans and more specifically because the deaths of those who would
be the subjects of the rules of jus in bello do not hold the same value that they do with the
now popular “human rights” standards for all persons.
Jus in bello today requires that wars be fought with a view towards minimizing
destruction and one way that it does this is by looking forward to the end of the war and
considering the position that people will be in once the fighting has stopped. If the true
goal of every war in the present is a lasting peace in the future, then any actions
undertaken today must aim at achieving this peace in the future. It is not by some miracle
that the future will be a peaceful one. The future will be a negotiation between people
who are presently at war. In order to meet the requirement of right intention, those
fighting in the war of today must make it their goal to see their opponents as their friends
tomorrow. Those who die today will not be involved in the eventual discussions that will
lead to the lasting peace but their families and descendants will be and what takes place
today on the battlefield will have a lasting effect on the prospects for making the future
peace possible. There are two possibilities that open up once the goal of war is a lasting
peace. The first is that wars ought to be fought with as little destruction and bloodshed as
possible, and this approach is exemplified in the duels between princes or single battles
that were used to decide the fates of nations. Von Clausewitz begins his famous On War,
69

stating that “War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale” , so the single duel would
be the most restrained form of war. Walzer echoes this idea when discussing the nature
of consent in war, saying:
Some wars are not hell, and it will be best to begin with them. The first and
most obvious example is the competitive struggle of aristocratic young men, a
tournament on a larger scale and with no presiding officer in the stands.
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Examples can be found in Africa, ancient Greece, Japan, and feudal Europe.
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On the other end of the spectrum is the possibility of so completely destroying opposition
that there is no one left to negotiate with. If the enemy is completely wiped out and his
territory taken over there will be no future wars with that particular enemy. In other
words, having a lasting peace as the end that is being aimed at is uninformative as a guide
to action.
Without a clear guide as to what is permissible and impermissible in wars, relying
only on the end goal as a guide to behaviour in a particular instance is unhelpful at best.
What will be argued in the next chapter is that having a clear and specific understanding
of the limits of the permissible in warfare is essential to actually achieving the end of a
more peaceful international political order. Grotius achieves this through a twofold
process of, first, rejecting the religious justifications for war, which as we have seen,
means basing the reasons for going to war on the idea that the violence inflicted is carried
out by God in order to punish sin. Second, he lays out a detailed account of what is
permissible for soldiers fighting in a war, which is essential to limiting destructiveness
but is inconceivable if your system relies on the idea that soldiers fighting on God’s side
will be rewarded while those who fight against God will be punished. In other words, the
Grotius’ ability to elaborate a fully developed jus in bello depended on removing
religiously motivated wars from just war theory.
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2

Grotius and the Modern Secularization of Just War
Theory
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a prominent Dutch jurist whose works were
extremely influential and popular during his lifetime. For two centuries after his death
his political writings were considered essential reading for any scholar. That Grotius is
not currently considered to be required reading is an artefact of the popularity of other
streams of thought but his works have recently made a resurgence in the areas of
international relations and political theory, due to their lasting application to today’s
political situation. This chapter will examine Grotius’ thinking on international politics
and war and hopefully it will become clear why his writings are still pertinent nearly 400
years after his writing. The present chapter aims to show how Grotius articulated his
theory of The Rights of War and Peace through the elaboration of a political and moral
philosophy based on our natural rights as human beings. I hope to compare and contrast
Grotius with the theorists of political rights who came before him, with an emphasis on
the role of the individual in politics. Specifically, I hope to show how his conception of
the individual as a bearer of rights, from which the rights of political groups are derived,
changed the focus of just war theory from one in which the principles of jus ad bellum
have primacy and the principles of jus in bello are secondary concerns, to one in which
the two spheres are held separately and without hierarchical ranking.
In spite of the fact that the state of the international political arena was completely
different at the time that Grotius was writing On the Rights of War and Peace, his work
has had a lasting impression on political thought for a number of reasons. First, Grotius
was one of the first thinkers to conceptualize the rights of political leaders and their
subjects through the lens of a social contract that arises for the benefit of the ruled. Prior
to Grotius, Medieval thinkers relied on the idea that rulers were ordained by God in some
way and that they must rule for the benefit of the people, but the people themselves are
not in a position to judge what is best for them. Grotius conceived of political authority
as a relationship that is based in the relationships that people have prior to the
establishment of political rule. Everyone is in a position to understand the nature of
justice and the rights afforded to citizens through the exercise of reason. This was to
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become a hugely popular way of understanding moral and political relationships between
people, owing to the increasing importance of individual participation in the political
process with the ongoing democratization of politics in Europe and beyond.
The social movements underway in Europe that would shape the 17th century and
define the terms of debate in international relations for the centuries to come were
directly related to the wars that were fought on the basis of religious disagreement. The
violent clashes over religious belief that came with the protestant reformation and
subsequent wars for religion dramatically altered the political landscape. Notably, the
extremely destructive Thirty Years War, which was the longest continuous war in
European history (1618-1648), ended with the Peace of Westphalia and instituted what
we now take for granted as a political order based on the idea of territorial sovereignty.
Grotius was writing On the Rights of War and Peace in the middle of this political
upheaval and was concerned with the ideas that could ground the wars for religion that
were ravaging Europe. It is perhaps unsurprising then that Grotius would be against wars
waged for the purposes of spreading a preferred version of religious doctrine, especially
when the history of such wars was so bloody and it was becoming increasingly difficult
to justify the resort to wars on the basis of some future benefits that they would provide
society.

The Thirty Years War in particular was so devastating, resulting in the

annihilation of approximately half the population of what is now Germany through the
combined effects of battles, food shortages and disease spread by the movement of
troops, that the idea that the later effects of the war would positively outweigh the costs
of fighting were almost impossible to motivate to a population of citizens.
One way to capture the difference between the Grotian position and other versions
of just war theory that we have looked at is to compare the connections between jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. The Christian literature that we have looked at until now
contained the beginnings of a jus in bello but one that was second to and dependent on
the principles of jus ad bellum. Take for example Augustine’s idea that people who are
being fought against must be treated charitably. As we saw in section 1.1, the ideal of
charity is important because the people being fought against have souls that have the
potential of being saved if only they adopt the correct Christian beliefs and practices so
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they matter for their own sake. But, and more importantly perhaps, the ideal of charity is
to be pursued by a just conquering force because the soldiers doing the fighting are
concerned about their own salvation.

Soldiers fighting for a just cause are not

committing murder according to Augustine and his followers because they have just
cause. However, there are still ways in which the just soldier can be condemned for his
actions if, for example, they are done for his own personal gain or are excessive with
regards to the amount of force used.

The principles of this proto jus in bello are

secondary to the principles of jus ad bellum espoused by the medieval thinkers because,
for one thing, just cause determines whether the principles of jus in bello apply to your
side in the conflict. Those who do not have God on their side have no claim to just cause
so they are engaged in condemnable acts of murder and not legitimate killings of people
who deserve to be punished. And second, the more important the cause the better the
likelihood that concerns for enemy populations will be subsumed under the desire to
achieve military objectives with the least amount of harm to your own side. Christian
soldiers were not supposed to engage in acts of plunder when conquering enemy territory
because they were not supposed to gain personally from engaging in a war effort.
However, concerns for the lives of the conquered for their own sake were not really
considered so long as the enemies were sinners.

Wars then were seen as divine

punishment for the sin of not believing in the true God and following the moral code set
71

forth by Him.

Grotius altered the logic of his medieval predecessors by placing jus ad bellum on
an equal footing with jus in bello. In doing so he maintains that the two spheres of just
war theory are to be judged independently. This position takes seriously the possibility
that both sides to a conflict may have a claim to just cause, which in turn means that each
side cannot simply claim that winning the war necessitates violating the otherwise
binding rules of jus in bello. Grotius elaborates his just war theory in the larger context
of a political system that makes individual people the primary units of concern. Before
moving to a discussion of his just war principles I will provide an account of his broader
political system.
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2.1 Grotius on Rights
For Grotius, the rights of states derive from the rights of the individuals that
comprise them. States are simply the aggregation of individuals who have all tacitly or
explicitly given their consent to be ruled by the governing body in question. This
formulation is not new for contemporary theorists familiar with the contractarian
tradition. However, from the point of view of the seventeenth century, the idea that
individuals have certain fundamental rights, and that these rights constrain what the state
may or may not do was a significant departure from a world-view in which state and
religion were inextricably linked.

For centuries prior, the Middle Ages were

characterized by political arrangements in which a state’s religion and its government
were one and the same thing. The authority of the state did not come from the individual
subjects that made it up but rather, from the religious authorization of the person in
charge (usually a prince or king). Grotius’ what we might call “bottom-up” view of
rights can be contrasted with the religious “top-down” model. So in order to explain
what rights a state has we must first pass through an examination of the rights of the
individual. Let us now turn to the question of what grounds an individual’s rights for
Grotius.
Although Grotius does not completely eliminate the role of God in his account of
rights, this role is significantly minimized so as to pave the way for his successors to
proceed towards a system completely devoid of any reliance on the authority of some
supernatural being. For Grotius, God is conceived of as the author of the laws of nature,
to which human beings are subject but this God is not thought of as intervening in the
affairs of humans, at least not in the time after scripture. For example, in laying out his
genealogy of law from human nature to natural law and civil law, Grotius says that the
basic elements of human nature come from the “Author of Nature.”
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(Proleg, §16)

Despite having God as the foundation of his account of human nature in the limited sense
that God created people with certain characteristics, Grotius asserts in the prolegomena to
his On the Rights of War and Peace, that “what we have said [regarding the natural law]
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would still have great weight, even if we were to grant, what we cannot grant without
73

wickedness, that there is no God, or that he bestows no regard on human affairs.”

(Proleg, §11) In other words, everything that Grotius says about human nature could be
said without reference to God.
Grotius maintains that human nature rests on two fundamental things, the desire to
promote our interests (which is common to men and other animals) combined with a
desire to live in society with others. Man is contrasted with the other animals in this
desire to live in society, which is desirable because of its ability to provide a life of
tranquility. As Grotius puts it:
For man is an animal indeed, but an animal of an excellent kind, differing
much more from all other tribes of animals than they differ from one
another, which appears by the evidence of many action peculiar to the
human species. And among these properties which are peculiar to man,
is a desire for society, that is, a desire for a life spent in common with
fellow men, and not merely spent somehow, but spent tranquilly, and in a
74
manner corresponding to the character of his intellect. (Proleg, §6)
This basic desire to live in society coupled with both our innate predispositions for
compassion, and a capacity to use reason and to be guided by general principles in our
decision-making is the “source of natural law”
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according to Grotius. (Proleg, §8) This

conception of human nature gets us a few basic principles of justice that exist even before
we agree to set up institutions for our mutual governance. The basic notion of justice pre
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social contract is: “to leave to another what is his, [and] to give him what we owe.”

(Proleg, §10) So, even before there is any government capable of enforcing our rights
legally we would have the moral duty to respect other people’s bodily integrity, their
right to use the things necessary to maintain their bodies, so called “universal use,” and
those things that fall directly out of these rights. Grotius’ view lies in contrast with the
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later Hobbesian idea that there is no such thing as justice or injustice until there is an
authority in place to enforce these standards of behaviour. As Hobbes makes clear in
Leviathan XIII:
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that
nothing can be unjust. The notions of rights and wrong, justice and
injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is
77
no law: where no law, no injustice.
And following in XIV:
And because the condition of man, is a condition of war of every one
against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own
reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help
unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in
such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one
78
anothers body.
In contrast, for Grotius, because we all share a common human nature, which contains
within it both reason and compassion, we all have basic rights to bodily integrity and
universal use even before there is any way for violators of others’ rights to be punished.
For Grotius morality is the foundation of law and morality exists prior to any social
contract in the state of nature. For Hobbes there is no morality or law prior to the social
contract. On Grotius’ view then we would have a duty to obey the moral law

79

not

because moral laws were ordered by God at Mount Sinai, or because violators will be
punished but because they fall out of our common human nature.
The authority of the laws that we enter into in civil society stems from our mutual
agreement that there ought to be some authority capable of adjudicating between parties
who are subject to the principles of justice derived from the natural law. In other words,
we tacitly agree to follow the laws of the society that we live in because society provides
a mechanism capable of punishing those who would violate our rights under the natural
77
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Going against these moral laws would be against the desire to live peacefully in society because
violating them displays a lack of regard for other people as equal moral agents.
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law. Without this authority we may have a right to bodily integrity and universal use, but
the only thing stopping someone else from violating that right would be each person’s
ability to defend herself from potential violators.

Because we all desire to live in

peaceful society, and to improve our conditions beyond what is possible in the state of
nature, we must be assumed to have agreed to put someone or some group in a position to
80

punish those who violate the conditions for living in this stable and peaceful society.
As such, Grotius maintains that:
Civil Rights were derived from this source, mutual compact. For those who
had joined any community, or put themselves in subjection to any man or men,
those either expressly promised, or from the nature of the case must have been
understood to promise tacitly, that they would conform to that which either the
majority of the community, or those to whom the power was assigned, should
81
determine. (Proleg, §15)

This way of understanding where the authority of political bodies comes from has been
extremely influential. Charles Taylor, for one, puts this idea in the following way:
The underlying idea of moral order stresses the rights and obligations that we
have as individuals in regard to each other, even prior to or outside of the
political bond. Political obligations are seen as an extension or application of
these more fundamental moral ties. Political authority itself is legitimate only
because it was consented to by individuals (the original contract), and this
contract creates binding obligations in virtue of the pre-existing principle that
82
promises ought to be kept.
In moving to the international context the same considerations apply, except that there is
nobody capable of governing above the level of the state.
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The genealogy of international law stems from the aggregation of different
communities who should all recognize the utility of working together for the sake of
maintaining peace. So, just as individuals living in civil society must have come to a tacit
agreement to uphold the laws of their society for mutual benefit, communities must be
thought to have consented to an international legal order capable of maintaining peaceful
relations between political groups. Even though there is no authority with jurisdiction
capable of punishing offenders at the international level, Grotius believes that peoples
will be driven to respect the conditions for their mutual thriving and not fall prey to the
present utility of violating the law to the detriment of future peaceful relations. In other
words, Grotius believes that political groups will recognize that going to war for the
purpose of aggrandizement actually compromises the conditions that are necessary for
future flourishing, and so we will be driven by our nature to avoid conflict.
For as a citizen who violates the Civil Law for the sake of present utility,
destroys that institution in which the perpetual utility of himself and his
posterity is bound up; so too a people which violates the Laws of Nature and
Nations, beats down the bulwark of its own tranquility for future time. And
even if no utility were to arise from the observation of Law, it would be a
point, not of folly, but of wisdom, to which we feel ourselves drawn by
83
nature. (Proleg, §18)
So, the basis for any discussion of just war theory with an aim towards creating a
framework of laws in the international realm is generated out of the account of natural
law based in a particular view of human nature; one in which we strive to meet our
particularly human needs by living together in society, which contains within it both our
basic animal functions as well as our social needs.

2.2 Individual and Collective Rights in War
“War” for Grotius is defined as “the state of persons contending by force”
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(I.1.2.1) and so what he refers to as “public” and “private” wars are both included under
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this definition, even though he recognizes that what we normally mean by war is public
war only. Whether or not there is such a thing as a just war depends on a conception of
rights, as “Right is a moral Quality by which a person is competent to have or to do a
certain thing justly.”
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(I.1.4) So, in deciding whether there is a case of just war what we

ought to look for first is whether there are cases of private war that are just, and then see
whether a case can be made by analogy to public wars.
In trying to decide whether war can ever be just we must first look to the natural
law. According to the natural law, “the first business of each is to preserve himself in the
state of nature; the next to retain what is according to nature, and to reject what is
contrary to it.”
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(I.2.1.1) Grotius maintains that we have certain rights that are

presupposed in the kinds of creatures that we are. Because we are human, we have the
right to preserve our lives and we also have to live in society with others. Setting up a
society with its laws is the best way to satisfy these goals in a stable manner.
In society the authority put in charge upholds certain rights to property.
Originally however, all things were held in common granting people a certain limited
right to those things in his own possession. On this point Grotius asserts:
God gave the human race generally a right to the things of a lower nature, at
the creation, and again, after the deluge. Every thing was common and
undivided, as if all had one patrimony. Hence each man might take for his use
what he would, and consume what he could. Such a universal use was then a
right, as property is now. What each one had taken, another could not take
87
from him by force without wrong. (II.2.2.1)
With the institution of civil society a more robust set of rights to property are granted.
For example, with civil society infants may inherit property, even though they would not
be able to do so by the laws of nature alone, because only rational beings can claim a
right to property in the state of nature. (II.3.6) Because rational beings have a right to
what he calls “universal use” in the state of nature, in that state “there is nothing which is
85
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repugnant to war, indeed all things rather favour it, for the end of war, the preservation of
life and limb, and the retention or acquisition of things useful to life, agrees entirely with
88

that principle.”

By human nature then, if someone challenges my ability to live (tries to

kill me) or the material conditions of my life (tries to steal what I have acquired) I have a
right to defend myself against this attack, as Grotius makes clear in the following
passage:
If the body be menaced by present force with danger of life not
otherwise evitable, war is lawful, even to the slaying of the aggressor, as we
have before said, in proving some private war to be lawful. And this right of
defense arises from the natural right of self-protection, not from the injustice of
fault of another who makes the danger. And therefore this right of selfprotection is not taken away, even if the aggressor be blameless; if, for
instance, he be a soldier acting bona fide, or if he take me for another than I
am, or if he be insane or a sleepwalker, such as we read of: it is sufficient that I
am not bound to suffer what he attempts to inflict; just as if a wild beast were
89
to attack me. (II.1.3)
Grotius is sympathetic to the Attic law that says: “if a man commits robbery by night, and
if anyone kills him, it is justifiable homicide.” (I.3.2.2) The significance of the condition
that the robbery is committed at night and not in the day is twofold. First, “by night”
signifies that you cannot easily know the intent of the burglar in order to be in a position
to judge whether there is actually a threat to your life. And the second signification is
that it will be extremely hard to identify a thief in the night at some further time to be
able to reclaim your goods. (II.1.12.2)
What is important in Grotius’ account of the conditions that justify a resort to war
is that he immediately moves to qualify all justifications of using violence to fend off an
attacker, putting forward the basic principles of a jus in bello immediately following this
argument from self-preservation. Grotius warns that while I may justly kill the aggressor
in order to save myself, I may not kill a third party who is innocent to achieve the same
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result.

90

This may seem puzzling, as Grotius does not base the right to use force on the

assailant’s guilt, so why make the distinction between first and third parties if in both
cases an innocent is to be killed? While Grotius does not consider this puzzle, one
possible response is that my moral responsibility for causing harm rests on what I can
reasonably be expected to know about a given situation. If I believe that someone intends
to take my life, I am justified in using violence to fend off the attacker, even if, upon
further reflection, the person who was “attacking” me was not actually intending to take
my life. However, I know, all things being equal, that the bystander has no intention of
harming me and so cannot be sacrificed to safe my life. In the first case, so long as I
could not have known better at the time I am excused from having made a (terrible)
mistake. In killing the bystander to save myself I have no such excuse. In other words,
my right to self-defence extends only insofar as this is the only way to avert an attacker,
and this attack is either already underway or imminent. If, on the other hand, I have
recourse to any other method to repel a potential attack, I must make use of whatever
other means are possible. So, on our thief in the night example, the night is important
because it limits our recourse to the judicial process, whereas a thief who is easily
recognizable could be stopped and brought to trial. On these point Grotius tells us that:
Present danger is here [for the purposes of self-defence] required, and
imminent in a point of time. I confess that if the aggressor be taking up
weapons, and in such a way that he manifestly does so with the intent to kill,
the deed may be anticipated; for in moral things, as in natural, there is no point
without a certain latitude: but they are in great error who allow any fear
91
[however slight] as a right of killing for prevention. (II.1.5.1)
And, furthermore:
If any one direct against us violence not present; as if he make a
conspiracy, or lay an ambush, or put poison in our way, or assail us with
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a false accusation, false testimony, or iniquitous judgment; I deny that he
may be lawfully slain, if either the danger may be otherwise avoided, or
it be not certain that it cannot be otherwise avoided. For delay allows
recourse to many remedies and many chances; as we say, between the
92
cup and the lip. (II.1.5.2)
So in the first few sections on the causes of war Grotius lays out many of the fundamental
principles of a modern just war theory. Namely, the jus ad bellum principles of moral
equality of combatants, and the just cause of self-defence, as well as the two fundamental
principles of jus in bello: discrimination between legitimate targets and proportionality in
the means used to repel an attacker.
What is especially important, for our argument, is that individual “private” wars
do not depend on a religious authority for their justification. Instead, they depend on a
naturalistic account of what all humans, independent of religious affiliation, must be
thought to need to live their lives. In the state of nature there is a right to war, but this
does not necessarily show that this right carries over into civil society once the power to
punish wrongdoers has been put into the hands of political leaders.
The story continues that men did not remain in the simple state of nature and so
came to develop agriculture,
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which necessitated the division of the land into parcels

appropriate for this purpose, as well as trades and professions useful for the production of
goods made from the resources extracted from the land. So, things became the property
of some to the exclusion of others through an agreement that it was better to have
property than to continue to live the simple life that did not necessitate it. Grotius tells us
that:
By a certain pact, either express, as by division, or tacit, as by occupation. For
as soon as community was given up, and while division was not instituted, it

92

Ibid.

93

The development of agriculture may be a necessary condition for the establishment of property and then
the state, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition, as Benoît Dubreuil makes clear in his: Benoît
Dubreuil, Human Evolution and the Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 194-95.

60

must be supposed to have been a matter of agreement among all, that what
94
each had occupied he should have as his own. (II.2.2.5)
Many rights follow from the right to property, including the right to exclude others from
hunting on your land but as with self-defence against an attacker the right to property is
limited in cases of necessity. Grotius remarks that a person who is in great peril may use
the property of another to keep himself alive (as a sailor using a dock that is not his own
during a storm) and that people may not be denied harmless use of property (as when they
pass over your land or drink water from a stream running through your
95

property). (II.2.12) The right to use another’s property in self-defence is a special case of
the right to self-defence and as with the case of defense against an attacker it too extends
to the international realm of warfare. Grotius maintains that an army may occupy the
land of a neutral third party in a case of extreme necessity so long as it pays damages for
any loss that occurs as a result. So:
Hence we may collect how he who carries on a righteous war may
lawfully seize a place situate in a land which is not at war, namely, if
there be a danger, not imaginary, but certain, that the enemy will seize
that place and thence do irreparable damage and next, on condition that
96
nothing be taken which is not necessary for this purpose of caution.
(II.2.10)
This passage introduces a requirement of proportionality as well as discrimination in the
particular actions undertaken by troops acting on the ground. Because property rights are
contingent on their usefulness for preserving life and improving the conditions of that life,
property rights may be overridden in cases where it would not make sense to preserve that
property at the expense of life. Proportionality provides the guiding line for determining
which violations of property rights are allowable once the condition of necessity is in
place. And since in this example the people whose property rights are being violated are
not parties to the war they must be thought of as immune from violent attack. The
structure of the scenario is such that once you have a situation of necessity this does not
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create a rights-free-zone. Instead it creates a zone in which specific sets of principles
apply that would not normally apply. Proportionality in this context is a jus in bello
principle because it constrains the actions of soldiers and commanders once they are
already in the situation of war. Discrimination says that we treat people differently
depending on their status within the war. The third party citizens in this example are the
ones who are to benefit from their territory being taken over by a righteous ally, so they
are not the proper targets of attack, even if it would be more expedient to attack them to
secure the position.
A second jus ad bellum principle that is implicit in the discussion of property right
in war is right intention. Right intention requires that for an action to be just it must not
only be done in external compliance with the requirements of just cause, it must also be
done with the intention of actually achieving the permissible end in question and not for
some other self-interested aim. Hence, the emphasis on he who carries out a “righteous”
war, for in the following sentences it is clear that the seizure of the land must be for the
protection of the inhabitants and not for some other secondary goal such as territorial
expansion. Reading on, we learn that the land may be occupied but that it must remain in
the control of the original owners for all purposes external to the war effort.
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(II.2.10)

That Grotius makes reference here to those carrying out a righteous war may be
interpreted so as to make the conditions of jus in bello only applicable to those fighting on
the side of justice, or those with just cause in the war. However, given that Grotius goes
on to state that what it means to be righteous in this example is to seek to preserve the
lives of third parties it need not be interpreted in this way.
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(II.2.10) A more consistent

reading would be to say that it is possible to behave righteously in war regardless of
whether just cause in the war can be attributed to the party. So, an unjust enemy,
meaning one without just cause to go to war, may nevertheless conform to the jus in bello
requirement to do as little damage as possible to property once at war. This reading
concords with the way Grotius argues for the division between the various spheres of law.
I will have more to say about this later in this chapter, but for now what is important is
97
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that the principles of jus ad bellum seem to mirror Civil Laws, while the jus in bello
principles mirror the Natural Law. That is not to say that the principles themselves are
natural or civil laws themselves, merely, that the principles of the jus in bello seem to
hold whether or not the jus ad bellum principles are met. As such it may be helpful to
think of them as being prior to the jus ad bellum principles in line with Grotius’ historical
metaphor regarding the natural condition of man in the state of nature.
The structural difference between the individual and collective cases makes a
difference to the content of the right, but not the basis for the right. So, if individuals
have a right to self-preservation, then political communities must have a similar right to
defend their members against unjust attack, even if they may have further obligations,
such as declaring war, that individuals do not have. In fact, in the case of a political
community, it would appear that the requirement that they defend their members is even
stronger than in the individual case of self-defence. The reason for this is as follows. In
the case of an individual being unjustly attacked, that person may willingly give up his
life, however, in a case of a guardian who has agreed to take care of a charge, the act of
defence of the other is no longer optional, or merely allowed, it is required by the terms
of the contract.
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In like manner, the state is responsible for the tranquility of the lives of

its citizens and would be acting unjustly if it were to ignore its duty to protect them in the
event of an attack. This is the limit of the state’s duty to protect its citizens, as just war
requires that the act of aggression be resorted to only in the case of an attack already
underway or imminent. In addition, the jus ad bellum requirement that we must have a
reasonable chance of success when entering any war fits into the broader requirement that
states are required to take into account when considering going to war. All of the
principles of jus ad bellum are derived from the collective nature of public wars
combined with their natural law justifications. As we saw above, an individual may
choose to sacrifice himself, or to fight an aggressor even if he has no chance of
succeeding in fending off attack. However, in the collective case, it is incumbent upon
leaders to take into consideration the lives that will be lost in a vain war effort. If there is
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no chance of success, then some cases may require surrender on the basis of a utility
calculus. Fighting to the last man may appear to be the right thing to do, but it may
simply be folly or pride that leads to the adoption of this position and not defence of
human life, which lies at the heart of just war theory.
A third principle of jus ad bellum can be derived from Grotius’ discussion of
property rights, namely, “reasonable hope of success”.

In the example above of

occupation of a foreign third party to a conflict, this right of necessity would surely not
hold if there were no reasonable hope of the protecting forces succeeding in fending off
the imminent attack.

In other words, there is a jus ad bellum requirement of

proportionality that comes prior to specific calculations of utility once a battle is
underway. Since the recovery of property is supposed to mend a previous injustice that
resulted from its being wrongly taken, engaging in an effort that is likely to fail even
before it is begun does nothing to right the wrong, it simply causes more damage on top
of the wrong already committed of stealing the property.
That Grotius entertains the idea that both parties in a war could be acting from a
just cause is unique for the time of his writing. While he does not explicitly endorse the
view that this is possible the mere identification of this as a possibility is telling of his
commitment to judging parties to a war or dispute on the actions that they take in trying
to resolve their dispute.
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(II.16.13.2) The focus of his writing is clearly on the details of

what it means to act justly and according to law and not on the abstract conditions that
render one’s cause just. Readers of Book II will notice the discrepancy in the time and
energy directed to questions of the background conditions necessary for justice to obtain
compared to the detailed account of lawful action in acquisition, contract, exchange,
inheritance, etc. Whether initial conditions were just with respect to first acquisition of
property is not really important. What is important is that there are conditions under
which it could have been just and now we are held to acting morally in the situation that
we find ourselves in.
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The final just cause of war that Grotius identifies is the right to punish
wrongdoing.

In line with his arguments for the other just causes, self-defence and

retrieval of property, punishing wrongdoing is understood in terms of righting particular
wrongs that cannot be stopped except by the resort to violence. However, the right to
punish wrongdoing differs from the rights to self-defence and retrieval of property
because, as he points out, either a) the wrongs that are being punished have already been
committed and the punishment does not serve the purpose of securing peace in the future
and/or b) the party carrying out the punishment is not the one that is being harmed. The
category of punishing wrongdoing is explicitly contrasted with revenge and Grotius takes
great pains to argue against those who would justify the resort to war on the grounds of
vengeance.

At Book II: XX, Grotius compares punishing a wrongful act already

committed in order to prevent future misdeeds and deterrence of others who may be
tempted into engaging in similar criminal acts.
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Grotius condemns revenge on the

grounds that it belongs to a past and more imperfect time. Grotius maintains that those
who seek to exact revenge against their enemies do not take seriously that God is the
ultimate judge of the actions of men on earth and that it is not within the rights of men to
punish those who have transgressed against the law in the past. If we have reason to
believe that the one who did wrong may harm again in the near future he may be detained
in order that this wrong be avoided but if there are any signs of repentance then the
former enemy must be given the benefit of doubt. As Grotius argues:
But what are we to say of revenge, as it respects, not the past, but
protection for the future? Here also Christ enjoins us to forgive, if he
who has injured us shews any signs of penitence; [see the passages,] in
which he speaks of a plenary remission of injury, which may restore the
offender to his former place in our good will, whence it appears that
nothing is to be required of him in the way of punishment. And even if
signs of such penitence be wanting, we are not to take it too severely, as
the precept, of giving our coat also, shews. ... But if such forbearance
bring great peril, we are to be content with such precaution as shall do
102
the least harm to the offender. (II.20.10.6-7)
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The case of punishment of wrongdoing does not seem to occupy a central role in Grotius’
program of just war theory, yet it serves to point out an important difference between
himself and his predecessors, as well as to emphasize proportionality in dealing with
threats once again. While the authors that Grotius quotes in this section allowed for
vengeance to play a role in justifying the resort to war Grotius takes pains to argue against
this historical residue from a certain type of reading of Biblical texts. He emphasises that
while other commentators may have pointed to instances of justified vengeance in the Old
Testament, we must see ourselves as living in a time where the Divine Law demands
more of us than what was asked of previous generations before the reign of Christ. More
on this Divine Law category later in the chapter.
Punishment of wrongdoing still has a place in Grotius’ just war theory, but it is
one that is greatly reduced to what we might think of today as extreme breaches of human
rights. It is important to note here that Grotius maintains a right to go to war in order to
punish wrongdoing and also that he is cognizant that allowing this just cause of war opens
his theory up to potential misinterpretation leading to the use of just war theory to further
self-serving ends. The type of wrongdoing that Grotius has in mind as punishable by war
is what he calls a “sin against nature”.
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(II.20.40.4) Sins against nature are distinguished

from sins against God and punishments cannot be inflicted against other nations for
violations of the civil laws that are not instituted in that territory but that apply in yours.
Sins against nature can only be punished if they are so grave that there is no doubt as to
their injustice. In Grotius’ words: “war undertaken on the ground of punishment, must be
very suspected, except the crimes are very atrocious and very manifest.”

104

(II.20.43.3)

They are very atrocious and very manifest when there is no doubt that they are violations
of the law of nature. As we have seen, the law of nature applies even in the state of
nature before we enter the civil condition and we gain the formal right to property. When
a people is being so clearly abused that even their natural rights are being violated it is an
insult to the humanity of those being violated to do nothing to help them. Grotius cites
Seneca and agrees with his assertion that “though he does not do any harm to my country,
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yet such depravity cuts him off [from the tie of humanity]:”

(II.20.40.3) and so they

should be punished with war. The examples of sins against nature that Grotius believes to
merit punishment by outsiders include: tyranny, killing strangers, cannibalism and
piracy.

106

(II.20.40.3)

Grotius’ inclusion of punishment as a just cause reintroduces the ideologically
driven wars back into his program, albeit with a reduced emphasis compared with the
justifications from self-defence and retrieval of property.

Whether or not we find

Grotius’ argument as to why these punitive wars are justifiable persuasive there is still
something to be said for the fact that Grotius at least attempts to make the basis for
punitive wars universal. Compared with the religious thinkers who came before him, all
people, not only Christians, can and must recognize the human rights abuses that are
punishable by war. However, the inclusion of punishment as a just cause is not without
its problems. Richard Tuck, for example, argues that Grotius’ list of atrocities that can be
punished with warfare neatly justified wars by Europeans against indigenous peoples
around the world in order to annex territory.
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We can, perhaps, differentiate between

the theory as Grotius presents it and the use the theory was put to, but we may have
further theoretical reasons for disagreeing with this part of his jus ad bellum. Grotius
presents a list of abuses and historical incidents of peoples responsible for carrying out
atrocities that he thinks others were justified in punishing. We may disagree in principle
with the categories of abuses that he thinks justify punishment, with the historical
examples that contribute evidence towards his categories, or more importantly, we may
take issue with the entire idea that others can punish abuses to which they themselves are
not subject. Kant, as we will see in later chapters, takes issue with the idea that outsiders
have a right to punish people who are not part of your political community unless they
have failed to maintain what he calls the “civil condition”. He might, therefore, agree
with Grotius that tyrannical rulers who abuse their subjects can be attacked for the benefit
105
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of creating the conditions necessary for rule of law to be maintained, but even this
minimal goal is best achieved internally than with the help of outsiders. Kant, like Tuck,
was worried that the principles of just war theory as they were presented by Grotius and
others, were liable to be used as a smokescreen for territorial expansion and other abuses
by powerful nations. We will return to this tension between the principles of just war
theory and abuses of the theory in later chapters. For our present purposes I will present
Grotius’ principles in the most charitable way possible, ignoring for now whether they are
likely to be abused.
To summarize, the principles of just war theory that Grotius develops are as
follows and they can be divided into two broad categories:
Jus ad bellum:
1. Just Cause:
a. Self-Defense
b. Retrieval of Property
c. Punishment of Wrongdoing
2. Right Intention
3. Reasonable Hope of Success
4. Proportionality

Jus in bello:
1. Proportionality
2. Discrimination

What I hope to show in the next section is that Grotius’ important contribution to just war
theory was that he made jus in bello independent of jus ad bellum in a way that would
have profound implications for the future of just war theory and the kinds of policies that
would be developed to counter the destructiveness of war.

2.3 Grotius on the Independence of jus in bello
In making jus ad bellum independent of jus in bello, James Turner Johnson
argues, Grotius and his contemporaries achieved two very important results for just war
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theory. First, jus ad bellum could now admit the possible moral equality between two
sides in a conflict. Since one side is no longer authorized to engage in warfare by God,
because this is not the way that God intervenes in the world, it is theoretically possible for
both sides in a conflict to be acting justly, or for both to be acting unjustly (with the
potential that one side is in the right and the other in the wrong still remaining). For
example, two nations could go to war over a territory that belongs to neither side. In this
case, both sides are acting with the purpose of aggrandizement and are acting unjustly.
On the other hand, the possibility remains that one nation attacks another and the latter
act in self-defence justly. However, when one side claims to be acting on the command
of God, there is no theoretical space for the other side to be acting justly in self-defence,
or for both sides to be in the wrong. Johnson notes that Augustine’s statement that “that
kind of war is undoubtedly just which God himself ordains” and God would never ordain
a war for his behalf on both sides of the same conflict was often cited by religious
thinkers in the Middle Ages.
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The second result of secularizing just war theory is a significant strengthening of
jus in bello (the rights in war).

Turner points out that the moral equality of combatants

on both sides of a struggle leads to the recognition that strong rules of engagement need
to be put forward to protect the innocent from attack. The two principles of jus in bello
that gain their full expression in Grotius’ writings are discrimination and proportionality.
Discrimination, as we saw in the introduction, says that there are certain permissible and
impermissible targets in war while proportionality aims to mitigate the amount of
violence permitted even against legitimate targets. As Thomas Hurka explains, “there is
controversy about exactly who these [legitimate targets] are, but the traditional view is
that deadly force may be directed only at combatants, including soldiers and munitions
factory workers, but not at non-combatants.”
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So, for example, targeting civilian
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populations is not permissible, but even if you are targeting a legitimate military target,
like a munitions factory, there are things that are banned by the further condition of
proportionality.

This condition would, for example, allow the targeted bombing of a

vital munitions factory even if that will unavoidably kill a few civilians, but forbids
killing thousands of civilians as a side effect of achieving some trivial military goal.
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If you are fighting a war on God’s behalf in order to punish non-believers, then
reasons for considering the moral value of the enemy and to obey rules of engagement
meant to spare lives on the side of the adversary may be diminished in order to guarantee
a future lasting peace. If on the other hand, the enemy’s citizens are being fought against
because of some act of aggression perpetrated against you, there are reasons to consider
the non-military populations of that state to be outside the sphere of possible targets.
They have equal moral standing and have not sacrificed their right not to be targeted with
violence as those who bear arms have. The raison d’être of just war theory, from at least
Augustine on, was to establish a lasting peace between those who are now in conflict, and
so it becomes important to have an appreciation for rules of engagement in order to
promote peace in the future. How exactly this result is achieved is of central importance
to which practical solutions get advanced. As we saw in chapter 1, for Augustine and
Aquinas the future lasting peace is achieved by bringing those who are outside the grace
of God into the fold. For Augustine in particular, this world is one of violence and sin,
whereas the world as governed by the one true God is one of peace and tranquility. This
is the central distinction between the two cities in City of God. So, even though it is
impossible for the fallen world to be completely redeemed until the second coming, it is
incumbent upon the followers of Christ to attempt to bring about the conditions necessary
for the lasting peace to occur. In order to do this, people must strive to live their lives
according to the teachings of Christ. But, as we saw, there is a potential disagreement
between this goal and the goal of punishing sinners in the world. To get around this
problem Augustine admits the possibility that God uses people to punish others in this
world. What this allows for in the abstract is the potential for the ends to justify the
means in just war thinking. In other words, when evaluating the morality of war, what
110
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we care about is the end result. Do we have a situation in which sinners were punished?
Did the good guys win? The alternative approach that is present in Grotius and his
followers reverses this logic. Instead of looking at the totality of results after the war is
over, what we have to evaluate is whether or not the actions that are being planned are in
line with morality and this morality is measured according to standards of shared human
rights.
Grotius answers the question, ‘what is permissible in war?’ with a detailed
account of the principles of jus in bello. (III.11) He concludes that even for those with a
just cause restraint must be used against one’s enemies. The familiar principles of
discrimination between combatants and non-combatants as well as proportionality are
expressed.

111

In addition to right conduct in war Grotius ties the duties of jus in bello to
112

the requirements of jus post bellum, or the justice in the termination of wars.

Grotius

maintains that it is much easier to acquire a foreign government by force than it is to
properly rule over newly conquered people. Following Plutarch, he asserts that “ordering
a great government is a greater work than acquiring it.”

113

(III.15.7.1) For this reason

measures must be taken to ensure a smooth transition between the conditions of war and
peace. Grotius judges that the best way to ensure a lasting peace is to respect the
principles of jus in bello when conducting a war and to always keep in mind that the goal
of the current war is a lasting future peace. He urges even those conducting a just war to
use clemency against their enemies especially in the termination of wars. Grotius cites
several authors on this point, Hermocratus: “The glorious thing is, not to conquer, but to
use victory clemently,” Tacitus: “Those endings of war are to be admired which are
brought about by granting pardon,” and Cesar: Be this a new way of conquering; to
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protect ourselves with mercy and liberality.”

114

(III.15.12.2) The liberality that Grotius

recommends is specifically, to leave the people to rule themselves whenever possible and
to allow them to continue to practice their religions freely.
The emphasis that Grotius places on conducting war justly through the elaboration
of the principles of jus in bello marks a contrast with earlier ways of thinking. As
Johnson remarks:
It is the work of Grotius and his successors, then, to provide after the
holocaust of a hundred years of religious war that shattered the unity of
Europe a new basis for conceiving that unity, along with a new basis in
115
custom and mutual self-interest for mitigating the harshness of war.
This new basis for understanding just war was in the rejection of the crusade on God’s
behalf as a possibly just war, and this new synthesized just war theory, which took into
account different traditions of thinking about just war, would come to have significance
for all peoples, whether Christian or not, in how they would engage in warfare in the
field.

2.4 Just War and Holy War Contrasted
Just war, as we have seen Grotius argue, is based on a right to self-defence, the
defence of others and punishing transgressions against human rights. Holy war, as it was
developed by the authors we saw in chapter 2, is justified on grounds of punishing
transgressions against divine law or doing God’s bidding. Both the holy war and the just
war are motivated by the possibility of a future lasting peace between people in the future
of this temporal realm. However, from the standpoint of religion there is a further
purpose beyond a temporal peace, the purpose of fighting against idolaters is to make
them recognize the error of their ways so that they will adopt the true religion and be
saved at the final judgement. The intermediary goal of a peaceful temporal realm may
114
115
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also be aimed at, meaning, that it is consistent with the religious approach to strive for
peaceful relations between peoples now, but the ultimate goal is always in the spiritual
realm. Because peace in the temporal realm is consistent with the religious approach it
should not be surprising that there is overlap between religious and just war principles.
All holy wars are necessarily just from the standpoint of religious thinkers but not all just
wars are holy wars, providing room for overlap between justifications advocated by
proponents of holy war and just war. For example, in the Middle Ages, the following list
of 11 causes for which one may justifiably go to war was common, according to
116

Johnson:

1. If a province blasphemes God by the cult of idols;
2. If it departs from the worship of God;
3. If it ceases to be faithful to its temporal lord;
4. If it rebels against its sovereign;
5. If it defends evildoers;
6. If it is guilty of an injury to a prince or his legate.
7. A prince may make war to free himself from an unjust tribute;
8. In order to deliver a friendly or allied nation from its enemies;
9. To recover the freedom of its subjects;
10. To recover the integrity of his kingdom.
11. A war against one who aids an enemy may also be declared a strong duty.117

The above list shows that even religious thinkers allowed for the legitimacy of some wars
fought for reasons that go beyond religious justification.

Out of these 11, those

pertaining to the rights of princes, or secular authority, are those that are associated with
the modern conception of the just war, specifically those dealing with defence of subjects
and allies, while the first two are clearly religious in nature. The third condition is not
grounds for going to war on a secular conception, as independent temporal lords are not
seen as responsible for actions undertaken in other independent territories. However, this
116
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justification does make sense on the religious view that temporal authorities are granted
their status by God. So, if a community ceases to be faithful to its (true?) temporal lord,
then they must be seen to be rebelling against God as the authority legitimating the
temporal leader.
Johnson argues in his Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, that the
abandonment of the religious justifications for going to war led to different emphases in
just war thinking as compared to holy war thinking. While secular just war theory from
Grotius onward emphasized limiting the destructiveness of war through the development
of a robust jus in bello, religious thinkers were much more concerned with who had the
authority to authorize wars and whether Christians could go to war without sinning
against God. Johnson’s observation of the historical trend that occurred in the Middle
Ages among religious thinkers is not one based on necessity. Instead, it could have been
the case that religious thinkers would have been drawn to develop a robust jus in bello
taking off from Augustine’s emphasis on the charity that we owe our adversaries as good
Christians. However, what happened in practice was that religious thinkers coming after
Thomas Aquinas emphasised the moral inequality of the two sides in a religious conflict.
In the case of two sides in a conflict where the rules of engagement are only thought to be
applicable to one side in the conflict, it becomes very difficult to gain any traction against
the enemy. If the Christian side of a religious conflict being fought for the true religion is
held to a higher moral standard than the idolatrous enemy, it would be very difficult to
fight against the immoral enemy. Since the non-Christian group has already proven their
disregard for the moral law by shunning the true religion, how could they be trusted to
follow any of the rules of engagement? With the secular just war, all combatants on
either side of a conflict are held to the same moral standards based on their common
human nature. In other words, the moral standard that you are held to does not depend on
your religious belief, but instead on your social and rational nature. On the religious
basis for morality, non-Christians would not be trustworthy moral agents and so any rules
of engagement that sought to limit what is permissible in war, once the war has already
begun, would hold sway with only those who are held to the moral law. It is not
surprising then that a religious framework that emphasises the moral inequality of
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enemies was not the one to develop a robust jus in bello with the aim of limiting the
destructiveness of wars once they are underway.
Once the moral equality of combatants is a central feature of just war thinking it is
possible to envision a jus in bello that binds all parties to a conflict equally.

In

contemporary just war thinking there has been a renewed trend of emphasising the moral
inequality of combatants and challenging of the traditional separations between jus ad
bellum and jus in bello. For example, authors like Jeff McMahan have recently argued
that only those who are fighting on the side of justice have a legitimate right to selfdefence and that those who are on the aggressor side cannot legitimately target even the
army on the other side.

118

This position does not entail that each individual of either

side of a conflict is not a moral agent of equal standing, what it does mean is that these
individuals will be judged differently for having done the same action; namely, targeting
the other side’s military service people and munitions installations. If I am on the side of
justice and I kill enemy combatants I will not face punishment at the end of the war, if I
happen to be on the unjust side then this same action will be judged unjust and I will face
consequences for having performed that attack. The traditional account of jus in bello
does not typically judge these cases differently. Instead writers like Grotius and more
contemporary thinkers like Walzer and Hurka (along with many others), make a
distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate uses of violence, so that the opposing
army’s soldiers constitute a legitimate target, while civilians on either side are considered
off limits.
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Just how far these categories extend has fuelled countless debates, for

example, whether munitions factory workers are legitimate targets is questioned. But the
basic idea that the soldiers on either side of a conflict are legitimate targets has remained
a popular position.
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equality of combatants so that one side of a conflict is held to a different standard than the
other does nothing to promote the rationale of just war theory, which we have already
said, is to limit the resort to and destructiveness of wars through the application of its
principles. Although saying that one side in a conflict is not legitimated in attacking the
adversary may seem to limit the destructiveness of wars, there is little practical reason to
think that this will ever happen. What is most likely is that parties on the ‘just’ side of
the conflict will be allowed to fight, while those on the ‘unjust’ side are doomed to either
be killed or tried as criminals under international laws against war crimes. Given the
difficulty of figuring out whether wars are just in the first place, leaving the decision to
individual soldiers who face severe disciplinary measures in the case that they refuse to
carry out their orders seems to lay the responsibility for the war in the wrong hands.
Maintaining the moral equality of combatants allows for a jus in bello in which both sides
are held to the same standards and it also places the blame for the resort to war in the
right hands, in the hands of the politicians who authorized the war in the first place. On
this view, consistent with Grotius` just war theory but not the holy war theory, individual
soldiers are responsible for the actions that they undertake to perform freely, while the
political leaders are responsible for injustice if they authorize injustice.
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Some would argue that Grotius does not have the tools necessary to allow for the
true moral equality of combatants, given that his account does rest on a conception of
morality that is ultimately based in religion. Numerous passages seem to suggest that
Christians are held to the standards to the divine law, while others are merely held to the
standards of natural law. If this is the case, then perhaps the case for the moral equality
of combatants with differing religious affiliations has been overstated in this section. The
following section will aim to give an account of divine law that is entirely consistent with
the moral equality of combatants (and all people) because it is rooted in the natural law
and not distinct from it.
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2.5 Natural and Divine Law
In putting forward his vision of the natural law, many scholars have argued that
Grotius departed from religious thinkers who based morality on divine revelation and
instead rooted morality in a secular conception of human nature. However, the story that
Grotius tells is a bit more complicated and nuanced than this account allows for.

For

example, in reading On the Rights of War and Peace, it is immediately obvious that
Grotius takes scripture seriously and thinks that scripture is an important moral guide, so
to say that his is a theory divorced from religion would be a stretch. The story that
Grotius tells us about human nature and the basis for morality is one that can be told
without reference to God, but only up to a point. Eventually the basis for human morality
still lies with God, as the creator and maintainer of human mature.

This point is

emphasized by Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, who argue that Grotius` secularity has
been overstated in the literature.122 They try to show how, in spite of the fact that the
natural law does not need reference to God to get off the ground, in the end, Grotius is a
profoundly religious thinker whose views are entirely consistent with the Christian God.
This is no doubt right, however, the way that Grotius goes about laying the foundations
for the natural law is still in sharp opposition to the way that religious thinkers previously
laid the basis for morality. Instead of having a God-centered approach in which the
moral laws enumerated in scripture are followed for fear of eternal damnation, the moral
law follows from consideration of the nature of the beings to whom morality applies. It
may be the case that God is the supreme author of this law, but it does not follow from
that fact that only some of humanity who are believers are held to the standards of the
moral law. In the traditional religious interpretation of the foundation of morality it
makes perfect sense to be wary of those who have not accepted the Christian God as
saviour, as they cannot be trusted to have the requisite fear of damnation in their hearts
that is thought to be necessary to stimulate conformity with the moral law. However, on
Grotius` view, the element of belief in God has been removed as a necessary condition
for conformity to the moral law. For Grotius, all humans are subject to the moral law,
whether they believe in God or not and they will hold themselves to the standards of the
122
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law because they realize it is to their mutual benefit and not because they fear punishment
at the final judgement. There is no reason to fear that non-Christians will thwart the
moral law, as its basis is located in our common human nature and not in faith. The
divine law that is given in scripture is entirely consistent with the natural law in Grotius`
system, so there is no need to fear that non-Christians will not be held to similar moral
standards to Christians.123 On this reading of the grounds of morality it makes sense to
call Grotius a religious man, but to contrast his belief in revelation from the theoretical
underpinnings of his theory of morality and law. They might be seen as two routes
towards the same conclusions regarding morality, but they have importantly different
foundations. The divine law may be more demanding on Christians but what does this
mean for morality? As we have seen, morality remains the same irrespective of how
people come to it. All people are required to obey the moral law based on their shared
human nature. If Christians are supposed to be more charitable because of what is
written in scripture, this means that they have further positive duties towards their
neighbours; it does not undo the negative obligations that others are required to follow.
In other words, if I believe in the revelation then I may have reason for going beyond the
strict requirements of natural law, but this does not minimize what I can expect from
others. So, for example, the natural law may forbid that I steal from my neighbour but
this does not require that I provide for him in a time of need. The divine law, however,
may prescribe charity towards my neighbour, which is a positive duty beyond the mere
negative requirement that I not harm him.
Grotius shares much of the structure of just war theory with earlier religious
thinkers, however, his particular take on the perennial issues of justification, authority,
and just means refocuses these ideas to account for a newfound scepticism regarding the
claims for the truth of one religion over another. If people no longer believed that they
were justified in going to war over religious matters then there would be, from Grotius’
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standpoint, a huge reduction in the number and gravity of wars. Unfortunately, we have
found novel reasons to go to war that do not encompass a religious element and removing
religious justifications from the possible list of just wars has not ended warfare. Where
Grotius aimed to limit the possible reasons for going to war and the proper means of
engaging in it so as to curb its destructiveness, future theorists would focus on the means
required to eliminate war from international relations.
The next chapter focuses on Immanuel Kant’s program for lasting world peace as
it is laid out in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace”. Although Kant was a critic of just war
theory and its proponents, including Grotius, his thinking is consistent with the spirit of
just war theory in that it aims to reduce the incidence of war so that a perpetual peace
would remain.
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3

Kant’s Perpetual Peace
In the first two chapters I have outlined a number of theories that aim to establish

the necessary and sufficient conditions for achieving a lasting peace between nations.
What all the authors we have looked at thus far have agreed on is that international
relations can be improved by the elaboration of a set of rules that will bind the various
actors in the international realm. What they have disagreed on is to whom the various
rules of engagement apply (who has the authority to go to war) and what can be
legitimately done to win a just war (the rules of engagement). In this chapter I will
examine Kant’s vision for a lasting peace between societies. Kant differs from the
theorists that came before him in that he does not think that the elaboration of a set of
rules will do anything to change the nature of international relations. Instead of coming
up with a list of rules for who can wage wars justly and how, he sets out to show how the
entire international realm would have to be altered to achieve the ideal of perpetual peace.
Ultimately, Kant believes that the power dynamics of states competing against one
another would have to be replaced by a system of mutual cooperation in order for wars to
become less frequent. While the principles elaborated by the just war theorists are nice in
theory, Kant ultimately thinks that these theorists are merely “sorry comforters” because
their principles cannot apply to the world that we find ourselves in.
Kant has been interpreted by many contemporary scholars as correctly predicting the
democratic peace and they read his Perpetual Peace as support for democratic peace
theory. 124 The democratic peace refers to the empirical fact that no (or almost no)
democracies have gone to war against one another in the last 200 years. The democratic
peace thesis states that the fact of this lasting peace between democracies can be best
attributed to some feature or set of features inherent to democratic norms and or
institutions.

If the theory is correct, then it follows that if all nations were run

democratically there would be few to no wars. Many authors, such as Bruce Russet and
Michael Doyle, begin their defense of democratic peace theory by referring to Kant as the
“father” of their favoured theory. What I want to argue is that a careful reading of Kant
124
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reveals that he would not have endorsed the theory as it is specified in most of the
contemporary literature. My argument will proceed as followed: First, I will begin by
laying out Kant’s own theory of how we are to achieve a lasting peace among nations.
Second, I will turn to Kant’s larger political theory to show how his program for
perpetual peace is the logical endpoint of his vision of a just society. Third, I will argue
that Kant’s political philosophy contains within it a version of just war theory that places
him firmly outside the realm of either realism or pacifism and that commits him to a
principled view of what is allowed in international relations. Finally, in chapter 4, I will
be in position to present democratic peace theory and to argue that Kant himself would
not condone this theory.
Whether or not Kant would endorse democratic peace theory, as its proponents
suggest, is an interesting topic from the point of view of Kant scholarship. However,
regardless of Kant’s position, democratic peace theory is significant in its own right
because of its public policy implications. Our democratic politicians frequently make use
of the rhetoric of “spreading democracy abroad” and they justify their authority to do so
on the grounds that this will produce a more peaceful world in the future. For example, at
his inaugural address in 2005, President George W. Bush made the following statement:
We have seen our vulnerability, and we have seen its deepest source. For as
long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny -prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder -- violence will
gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended
borders, and raise a mortal threat. ...We are led, by events and common
sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly
depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in
our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.125
While democratic peace theorists like Russett and Doyle do not necessarily condone the
use of violence to achieve perpetual peace, the resort to war to produce a future lasting
peace is consistent with the internal logic of the theory. Because of this I believe that we
do best to avoid this kind of argument. In addition, if it is found to be a defective
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explanation, and there are alternative ways of promoting a lasting peace between nations,
then we should prefer these ways to the defective theory. I hope to show that Kant’s
Perpetual Peace provides this alternative and is preferable to democratic peace theory.

3.1 Kant’s Perpetual Peace Explained
3.1.1

Six Preliminary Articles
In arguing for the principles that are required for a perpetual peace to be

maintained, Kant maintained that there are six “preliminary articles” that must first be
achieved by nations. These six articles must be achieved first because they lay the
groundwork for possible mutual trust in the future. In other words, it is impossible for
Kant to imagine a perpetual peace without these initial conditions being met. The six
preliminary articles (PA), as follows, are all obviously directly linked to the business of
war and it is not difficult to see why Kant thought that moving towards achieving these
intermediate goals would be in line with the further goal of a lasting peace among
nations.
PA1. ‘No treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a secret
reservation of material for a future war.’

126

In the terminology of just war theory this amounts to the jus post bellum idea that any
peace treaty entered into must be entered into on good faith and without plans for a future
war. It is also connected, theoretically, to the jus in bello requirement that wars must be
waged with the goal of a future peace in mind. This means that you must view your
enemy of today as a future ally tomorrow, so as to not do anything in the present that
might hamper future peaceful relations. There are many possible examples of actions
that can be taken by armies that would constitute a breach of this guiding principle. One
such example would be the mistreatment of prisoners of war. Although they are enemy
combatants and have lost their right not to be attacked when on the battlefield, once
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captured, they are no longer in a position to do damage and must not be treated as such.
Mistreatment of these prisoners may threaten the future peaceful relations between states
who discover this mistreatment only after the fighting is over. Kant expresses this idea,
stating that “a conclusion of peace nullifies all existing reasons for a future war, even if
these are not yet known to the contracting parties, and no matter how acutely and
carefully they may later piece together out of old documents.”127
PA 2. ‘No independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired
by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.’

128

Kant bases this injunction on the moral character of the state as a collectively willed
institution granted its moral status by the original contract. By acquiring another nation
as though it was a possession and not a moral entity capable of self-determination you
treat the collectivity as a means to your selfish ends instead of as an end in itself. Even
without the Kantian formulation it is easy to see why this is an important step towards the
goal of perpetual peace. If independent states can continue to be acquired by others there
will be no end to wars. This still leaves open the question of whether there are any nonindependent states and, if these exist, how and whether these can be acquired. However,
assuming that we live in a world of already existing independent nations, that they cannot
be acquired as possessions is already an important step forward for perpetual peace.
PA 3. ‘Standing armies shall in time be abolished altogether.’

129

Having an army is rightly seen as a threat to other nations so the best way to show your
own commitment to perpetual peace is to gradually diminish and eventually abolish your
standing army.

While Kant could probably not have envisioned the technological

developments in weapons that have occurred since his writing, his condemnation of
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standing armies would likely extend to the financing of weapons technologies and their
stockpiling. In discussing standing armies Kant says:
They spur on the states to outdo one another in the number of armed men,
which knows no limit; and inasmuch as peace, by the cost related to it,
finally becomes even more oppressive than a short war, a standing army is
itself the cause of an offensive war, waged by a state in order to be relieved
130
of this burden.
While in his time the number of soldiers was the definitive element in wars and the
challenge of feeding, outfitting and transporting these soldiers was the most costly
expenditure, today the soldiers themselves are becoming less important while the
weapons they have access to largely determine the wars they are likely to engage in.
Regardless of what tools are being financed Kant’s point still holds true; being prepared
for war makes you more likely to engage in wars of aggression.
PA 4. ‘No national debt shall be contracted with regard to the external affairs of a
state.’

131

Kant immediately recognized how the creation of international credit systems had the
potential to completely change warfare. While he saw how taking loans for the purposes
of achieving food security in years of famine could be useful, he warns against incurring
debt for the sake of growing military powers. He warned “the ingenious invention of a
commercial people in this century – is a dangerous power of money, namely a treasury
for carrying on war that exceeds the treasury of all other states taken together”.

132

The

dangers of allowing the military to expand were reviewed in the preceding article;
however, Kant adds one important point: “This facility in making war, combined with the
inclination of those in power to do so, which seems to be implanted in human nature, is
therefore a great hindrance to perpetual peace.”
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cannot be minimized. If it is a natural tendency of humans, especially those in power, to
be warlike, then what are the hopes of achieving a perpetual peace through a voluntary
association of nations? In order to achieve anything close to perpetual peace given that
we start out with a tendency to be warlike we must put in place the preconditions
necessary for these tendencies to be minimized. The list of preliminary articles that Kant
mentions is not necessarily a complete one, but one that covers at least the basic steps that
need to be taken to minimize our pre-existing warlike inclinations, which then in turn
allows us to provide a positive structure for keeping peaceful relations in check moving
forward into the future.
PA 5. ‘No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of
another state.’

134

The only exception to the article above is in cases of civil war. In the case of an ongoing
civil war the “rightful condition”, Kant’s term for a society in which the basic demands of
justice are being met, has already been reduced to one of anarchy and so technically an
ally interacting on behalf of one side in the conflict is not interfering with the constitution
or government of another state. In all other cases, a state, in securing the peace of its
citizens is achieving its primary goal and cannot be interfered with by an outside force
not having the authority to regulate the internal affairs of one another. Once civil war has
been initiated from within it is allowable for an outside force to side with one of the
parties in the already ongoing conflict, just as it is acceptable for a force to defend an ally
in an already declared war. Once the state of peace has already been abandoned a new
set of rules apply that did not when the peace was still being maintained.
PA 6. ‘No state at war with another shall allow such acts of hostility as would
have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace; acts of this kind are
employing assassins or poisoners, breach of surrender, incitement to treason within the
enemy state, and so forth.'
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Article 6 differs from the first 5 in that it discusses actions taken in the state of war as
opposed to how to avoid entering this state in the first place. PA 6 acknowledges that
wars will continue to exist but that they must be undertaken so as to preserve the
possibility of entering into a peaceful condition once more. If all trust in the enemy is
lost and all means of achieving the annihilation of the enemy are allowed, then wars will
become what Kant terms “wars of extermination” or what we might call “total wars”.
Kant was unaware of the potential that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction hold to turn contemporary warfare into total war, yet in 1795 he was already
concerned with this possibility. PA 6 is of particular importance because it holds that
some element of trust must be maintained between those currently engaged in fighting.
Without this minimal condition of trust no conception of jus in bello can even get off the
ground.
Taken together the preliminary articles that Kant lays out are the conditions under
which a lasting peace could be constructed among nations who have a natural inclination
to go to war against one another owing to their competing interests. The preliminary
articles may not comprise a complete list of all the things to be established between
sovereign states, but it is an attempt to spell out practical guidelines for achieving the
basic goals of just war theory, or what I am calling the “basic spirit” of just war theory as
elucidated by Grotius and others. This basic spirit is that we should be working together
in the international arena to limit the resort to war, jus ad bellum, as well as the
destructiveness of those wars that do occur, jus in bello. While Kant, as we have seen
before, is explicitly sceptical of Grotius and others’ attempts to lay out laws of war and
peace, Kant’s basic impetus is the same as the just war theorists he seems to ridicule.
What Kant adds to just war theory, while he might have abhorred being lumped together
with his predecessors, is an insistence on the mutual trust that must obtain between
sovereign nations if any hope of perpetual peace in the future is going to obtain. He is
sceptical of the ability of just war theory, as laid out by the likes of Grotius and others, to
have a positive effect on international relations because they do not take into account that
sovereign nations have no reason to abide by the laws laid out by these “important
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men”.

136

In order to be in a position to trust the other, all nations must be moral, to some

minimal degree, which means that they are working towards achieving the moral goals of
their individual members. While the preliminary articles aim at the steps that nations
have to take to make themselves less likely to go to war with their neighbours, the
following definitive articles (DA) point to the relations between these sovereign nations.
John Bourke explains the functioning of the preliminary articles as follows:
The burden of these conditions [PA’s], if we take them all together, is clear.
The only way of approximating gradually towards a state of permanent
peace is by seeing to it that, each time a war is fought, the period following
it shall be less and less a merely negative period, a mere cessation of
hostilities, an interval between one war and another, and more and more a
positive period in which constructive attempts are made to establish peace
on a firmer and more lasting basis. Let, therefore, such wars as from time to
time unhappily will still occur be conducted honourably and not in such a
way as will further wreck confidence and respect; let the peace treaty which
concludes each be, not vindictive merely, but open, generous, and
constructive; and above all let each succeeding period of peace be one of
serious and unceasing effort on all sides towards lessening the causes of
further outbreaks.137
The definitive articles make a further claim on nations, because they require that nations
enter into a lawful state with one another. In other words, they must leave the state of
nature at the international level.

3.1.2

Three Definitive Articles
If the preliminary articles were all achieved this would be a step in the direction of

perpetual peace. However, in order for perpetual peace to be guaranteed nations must
enter into a lawful state with one another. As Kant states:
A condition of peace among men living near one another is not a state of
nature, which is much rather a condition of war, that is, it involves the
constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always
occur. A condition of peace must therefore be established; for suspension
of hostilities is not yet assurance of peace, and unless such assurance is
afforded one neighbour by another (as can happen only in a lawful
136
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condition), the former, who has called upon the latter for it, can treat him as
138
an enemy.
Kant is clear that the state of peace between nations must be “established” and talks about
the terms of the formal agreement in terms of two neighbours giving one another a
guarantee. However, the guarantee that two nations give one another is not akin to the
kind of guarantee that is made between two individual neighbours.

In the case of

individual neighbours, they are bound to enter into civil society and to accept the laws
that the society they are members of has instituted. Then, when they are faced with
problems they can take their respective complaints to the proper authority in question to
settle their disputes. In the case of neighbouring nations, they must enter into a formal
agreement with one another but this is an agreement that is voluntary and that can be
backed out of if it no longer meets the needs of its individual members. Kant conceives
of many voluntary associations in the same terms as the international arena. A marriage,
for example, takes the same form; it is a formal agreement between parties who come
together for their mutual benefit, but they can back out of said agreement at a later time if
and when it no longer suits their purposes. Arthur Ripstein makes this point in the
following way, stating:
Kant does not deny that the people might come to recognize each other’s
claims to property or under contracts without an omnilateral authorization.
He characterizes these as “societies compatible with rights (e.g., conjugal,
paternal, domestic societies in general, as well as many others); but no
139
law.”
Members of such societies might well, in fact, accept rules and dispute-resolution
procedures governing their interactions, but whether they accept them or not depends on
the matter of their choices, that is, on the particular ends they happen to have. Such
associations are purely voluntary arrangements from which any member might withdraw
unilaterally if his or her particular ends were to change. The members themselves might
not see things this way, and might think they are morally bound to recognize each other’s
138
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claims, think it prudent to do so, or fear sanctions if they do not comply. None of these
possibilities is sufficient to give either the rules or the procedures genuine authority,
because there is no general entitlement to compel the members to accept them. Such
societies are like the international order as Kant conceives it: each state has a right to
withdraw from any alliance if it perceives that it is endangered by getting drawn into
disputes between other members.140
Because the international agreements that nations enter into are voluntary they cannot be
forced either to enter into an agreement, even for their own benefit, or to remain in it. It
may be rational to enter into an agreement with other like-minded nations but this
depends entirely on the terms of the agreement and on the likelihood that others will
comply with it. Kant believes that the likelihood that nations will agree to enter into and
obey the rulings of a league of nations is greatly improved if they are all internally set up
in a way that is consistent with the rule of law; that they are all in a rightful condition
themselves. For this reason he believes that the chances of achieving perpetual peace are
improved if the first of his definitive articles is realized, namely that:
DA 1. ‘The civil constitution in every state shall be republican’

141

By ‘republican’, Kant means that individuals within the state are free and equal before the
law and are represented in the government in place that upholds this law. In Perpetual
Peace Kant defines the republican constitution as follows:
A constitution established, first on principles of the freedom of the members
of a society (as individuals), second on principles of the dependence of all
upon a single common legislation (as subjects), and third on the law of their
equality (as citizens of a state) – the sole constitution that issues from the
idea of the original contract, on which all rightful legislation of a people
142
must be based – is a republican constitution.
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While the above is a definition of the condition of the citizen under a republican
constitution it does not tell us anything about the nature of the government that these
citizens are placed under. Kant is clearer on this point in Public Right, where he outlines
his basic theory of political authority and the institutional framework that grants this
authority its legitimacy. The government has authority over the people because they
could have consented to the establishment of the laws of the state. Without the state all
people are in a condition of lawlessness where no one’s rights are capable of being
secured. As such, we have a duty to enter into civil society and to respect the decrees of
the government. However, this does not mean that a government, no matter the content
or procedural mechanism by which its laws are instituted, has legitimacy. In order to be a
legitimate bearer of coercive power a government must respect the basic definition of
republican constitution quoted above. A government, for Kant, does this when it has
separate offices for the three branches of government necessary for maintaining public
order. These are: the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. On this
point Kant states the following:
There are thus three distinct authorities (potestas legislatorial, executorial,
iudiciaria) by which a state (civitas) has its autonomy, that is, by which it
forms and preserves itself in accordance with laws of freedom. – A state’s
well-being consists in their being united (salus rei publicae suprema lex
est). But the well-being of a state must not be understood as the welfare of
its citizens and their happiness; for happiness can perhaps come to them
more easily and as they would like it to in a state of nature (as Rousseau
asserts) or even under a despotic government. By the well-being of a state
is understood, instead, that condition in which its constitution conforms
most fully to principles of right; it is that condition which reason, by a
categorical imperative, makes it obligatory for us to strive after.143
Just before this point he explains the dangers of having these three offices with
any combination of one being subordinate to any other.

Since the people are all

themselves the government through a system of representation, all must be equally
subject to the laws and lawmakers with no conflict of interest arising when it comes time
to judge on individual cases. If any of the offices of the government are subordinate to
any other then we can be in three precarious positions. In order to avoid the various
143

Practical Philosophy, 6:318.

91

problems associated with the lack of separation of powers each branch must act
independently and be subject to the power of the others. Kant makes this point by stating
that:
The will of the legislator (legislatoris) with regard to what is externally
mine or yours is irreproachable (irreprehensibel); that the executive power
of the supreme ruler (summi rectoris) is irresistible; and that the verdict of
the highest judge (supreme iudicis) is irreversible (cannot be appealed).144
Now that we have outlined what it means for a constitution to be republican from the
point of view of the citizen as well as the institutions of the state, it remains to be seen
why it is that Kant thinks that this type of constitution is necessary for states to enter into
a relationship of peace understood as more than the elimination of hostilities. In Kant’s
words:
Now, in addition to the purity of its origin – its having arisen from the pure
source of the concept of right – the republican constitution does offer the
prospect of the result wished for, namely perpetual peace; the ground of this is
as follows. When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to
decide whether there shall be war or not (and it cannot be otherwise in this
constitution), nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant to
begin such a bad game, since they would have to decide to take upon
themselves all the hardships of war (such as themselves doing the fighting and
paying the costs of the war from their own belongings, painfully making good
the devastation it leaves behind, and finally – to make the cup of troubles
overflow – a burden of debt that embitters peace itself, and that can never be
145
paid off because of new wars always impending);
As we will see later, this is one of the arguments made with respect to democracies in
support of the democratic peace thesis.
DA 2. ‘The right of nations shall be based on a federalism of free states’
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By this Kant means that the states in the world stand in relation to one another as
individuals in the state of nature but that they must come together voluntarily in order to
144
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prevent one another from engaging in hostilities. The only peoples that can be expected
to voluntarily associate under this kind of federation are those states that recognize that
they are better off giving up some of their liberties, i.e. the liberty to go to war, in order to
reap the benefits of group membership, which lies in the potential for perpetual peace.
According to Kant:
Just as we now regard with profound contempt, as barbarous, crude, and
brutishly degrading to humanity, the attachment of savages to their lawless
freedom, by which they would rather struggle unceasingly than subject
themselves to a lawful coercion to be instituted by themselves, thus
preferring a mad freedom to a rational freedom, so, one would think,
civilized peoples (each united into a state) must hasten to leave such a
depraved condition, the sooner the better; but instead each state puts its
majesty (for the majesty of a people is an absurd expression) just in its not
147
being subject to any external lawful coercion at all,
Kant uses the parallel to the individual in the state of nature in order to motivate this
claim that it would be foolish for states to remain in the state of nature. However, it
appears, at least on the surface, that there is an obvious disanalogy between the case of
the individual and the state when it comes to the manner of enforcing the condition of
lawfulness. In the individual’s situation, once a person has exited the state of nature and
has joined civil society there is a coercive body in place that is charged with upholding
the law in the case of disagreements between people. In the case of states, they enter into
a condition of lawfulness not by placing some higher authority over them, as the creation
of some world state, or international court would do. They simply agree, without the
threat of a coercive mechanism, to try to resolve their disagreements by some means
other than fighting. Kant is clear in stating that:

This league does not look to acquiring any power of a state but only to
preserving and securing the freedom of a state itself and of other states in
league with it, but without there being any need for them to subject
themselves to public laws and coercion under them (as men in a state of
148
nature must do).
147
148

Ibid.
Ibid., 8:356.

93

It may be that confederation is still in the best interest of states, owing to the brutality of
warfare. But it is at least plausible to imagine a situation in which the costs that one
nation would face in engaging in warfare with a much weaker opponent would be worth
the risk of going to war. In this case, a further incentive would have to be used to
convince this state from refraining from the act of aggression that would appear to be in
the interest of the state. Given that Kant is clear that he does not want the federation to
have the kind of coercive power that would impose a burden on the otherwise beneficial
action, he has to provide some alternative reason for thinking that states will voluntarily
curb their natural tendency to go to war against weaker nations. The reason that Kant
insists upon is the fact that we can trust that the other nations in the federation all abide
by the moral law, meaning the categorical imperative. So, since no nation that is morally
run can will that others take up arms against her, then she must also refrain from warfare.
The test of whether the other nation is trustworthy in this sense would seem to be that it
has organized itself into a republican government, because this is the only institutional
form that is reasonable and so in accordance with the autonomy of the individuals who
make it up.

Perpetual peace then relies on some nucleus of republican states that all

agree to enter into a federation with one another that will eventually expand to encompass
all political groupings across the globe.
DA 3. ‘Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal
149

hospitality’

What this means is that people must be granted right of free passage in all the territories
of the world without fear of facing a hostile native population. This was very important
to Kant in an era of increasing travel and trade between formerly isolated populations.
Kant saw this free movement of people and goods as a necessary condition for a lasting
peace owing to the violation of individual rights that he witnessed when foreigners
travelled to states with laws different from their home land. Only with the protection of
the “public rights of human beings” in all corners of the world could there be hope for a
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universal peace in which these rights are not violated and so put all of humanity at risk of
continued fighting.

150

The final definitive article, like the second, seems to rest on the first, or on the
requirement that all states be republican, because it requires that all states treat their
subjects morally, which is only possible under a republican government. If Kant is right
that the only legitimate constitution is republican and that only if all states are republican
do we have a hope of achieving perpetual peace, then does it follow from this that states
that are already republican have the right to coerce non-republican states into becoming
republican and joining the federation of free states that he envisions? The next section
will examine whether Kant is in fact committed to this view.

3.2 Kant’s Larger Political Commitments
3.2.1

Kant on Freedom and Coercion
In the last section we already encountered a tension in Kant’s theory that deserves

extra attention. On the one hand, freedom is central to his account of moral personhood
and on the other hand freedom is dependent on there being some coercive agent capable
of enforcing the conditions of freedom. Kant defines freedom in a discussion on innate
right in the introduction to the Doctrine of Right, stating:
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice),
insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with
a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue
of his humanity.151
Freedom is a relational concept because it does not make sense to talk of a person as
being free if there are no other people whose wills she cannot be subject to. So, the
hermit living alone in the woods does not have “freedom” in the sense of freedom from
the coercive actions of another. It may seem that living in a society with laws and rules is
less free than living without them in the state of nature where one is “free” to do anything
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without fear of being punished. However, this kind of freedom is no real freedom at all
because in this condition I am always potentially the victim of the arbitrary will of
another person. Moreover, I have no recourse to defend my right not to be coerced in this
way. The solution to this problem is to set up a coercive institution that can secure the
freedom of its various members.
The state is set up as a mechanism to deal with the problem of a lack of freedom
in the state of nature. For this reason the state is authorized to use coercion in order to
combat the failures of the state of nature. The particular laws that are instituted by the
state in order to guarantee the freedom of its individual members are only justifiable if
they could have been consented to under conditions of equality for all.

This

characterization of the original contract in Kant is not a foundational account of how we
came to be living in society together. Instead it explains what the limits on coercive
power must be in order to justify the limits of what can be legally instituted by the state.
What we really want then is to live in a condition where we are under the protection of
just laws, or what Kant would term a condition of “right”. Freedom is the gauge by
which we determine whether or not the condition of right obtains and not what we are
actually aiming for. Kant explains this point in “On the Common Saying: That May be
Correct in Theory, but is of no Use in Practice”. At 8:289 in the context of an argument
against the Hobbesian conception of the state of nature, Kant remarks that:
The concept of an external right as such proceeds entirely from the concept of
freedom in the external relation of people to one another and has nothing at all
to do with the end that all of them naturally have (their aim of happiness) and
152
with the prescribing of means for attaining it.
The state does not obtain its right to coerce owing to any improvement in the happiness
of its subjects; it obtains the right to coerce owing to the condition in which the subjects
of a political group find themselves. Right, then, is defined as follows:
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Right is the limitation of the freedom of each to the condition of its harmony
with the freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in accordance with a
universal law; and public right is the sum of external laws which make such a
153
thoroughgoing harmony possible.
Freedom then does not consist in not being subject to laws, but in only being subject to
those laws that create a condition of right in society. All other laws, ones that do not
respect the autonomy of subjects, meaning their ability to decide their ends for
themselves, are not legitimate laws. So, for Kant, the original contract is what tells us
whether the laws that are in place live up to the condition of public right. Kant puts this
point in the following way, stating that the:
[original contract] is instead only an idea of reason, which, however, has its
undoubted practical reality, namely to bind every legislator to give his laws in
such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people
and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has
154
joined in voting for such a will.
So, in spite of the apparent contradiction between freedom and coercion in Kant, there
appears to be a sense in which a conception of freedom without coercion is meaningless.
If we want to be able to live in society together then there must be some institution
capable of guaranteeing that the laws that apply to us as moral individuals are
enforceable. While the law, for Kant, is a natural thing, in the sense that we all have
access to the law as moral beings, there is only such a thing as law, as opposed to
morality, if it is instituted in such a way that it is enforceable. As Mulholland writes: “for
Kant knowing the law is insufficient to produce the rule of law.”155 We will come back
to this point later but for now I want to turn to Kant’s conception of the state of nature
and what condition states find themselves in in the international realm.
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3.2.2

The Original Contract and International Law

The state of nature for Kant is not necessarily a state in which people are living miserable
lives. In fact, Kant’s solution to the state of nature, namely civil society or a rightful
condition, is not one that claims to improve the living conditions of the people in it.
Instead, the civil condition is a permanent solution to the coordination problems that tend
to arise between people living in close proximity to one another, which is achieved by
placing a superior power over individuals in order to guarantee their safety. It is possible
for people to temporarily resolve these problems for themselves without entering into a
rightful condition. However, the civil condition guarantees that the individual rights that
people have will be enforced by the law. Kant defines a rightful condition as follows:
A rightful condition is that relation of human beings among one another that
contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to enjoy his
rights and the formal condition under which this is possible in accordance
with the idea of a will giving laws for everyone is called public justice. ... A
condition that is not rightful, that is a condition in which there is no
distributive justice, is called a state of nature (status naturalis). What is
opposed to a state of nature is not (as Achenwall thinks) a condition that is
social and that could be called an artificial condition (status artificialis), but
rather the civil condition (status civilis), that of a society subject to
distributive justice. For in the state of nature, too, there can be societies
compatible with rights (e.g., paternal, domestic societies in general, as well
as many others); but no law, “You ought to enter this condition holds a
priori for these societies, whereas it can be said of a rightful condition that
all human beings who could (even involuntarily) come into relations of
rights with one another ought to enter this condition.156
Because the rightful condition is one in which individuals place a sovereign capable of
enforcing the law over them there is a minimal threshold that needs to be met in order to
count as living in the civil condition. Not every instantiation of a civil condition will do a
great job of securing the rights of its citizens consistent with the rights of every other
citizen but so long as it is better than it would have been in the state of nature citizens
have a duty to obey the sovereign.157
156
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So Kant says that there is no right to revolution or sedition “even if the organ of the sovereign, the
ruler, proceeds contrary to law, for example if he goes against the law of equality in assigning the burdens
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Kant, as we saw earlier in this chapter, believes that the constitutional form best capable
of instituting the laws in a way that is legitimate is a republican government.

The

republican government is an institutionalization of the public will of the people such that
the laws that uphold the freedom of the people are maintained. In this system there is a
system of representation ensuring that the government is held accountable to the will of
its citizens. Moreover, even in the case where the government is deficient and the will of
the citizens is not represented or only partially represented there is the possibility of
reforming the system from the inside so that it better conforms to the ideal of the rule of
law. For this reason, Kant believes that people living in the state of nature (without the
possibility of the law being enforced) can be coerced into joining into civil society. To
reiterate this important point, individuals cannot rationally remain in the state of nature,
even if their physical condition may in actual fact be better than once they enter the civil
condition. The potential threat of being subject to the arbitrary coercive force of another
renders this decision untenable. We must enter the civil condition then because failing to
do so is not a rational response to the problem of political coordination. The downside to
this is that members of a society in which the laws can be enforced, even if the laws
themselves are deficient, must remain in society regardless of its faults. Its faults must
then be reformed from the inside, there being no situation in which it is preferable, i.e.
rational, to leave the civil condition. On this point Kant is clear that there is:
No right to sedition, still less to rebellion and least of all is there a right
against the head of a state as an individual person (the monarch), to attack
158
his person or even his life on the pretext that he has abused his authority.
Moreover,
A change in a (defective) constitution, which may certainly be necessary at
times, can therefore be carried out only through reform by the sovereign
itself, but not by the people, and therefore not be revolution; and when such

of the state in matters of taxation, recruiting and so forth, subjects may indeed oppose this injustice by
complaints (gravamina) but not by resistance.” He goes on to say that “a people cannot offer any
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a change takes place this reform can affect only the executive authority, not
159
the legislative.
Given that it is always preferable to be living in a civil condition as compared to the state
of nature, and that people can be coerced into the civil condition and cannot leave it by
force once they have entered into it, what does this tell us about the rights of independent
nations each living in a civil condition with respect to one another?
In Public Right 6:343 Kant tells us that states, like individuals in the state of
nature, are in a constant state of war with respect to one another.

160

Surprisingly,

however, unlike individuals in the state of nature who have a duty to enter into a rightful
condition by placing a coercive body in charge of enforcing the law, nations must not
place a sovereign authority over themselves but must come into a voluntary association.
This association will provide the structure that is necessary to establish a lasting peace
between nations and so it is something that states must work towards creating. Kant
believes that states that have a republican constitution are likely to be willing to enter into
this mutual association with other republican nations because they will contain within
themselves the elements necessary to establish a mutual trust. The following section
aims to examine the rights that nations have with respect to one another and how they can
hope to exit the state of nature, which is the state of war, without creating a coercive
power capable of binding them all.

3.2.3

Kant on the Just War

Kant asserts that states have three different kinds of rights with respect to one another as
follows:
The rights of states consist, therefore, partly of their right to go to war, partly
of their right in war, and partly of their right to constrain each other to leave
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this condition of war and so form a constitution that will establish lasting
161
peace, that is, its right after war.
The just war theory terminology that would map on to these rights are jus ad bellum, jus
in bello and jus post bellum, corresponding to the limitations on the right to wage war,
how the wars ought to be fought and the steps necessary to establish a lasting peace
through these first two categories.

While Kant clearly utilizes these categories he

emphasizes that there is no constraint on jus ad bellum and jus in bello that can be applied
by nations unless there is some coercive force necessary to enforce the rules. For this
reason he says that there can be no just war theory, or at least no just war theory in the
form proposed by Grotius and others, because there can be no mechanism of this kind in
the international realm. 162 The best that we can hope for is a provisional agreement
between nations to stop engaging in warfare and the better the internal setup of the
nations making the agreement the better the chances of it holding in the long run.
The following is a list of the elements of the right of nations as put forward by
Kant in Public Right:
1. States, in external relation to one another, are (like lawless savages) by nature
in a nonrightful condition.
2. This nonrightful condition is a condition of war even if it is not a condition of
actual war or hostilities.
3. A league of nations (social contract) is necessary not to meddle in internal
dissention but to protect against attacks from without.
4. This alliance must not involve a sovereign authority but only an
association.
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While individuals form themselves into associations with one another in a non-voluntary
way and can be coerced into joining political association, groups of individuals who have
already taken this first necessary step are not forced to enter into association with other
groups but they are compelled to do so by moral reason.

164

What feature of political

groups explains the difference between individuals and groups? Remember that for
Grotius the rights of nations were completely derivative of the rights of individuals and
there were some differences in application of the law owing to the conditions that larger
groups of individuals find themselves in but their laws were based on the same basic
principles. Here Kant departs from this way of thinking and seems committed to the
view that the laws that apply to individuals are not directly transferrable to groups.
Kant’s assertion that Grotius and other just war theorists are sorry comforters is
revealing on this point. What is wrong with Grotius’ position, on a Kantian reading, is
that there is no sovereign with the authority necessary to punish political units that violate
the laws of nations. If such a sovereign existed then it would have absolute power, as
there would be no other group capable of judging whether the sovereign was behaving
correctly. The problem with a world government is that the risk of creating an absolute
tyranny is too great. This leads Kant to conclude that the only way to achieve perpetual
peace, which is the “entire final end of the doctrine of right within the limits of mere
reason”,
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is to improve the internal workings of each sovereign state so that they will

voluntarily agree to associate with one another in achieving the goal of perpetual peace.
Since peace is in all of their interests there is no need to place a sovereign who is above
the law over the federation of nations.
With this solution to the problem of perpetual peace in mind there is one obvious
problem that confronts the possibility of achieving this reality.

Notably, even if it

reasonable to try to achieve the end of perpetual peace by agreeing to a voluntary
association, this voluntary association places each independent member in an
international prisoners dilemma. It may be better for me if everyone else agrees to the
164
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rules of the association such that no one goes to war against me, but if I manage to ensure
that others are complying without obeying the rules of the game myself, then I am in a
position to greatly increase my influence. Since, as we saw, the preliminary articles
require all nations to gradually disarm themselves it would be in every nation’s interest to
appear to be disarming while actually keeping secret a supply of weapons in case they are
ever in a position to use them. More problematic even, is that Kant limits the possibility
of states that are in the league of nations to influence others that have not already agreed
to the voluntary association. Kant is explicit on the point that nations must “gradually
work their way out of barbarism of their own accord if only one does not intentionally
166

contrive to keep them in it.”

If this is the case, then the more committed to the goal of

perpetual peace a nation is, the more likely they are to be defenceless against enemies
who have not agreed to the terms of peace. It is for these reasons that Kant maintained
that in practice “perpetual peace, the ultimate goal of the whole right of nations, is indeed
an unachievable idea”,
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one that he thought could only be approximated.

Although Kant is committed to the idea that states must not interfere with the
internal affairs of other states, when they pose a threat to another they are liable to attack.
While Kant maintains that there is a limit to the force that can be used against an unjust
attacker (it must be proportionate to the threat being countered) he does not say explicitly
what counts as a threat.
There are no limits to the rights of a state against an unjust enemy (no limits
with respect to quantity or degree, though there are limits with respect to
quality); that is to say, an injured state may not use any means whatever but
may use those means that are allowable to any degree that it is able to, in
168
order to maintain what belongs to it.
On one interpretation it would be possible to view Kant’s limited discussion of jus in
bello as though it were not even being discussed in terms of already instigated hostilities.
This is not an entirely ridiculous way to read Kant given what he said regarding the
166
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condition that states find themselves in in the international realm. Because the state of
nature is a state in which there is always the threat of war, there is no need for actual
hostilities to be underway in order for a state to feel threatened. Especially in the case
where some states have agreed to terms of peace based on their mutual acceptance of
republicanism they would be rational to feel threatened by other states that have not
accepted these terms. Since they are already technically “at war” with these other states
and since they cannot be trusted not to harm others in the future it is in the best interests
of more powerful states to try to disarm other noncompliant states into entering the
league of nations. This is allowed for in the case of individuals in the state of nature who
can be coerced into entering the civil condition, so it is not altogether inconsistent to read
Kant in this way.
However, since the ideals of republicanism as well as that of the perpetual peace
are unachievable in practice, it may be that any state no matter its constitution is already
in a civil condition that is sufficiently good to protect it from the external influence of
others. On this interpretation, exiting the state of nature is what is most important for
individuals.

Afterwards any improvements that can be made towards reaching

republicanism and then perpetual peace are improvements to the civil condition so that
deficiencies are not sufficiently threatening to authorize the use of coercive power against
less developed countries. I believe that this reading of Kant is more in keeping with the
spirit of his thinking as it is laid out in Cosmopolitan Right. Here he states that “morally
169

practical reason pronounces in us the irresistible veto: there is to be no war.”

Howard

Williams agrees with this reading of Kant, he argues that Kant was one of the first
thinkers to dispute the idea that just war theory would temper hostile relations between
states. Kant does place greater limits on the justifiable resort to war than the authors we
have seen so far, but to go so far as to say that Kant does not have a just war theory
would be, I think, to misunderstand the subtlety of Kant’s political program. At its heart,
Kant’s program for perpetual peace is pacifist in spirit. What I mean by this is that it
condemns the use of violence to achieve political goals. However, Kant cannot be a true
pacifist because he also maintains that states have to protect the rights of citizens and so
169
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they must maintain the right to defend these citizens from attack. In the next section I
will argue for a Kantian version of just war theory.

3.3 Kant’s Just War Theory
In spite of the fact that Kant scholarship has traditionally been in agreement that
Kant is not a just war theorist, more recently, attempts have been made to show that Kant
is committed to principles of just war theory.
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Brian Orend has made a convincing

argument that Kant cannot be seen as either a realist or a pacifist and that his writings on
war are consistent with a just war program. However, I would like to challenge the idea
that there is such a sharp division between these categories and that instead there is room
for significant overlap between realism, and just war theory. As Paskins has argued,
contemporary versions of just war theory, like the one put forward in Walzer’s Just and
Unjust Wars, “exaggerates the tensions between realism and the just war.”171 In other
words, there is a possible realist reading of just war theory that does a better job of
integrating Kant’s political writings.

The traditional realist position in international

relations is often expressed by the phrase “all’s fair in love and war.”

On this

interpretation, nations will do what is in their best interests and they cannot be expected
to obey laws. Even when they do appear to be acting in accordance with so-called laws
this is only because they happen to accord with their interest for the time being. As soon
as the laws no longer suit them, nations will violate the laws. On the popular realist
reading of Kant, just war theorists are “sorry comforters” because they outline laws of
warfare that will be violated as soon as it is in the interest of states to do so. What I
maintain is if Kant is a realist, then he is not a traditional realist but the kind of realist
who can accept that certain principles of just war theory are applicable to states that have
agreed to cooperate in a league of nations.
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The alternative to being a just war theorist is to be either a realist or a pacifist. Kant has traditionally
been placed in the realist camp, which I aim to show is an oversimplification of his position.
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Kant moves along the boundaries of realism and just war theory, recognizing that
states will do what is best from the point of view of their self-interest, but hoping that
rationality will guide states to recognize that cooperation is to their mutual advantage.
Apart from a few overtly hostile references to just war theorists such as Vattel
and Grotius that we have seen, Kant is committed to the view that states are moral agents
and that we can hold them to moral standards. The criticism of the just war theorists is
that they do not recognize that the laws that they propose will be violated whenever it is
in the interest of nations to do so. Kant’s solution to this problem is to suggest that states
must focus on their own internal make-up so that when they interact in the international
realm it is in their best interest to cooperate peacefully with others.

Because he

recognizes that pursuing perpetual peace is a utopian ideal that will not ever be fully met
he must allow for realist calculations of what is in the best interests of states. The hope is
that the calculation will work to favour peace but this may not always be the case.
In spite of the fact that he takes realist considerations seriously, Kant cannot be a
realist.

That is because he is clearly committed to the view that there can be moral

improvements in the international realm and that these improvements will come about
through gradual improvements to the individual governments that make up the
international realm. While Kant does believe that international relations at the time of his
writing are best explained through the lens of realism, he also thinks that we can and must
move beyond realism to a global rightful condition. A global rightful condition is one in
which the freedom of each state to act is compatible with the freedom of every other state
to do the same. This extension of the universal principle of right to the international
realm acts as a guide to the morality of actions done at this communal level. If it were
impossible to create a rightful condition at the international level, says Kant, then this
would undermine the possibility of morality at all the other levels. What Kant says at the
beginning of the section on “Public Right” in the Doctrine of Right is particularly
revealing on this point:
The sum of the laws which need to be promulgated generally in order to
bring about a rightful condition is public right. – Public right is therefore a
system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a
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multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful
condition under a will uniting them, a constitution (constitution, so that they
may enjoy what is laid down as right. – This condition of the individuals
within a people in relation to one another is called a civil condition (status
civilis), and the whole of individuals in a rightful condition, in relation to its
members is called a state (civitas). ... Hence under the general concept of
public right we are led to think not only of the right of a state but also of a
right of nations (ius gentium). Since the earth’s surface is not unlimited but
closed, the concepts of the right of a state and of a right of nations lead
inevitably to the idea of a right for a state of nations (ius gentium) or
cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum). So if the principle of outer
freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms
of rightful condition, the framework of all the others is unavoidably
undermined and must finally collapse.172
In order for the idea of international law to make any sense this must necessarily be the
kind of place where the concept of law makes sense. If there were no way for laws to
apply to and between nations, then there could be no cosmopolitan right. The challenge
for Kant, as was mentioned above, is to explain how it is possible to move from a
situation of anarchy in the international realm to a law-governed situation.
From this passage it is pretty clear that Kant thinks that we can and must
rationally move beyond the state of nature in international relations. What is still unclear
is whether he is committed to the pacifist view that all wars are necessarily unjustifiable
on any moral grounds. On this point it is obvious that Kant does not subscribe to
pacifism. In the Doctrine of Right he asserts that:
The right of states consist, therefore, partly of their right to go to war, partly
of their right in war, and partly in their right to constrain each other to leave
this condition of war and so form a constitution that will establish lasting
peace, this is, its right after war.173
This commitment to the categories of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum in
and of itself shows that Kant is not a believer in pacifism, which holds that all acts of
political violence are necessarily morally wrong, even if they are undertaken in selfdefence. It is clear from the use of the above-mentioned categories of thinking about the
172
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ethics of war that Kant believes that there are conditions under which wars can be waged
justly.
The conditions under which a state may justly wage war include self-defence, and
the defence of foreign populations against the abuse of their rights. These conditions
existed, as we have seen in previous chapters, under the various versions of just war
theory to come before Kant. However, under the Kantian commitment to the principle of
universal right these just war categories are more limited than the previous versions of
just war theory that we have seen. For example, the state’s right to self-defence under the
Grotian interpretation was grounded in each individual’s right to self-defence in the state
of nature. This individual right was then transferred to the state, which, being in an
international state of nature retains this right. On a Kantian reading the state of nature is
not one in which individuals have the proper right to self-defence, in a way they cannot
be thought of as having rights proper at all.

For Kant, we only have our rights

provisionally in the state of nature and the freedom that we have in the state of nature is
not really freedom at all. We give up the “wild” freedom of the state of nature for the
real freedom to pursue our life projects unhindered by the arbitrary will of another
person. As such we give up the right to punish those who abuse us to a coercive power in
the civil condition. However, nations are not similarly in a position to punish aggressors
in the international realm. Violations of the laws of nations can be rectified if they are
ongoing and directed at external others. Contrary to individual in the civil condition who
may be punished for their violations of the law, so as to maintain order in society; nations
do not retain the right to punish aggressors but simply to repel them and restore the
conditions prior to the aggression. In cases of aggression that is directed inwardly
towards a state’s own population, external others are not only not required to intervene
they are restricted from doing so unless the civil condition breaks down to the point that it
is non existent and the territory in question has returned to the state of nature. For the
present I simply wanted to point out that Kant’s version of just war theory is restricted
compared to Grotius and other social contract theorists because it eliminates punishment
as a possible just cause and defence of others is restricted to returning others, at their
behest, to a civil condition.
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To summarize Kant’s just war theory, jus ad bellum still contains the principle of
just cause, but instead of self-defence, defence of allies and punishment of wrongdoing,
we are left with only self-defence. Right intention becomes redundant in the case of
aggression already being committed against your own population and really only served a
role in limiting the resort to force for the protection of others. This is because there is no
need to prove right intention in the case of self-defence. The state has a duty to protect its
own citizens, which it is required to carry out precisely because we presume that the state
represents the best intentions of its citizens. The principle of last resort is also presumed
by the justification of self-defence. Since violence is more costly an option in the case
that you are being attacked than convincing your attacker to withdraw, when violence is
used in self-defence it is as a last resort. Jus ad bellum proportionality remains, limiting
what can be undertaken in self-defence to the reestablishment of the conditions that were
in place before the current act of aggression took place. In other words, you cannot
benefit from having been attacked by taking over territory that was formerly not your
own. And reasonable hope of success, the idea that aggression should not be met with
aggression simply for the sake of maintaining honour if there is no likely hope that by
engaging in self-defence you will be in a better condition than by surrendering.
The jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination remain at the core
of the Kantian idea that all people should be treated as ends in themselves and not mere
means to an end. Moreover, proper respect for these principles, as in Grotius, is the
foundation for coming to a lasting resolution of current hostilities.
Most important for Kant, the principles of a proper jus post bellum are
enumerated in the articles for perpetual peace that we have seen. Kant waffles in his
commitment to a set of principles governing rights after a war has been terminated. On
the one hand he seems to say that victory in war does not confer any rights upon the
victor to the detriment of the vanquished party’s ability to self-government. But he also
seems to say that once a war against an obviously unjust aggressor is over that state “can
be made to accept a new constitution of a nature that is unlikely to encourage their
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warlike inclinations.”174 So, it would seem that in spite of his commitment to allowing
independent states to govern themselves internally as they see fit, once they have shown
themselves to be unjust in their actions towards others it may become legitimate for an
outside party to intervene in changing the constitution. Usually it appears that states must
reform themselves from the inside out. Kant is explicit in “Cosmopolitan Right” that it is
not justifiable to take over the territory of another on the argument that things will be
better for the people there afterwards. In other words, there is no justifiable way to
“civilize savages”, and Kant counters arguments to this effect saying:
Someone may reply that such scruples about using force in the beginning, in
order to establish a lawful condition, might well mean that the whole earth
would still be in a lawless condition; but this consideration can no more
annul that condition of right than can the pretext of revolutionaries within a
state, that when constitutions are bad it is up to the people to reshape them
by force and to be unjust once and for all so that afterwards they can
establish justice all the more securely and make it flourish.175
There appears to be a difference between the example of the nation being forced to adopt
a new constitution after conquest and one being forced without previous aggression to be
subdued by a foreign power. Kant has in mind the taking over of territories native to the
indigenous populations of America in the latter case, which he thinks is unjustifiable on
the grounds of “civilization”. The former case seems to be one in which a nation has
been overtly hostile to another and has engaged in a war of aggression. These people,
and only under certain circumstances may be forced to adopt a more just constitution, but
there is a sense in which they are already returned to the state of nature internally and so
it does not violate their actualized rights, since they cannot be said to have any. As Waltz
commenting on Kant warns:
Peace is the noblest cause of war. If the conditions of peace are lacking,
then the country with a capability of creating them may be tempted to do so,
whether or not by force. The end is noble, but as a matter of right, Kant
insists, no state can intervene in the internal arrangements of another. As a
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matter of fact, one may notice that intervention, even for worthy ends, often
brings more harm than good.176
Kant is one of the first theorists to explicitly endorse the category of rights after war jus
post bellum and to link it to how wars are fought. His overall vision for just war theory is
that all the principles tend towards the goal of perpetual peace. In order to get closer to
this ideal we have to be willing to work on the internal workings of our own states in
order to make our national situation come closer to that of justice. In addition to this
internal work, we have to be willing to forego our rights to go to war in favour of
securing the global rightful condition. We do this by entering into a league of nations and
agreeing with others to resolve our disputes in non-violent ways. Kant insists again and
again that this must be done in a gradual way so as not to undo whatever gains in matters
of rights have been made in the past, so it is most consistent with his program for
perpetual peace that there be no coercive body capable of forcing compliance with
international laws. So:
The attempt to realize this idea should not be made by way of revolution, by
a leap, that is, by violent overthrow of an already existing defective
constitution (for there would be an intervening moment in which any
rightful condition would be annihilated). But if it is attempted and carried
out by gradual reform in accordance with firm principles, it can lead to
continual approximation to the highest political good, perpetual peace.177
Given that what we as moral agents must try to do is to exit the state of nature in the
international realm it makes sense to adopt the program that Kant spells out for perpetual
peace in his 6 preliminary articles and 3 definitive articles. The problem of other states
complying with the laws is always going to remain, so Kant’s assertion that:
What is incumbent upon us as a duty is rather to act in conformity with the
idea of that end [perpetual peace], even if there is not the slightest
theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its impossibility
cannot be demonstrated either.178
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There have, of course been numerous critiques of Kant’s position with regards to
the possibility of establishing a lasting peace through a voluntary federation. For one,
Thomas Carson has argued that a consistent Kantian position requires him to argue for
the creation of a world state with the power to coerce others and not merely a voluntary
association without a coercive body. Carson suggests that Kant is in fact committed to
this view and that his arguments in support of a world federation are based on the belief
that world powers will not in practice agree to give up their sovereignty in order to join
the world state. This may be the case, however, Carson maintains that without the
coercive power to enforce disarmament and to punish violations of international law the
federation of nations will do little to achieve the goal of perpetual peace.179 In response
to the supposed “fact” that democracies will not go to war with one another, Carson
considers this the result of happy coincidence and does not believe that the spread of
democracy will in any way guarantee a lasting peace. 180 I will turn to arguments in
favour of the “democratic peace thesis” in the next chapter and hope to show, ultimately,
that Kant cannot be thought to support the thesis that democracies will not go to war
against one another.
I believe that Kant’s development of a theory of international relations in
Perpetual Peace and elsewhere in his mature writings is particularly successful because it
navigates the line between realism and idealism. He is not committed to the view that
international relations are destined to remain violent and bloody, nor does he minimize
the great efforts that must be undertaken by nations, both individually and collectively, in
order to improve the international situation.

Kant’s position perhaps in political

philosophy is perhaps not the most optimistic but not entirely defeatist either. Kant asks
us to act in such a way that our actions are consistent with bringing about the goal of
perpetual peace, even if the likelihood of this occurring is negligible. What is somewhat
surprising, given Kant’s scepticism, is that it appears that international relations have
developed in a way that is consistent with the Kantian program, since his death many of
179
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the states of the world have voluntarily agreed to come together for their mutual benefit
in both the League of Nations and now the United Nations.

The result of these

associations has obviously not been to eliminate warfare between nations (or even
between members of the associations), yet there remains the hope that with the greater
expansion of the articles of Perpetual Peace, that more peaceful relations are possible. In
the next chapter I will examine the arguments in favour of “the democratic peace”
(sometimes called the “Kantian peace”, or the “liberal peace”). What I hope to show is
that in spite of the theory’s reliance on Kant as inspiration, Kant himself could not be a
supporter of the democratic peace thesis owing to the political program that was outlined
in this chapter.
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4

Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic peace theory begins from the empirical data that there have been no
wars between democratic countries since the beginning of the modern state system. From
this data set theorists conclude that there must be something about the nature of
democratic institutions or culture that produces this surprising result. Bruce Russett
summarizes the elements of democratic peace theory as follows in his influential 1993
book Grasping the Democratic Peace:
In the modern international system, democracies have almost never fought
each other. This statement represents a complex phenomenon: (a)
Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) because (b)
they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do
not fight each other (a prudential statement), and (c) they believe that
democracies should not fight each other (a normative statement about
principles of right behaviour), which reinforces the empirical statement. By
this reasoning, the more democracies there are in the world, the fewer
potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the
181
zone of peace.
Democratic peace theorists almost always make reference to Kant as having predicted
why the prudential and normative sections above serve to promote the empirical data that
has been observed.

For example Sean Lynn-Jones writes: “Two centuries ago, the

German philosopher Immanuel Kant predicted that republican states would enjoy a
“perpetual peace” with other republics.”

182

[emphasis added] Russett remarks that: “The

vision of a peace among democratically governed states has long been invoked as part of
a larger structure of institutions and practices to promote peace among nation-states,” and
then implies that Kant was the father of this line of thinking, saying: “Immanuel Kant
spoke

of

perpetual
183

constitutions.”

peace

based

partially

upon

states

sharing

“republican

And Doyle explains that: “Immanuel Kant offers the best guidance”

for the democratic peace. “’Perpetual Peace,’ written in 1795, predicts the ever-widening
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pacification of the liberal pacific union, explains that pacification, and at the same time
suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with non-liberal states.”

184

While many authors offer Kant up as a defender of the democratic peace theory
what I will suggest is that a careful reading of Kant shows that his claims are not
consistent with those of the democratic peace. What is perhaps most surprising about this
attribution is that Kant had absolutely no access to any empirical findings to support his
idea that the internal structure of a state’s government would have an effect on how it
interacts with other states. At the time that Kant wrote Perpetual Peace (1795), there
were in total only three states that could roughly be defined as democratic: the Swiss
Cantons, the French Republic (1790-1795) and the United States (1776 and following).
Even within this short list, not all the Swiss Cantons were democratic, and the United
States was only so north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865.
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Moreover, even in the

small areas of rule of law these states did not have universal suffrage until long after Kant
was writing.
The central claims of the democratic peace theory are, as we have seen above, that
the empirical evidence that democracies have not gone to war against one another in the
last 200 years is best explained by an inherent democratic feature of their governance,
and that, if more countries were democratic there would be fewer wars ultimately
resulting in a fully democratic peace if all states adopted democratic governance at the
internal level.

The theory does two things: first it provides an explanation for an

observed pattern in international relations; and second it tells us how to act in the future
in order to achieve the goal of a lasting peace among nations.

4.1 The Structural Argument
Broadly speaking there are two “explanatory” versions of the democratic peace
thesis. The first is based on an excerpt taken directly out of Kant’s Perpetual Peace and
in which he makes the following claims:
184
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Republics must get the consent of their citizens before embarking on a
war and these citizens will be hesitant to condone going to war because:
a) They will have to bear the costs of the war themselves in lives lost
and resources spent on carrying it out.
b) They will have to pay for reconstruction after the war is over.
c) They will have to pay back the debt accrued in fighting.186

Because of all of these factors it is believed that republics (which are taken by democratic
peace theorists to be consistent with democracies) and their citizens will only agree to go
to war in extreme circumstances where it cannot be avoided. This is not an unreasonable
claim; however, it is not consistent with the empirical data supporting the democratic
peace for the following reason. If republics are more peaceful because they have to get
actual consent from their citizens then it would stand to reason that they would be more
peaceful in general and not just more peaceful towards other similarly governed nations.
There is no reference to the internal governmental structure of the opposing state and it is
not clear why this would make any difference to the willingness of citizens to pay the
costs of going to war. What would be expected from this list of reasons why republics
would be less willing to go to war is that they would be more peaceful towards all states
regardless of governmental form, yet this is not the result that has been observed. In
reality, republics (or democracies) are less likely to go to war amongst one another, but
no less likely to go to war tout-court.
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Kant’s first definitive article for perpetual peace begins with the idea that the
consent of the governed is necessary in a republic and that this is the reason why these
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states will be less war prone. Consent plays an important role in the social contract
tradition and there are many types of consent, actual, tacit, hypothetical, which play
different roles depending on the job that consent is supposed to do in the theory. Consent
for Kant does not play the role of legitimating the government’s actions. What consent
does for Kant is justify the government’s exclusive use of coercion to control the actions
of its citizens. Moreover, it is not the actual consent of the citizens that does this.
Instead, citizens of the state must have consented to the government’s authority to
coercively enforce the law because living in a lawless condition, even a temporarily
peaceful lawless condition is worse than living under even a corrupt government.
It is tempting, based on the way the explanation of the first definitive article is
188

phrased, to interpret Kant’s reliance on consent to mean actual consent of all people.

However, what I would like to suggest is that it would be inconsistent with what he says
about representation to maintain that he thinks that actual consent to waging war would
be necessary to justify it. In fact, he asserts precisely that the actual consent of the people
is not required in order for the representatives to decide to engage in a war. In a note in
Theory and Practice he gives the example of a tax levied for a war effort:
If, e.g., a war tax were imposed proportionately on all subjects, they could
not, because they found it oppressive, say that it is unjust because in their
opinion the war may be unnecessary; for they are not entitled to appraise
this but instead, because it is still always possible that the war is
unavoidable and the tax indispensable, the tax must hold in a subject’s
judgment as in conformity with right. But if, during such a war, certain
landowners were burdened with levies while others of the same rank were
exempted, it is easily seen that a whole people could not agree to a law of
this kind, and it is authorized at least to make representations against it,
189
since it cannot take this unequal distribution of burdens to be just.
The test for whether legislation is in accordance with right is not whether the people do
consent to it, but whether they could consent to it. All people do not decide on the law
and its justice and they must abide by the decisions of the legislators even if it goes
against their own judgment. Reading the above passage in Perpetual Peace as though
188
189
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Kant required all people to vote on whether a war is just or not goes against what he says
in the rest of his political philosophy.

Notably, Kant maintains the need for

representative government in which not all but only some decide for all, and in which the
laws put forward by the legislature are legitimate regardless of whether the people
consent to the laws or not, because it is better to live in the civil condition and to
gradually reform its institutions and laws than to live in the state of nature where there
can be no laws to begin with. It is true that Kant does endorse voting as a decision
procedure and that some people may be in a position to vote on whether a war will
happen or not. In this case, representatives, who should have the interests of all citizens
and cobeneficiaries at heart, may have to vote on whether to engage in warfare but the
procedural mechanism is not what makes the resort to war less likely. What if the war
would benefit those who were in a position to vote and not their representatives? What
makes the resort to war less likely is that representatives in this ideal situation are duty
bound to respect the rights of those they represent. If they fail in this duty, citizens must
work to gradually reform the laws such that their rights are respected. The government in
this case would suffer from a lack of legitimacy but the decision to go to war would still
be justified. On Kant’s view of representation, it is likely that not very many people
would actually get the chance to decide on whether the state goes to war or not.
Kant holds that a situation in which all decide is necessarily despotism because a
majority will always get to decide against a dissenting minority. In order to solve the
problem of who gets to decide for all Kant says that the people must be represented by
officials whose mandate is to ensure that their rights as autonomous individuals are
maintained. According to Kant, the best government is one with the most representation,
meaning that there are a very small number of representatives (and possibly only one
person) representing the interests of all. Kant makes this point clear in the explanation of
the first definitive article for perpetual peace as follows:
It can therefore be said that the smaller the number of persons exercising the
power of a state (the number of rulers) and the greater their representation,
so much the more does its constitution accord with the possibility of
republicanism, and the constitution can hope by gradual reforms finally to
raise itself to this. On this basis it is already harder in an aristocracy than in
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a monarchy to achieve this sole constitution that is perfectly rightful, but in
190
a democracy it is impossible except by violent revolution.
The representative is given the mandate to use her best judgment to rule over the people
and is constrained in the types of laws that she can make by whether or not it respects
the freedom of the citizens. My freedom as a citizen is guaranteed when my rights are
secured by a government capable of enforcing them against others and the rights that
are guaranteed are those that apply equally to all citizens. Those placed in the position
of ruling over others must ask themselves in legislating and executing the laws whether
they are consistent with the freedom of each of the citizens. So the type of consent that
Kant must be talking about in the passage above is not whether the citizens actually
consent to the war, which they may or may not do, but whether they could possibly
consent and have that consent be consistent with their right to freedom. In the case of
war, if an outside force threatens the security of the nation, this undermines the
government’s ability to carry out its functions, which was the condition for leaving the
state of nature, so it is impossible for the citizens to not consent to defending themselves
against attack. If, on the other hand, the rulers wage war for their own benefit, or for
the benefit of some small group but not for all, then the people could not have consented
to taking on the burdens of fighting that Kant lists.

191

The burdens of fighting an aggressive war are the same whether the adversary is
a republic or any other form of government, so it should make no difference to the
citizens of a republic whether their adversary is a republic or not. Republics that near
the ideal will fight fewer wars, according to Kant, because the leaders are asking
themselves whether or not their citizens could consent to the actions taken on their
behalf all the time. They do not fight fewer wars against other similar government
types.
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It is important to recall that what we have been concerned with here is Kant’s ideal theory of
republicanism. Voting in the ideal world may be unnecessary because we could reach a consensus through
reason. However, in the real world voting plays an important role both as a procedural mechanism and as a
symbol of the consent of the governed.
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One reason why we might think that republics would not fight wars against other
republics but that they would fight against non-republics is because the citizens would not
consent to fighting against those they see as reasonable and capable of engaging in
trustworthy negotiations. This brings us to the cultural argument. This version of DPT
holds that there is something about the shared culture of democracy that makes
democracies trust one another more than other forms of government. For this reason they
manage to settle their disputes in ways that avoid warfare, through negotiation and
bargaining, which is how all democratic decisions are made. The next section will take
up this version of DPT to show why, even though Kant advocated that nations should
build their strategies for negotiation and building trust, he did not think that this trust was
built on the type of government that a state had, but on the concrete steps taken to
improve their relationships.

4.2 The Norms and Culture Argument
Bruce Russett, probably the most prominent advocate of the cultural thesis,
explains why the culture of democracy works to constrain violence against other
democracies:
The basic norm of democratic theory is that disputes can be resolved
without force through democratic political processes that in some balance
ensure both majority rule and minority rights. A norm of equality operates
both as voting equality and certain egalitarian rights to human dignity.
Democratic government rests on the consent of the governed, but justice
demands that consent not be abused. Resort to organized lethal violence, or
the threat of it, is considered illegitimate, and unnecessary to secure one’s
192
“legitimate” rights.
What this means is that democratic decisions are made through a process that involves
discussion and compromise. When two democracies have a dispute at the international
level, they each know that the other is experienced with dealing with negotiation and
compromise and so they are more likely to engage in these types of diplomatic actions
than to come to blows with others who are like them. Sebastien Rosato explains the
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“normative logic”, meaning the way that the cultural norms of society function to
constrain the actions of democratic citizens and their leaders, as follows:
Proponents of the normative logic argue that one important effect of
democracy is to socialize political elites to act on the basis of democratic
norms whenever possible. In essence, these norms mandate nonviolent
conflict resolution and negotiation in a spirit of live-and-let-live. Because
democratic leaders are committed to these norms they try, as far as possible,
to adopt them in the international arena. This in turn means that
democracies both trust and respect one another when a conflict of interest
arises between them. Sentiments of respect derive from a conviction that
the other state adheres to the same norms and is therefore just and worthy of
accommodation. Trust derives from the expectation that the other party to
the dispute is also inclined to respect a fellow democracy and will be
proscribed normatively from resorting to force. Together these two causal
mechanisms – norm externalization and mutual trust and respect – make up
the normative logic and explain why democracies rarely fight one
193
another.
The mutual trust and respect that democracies are expected to show one another are
supposed to override their desire to pursue their self-interest through violent means.
Kant thinks that we can override the effects of self-interest in the state of nature that
characterizes the international realm, so it is initially tempting to think that he would
endorse a version of the cultural argument, even if he did not explicitly discuss this
possibility. However, because the cultural argument is supposed to work because a
country is a democracy, and not because of any specific formal treaties or agreements
that it has made ahead of the peace, there are two possible Kantian responses. The first
option would be to say that it is a coincidence that no democracies have fought one
another.
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The second would be to say that it is because they have engaged in the

formal peace-building exercises that Kant suggested in the six preliminary articles.
Since it is clearly the case that our modern democracies fail to satisfy the preliminary
articles, even minimally, there is little reason to think that Kant would endorse this
view.
193

Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," The American Political Science
Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 586.
194

See Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace." For a criticism of the democratic peace showing
that it is statistically insignificant and predicted by random chance.

121

In contrast with democratic peace theorists, Kant does give us a list of the things
that republics would have to do in their own internal domestic cases to make them less
likely to go to war, however, like the democratic peace theorists these seem to be things
that would make them less likely to fight at all and not merely with other republics. As
we saw above, the preliminary articles (PA’s) 1-6 provide some guidance as to what
states ought to do in order to decrease their reliance on violence as the only means of
adjudicating disputes at the international level. Kant’s approach is internal looking as
opposed to external; he cares much more about how each state runs its own affairs as
opposed to what others are doing. Because of this his theory provides an account of how
we can all move independently towards the conditions that will make perpetual peace
possible. The likelihood that a state will choose to act in accordance with the PA’s is
significantly improved if it has adopted a republican constitution as its mode of
governance. And there is a greater likelihood that a number of states that have adopted
republican governments will respect one another and agree to disarm and abide by the
other PA’s due to this mutual trust. The structural and cultural arguments for DPT have
two different thresholds to meet when assessing the empirical data.

The cultural

argument requires more than a simple risk-assessment to determine whether it is
preferable to go to war or not. Because the cultural argument holds that democratic
nations will have mutual respect and trust due to their shared values we would expect not
only that they will not actively engage in hostilities with one another but also, that they
will not threaten to use force. If we accept the data that no democracies have gone to war
in the last 200 years, we must still take into consideration the posturing and threats of war
between democracies as potentially damaging to the cultural thesis.
Christopher Layne describes cases in which democracies have engaged in violent
posturing towards one another.

In these so-called “near misses” wars between two

democracies almost happened. Layne discusses four “near misses” in order to show that
a better predictor of whether two countries will go to war with one another is power
interests and not governmental structure. The four examples of near misses that Layne
details are clear instances in which the predictions that democratic peace theory would be
expected to make are all violated. If the norms of the democratic peace guided relations
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between democracies then we would expect democratic norms to be the things that led to
the “near misses” in question, as Layne explains:
Democratic peace theory, if valid, should account powerfully for the fact
that serious crises between democratic states ended in near misses rather
than in war. If democratic norms and culture explain the democratic peace,
in a near-war crisis, certain indicators of the democratic peace theory should
be in evidence: First, public opinion should be strongly pacific. Public
opinion is important not because it is an institutional constraint, but because
it is an indirect measure of mutual respect that democracies are said to have
for each other. Second, policymaking elites should refrain from making
military threats against other democracies and should refrain from making
preparations to carry out threats. Democratic peace theorists waffle on this
point by suggesting that the absence of war between democracies is more
important than the absence of threats. But this sets the threshold of proof
too low. Because the crux of the theory is that democracies externalize their
internal norms of peaceful dispute resolution, then especially in a crisis, one
should not see democracies threatening other democracies. And if threats
are made, they should be a last-resort option rather than an early one. Third,
democracies should bend over backwards to accommodate each other in a
crisis. Ultimata, unbending hard lines, and big-stick diplomacy are the stuff
195
of Realpolitik, not the democratic peace.
Layne documents four near misses where democracies almost came to blows: “(1) the
United States and Great Britain in 1861 ("the Trent affair"); (2) the United States and
Great Britain in 1895-96 (the Venezuela crisis); (3) France and Great Britain in 1898 (the
Fashoda crisis); and (4) France and Germany in 1923 (the Ruhr crisis).”

196

In all four of

these cases the democracies in question failed to live up to the expectations of the
democratic peace.

They engaged in big-stick diplomacy, their populations and

government bodies supported going to war, and Layne concludes that the best explanation
for why they did not go to war in the end was not because of some mutual respect for
other democratic people, but because of realist concerns. Instead of being concerned with
using non-violent conflict resolution whenever possible, the states in question backed off
from engaging in warfare because it was deemed to be too costly. In other words, if the
realist predictions are right, then the internal governmental form of a state has nothing to
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do with whether it will go to war against an opponent. Instead it makes sense to look at
other indicators, such as relative military power. On this count, Kant was right to insist
that the gradual demilitarization of states is key to ensuring peaceful relations between
them. However, he was acutely aware of the risks of being the only one disarming. In
order for it to be rational to disarm others must be doing the same. However, in spite of
the fact that many scholars claim that mutual republicanism is the key to ensuring that the
conditions listed in the PA’s be realizable, I would like to suggest that Kant could not
have held this view because he did not think of the actual world as divided into republics
and non-republics.
Some commentators of Kant’s Perpetual Peace suggest that the preliminary
articles and definitive articles are like the preliminary and definitive articles of a real
existing peace treaty.

197

The preliminary articles in these documents typically listed the

initial terms of the agreement to lay down arms, resulting in the end to hostilities, while
the definitive articles were usually drafted later and set out the conditions under which the
two parties would agree not to fight again in the future. Without the definitive articles
then, even if active hostilities had broken off, the threat of war would always be present
and so the two parties could not be said to be at peace, at least not on a Kantian definition
of peace. In order for a real peace to be instituted the parties would have to formally
agree to definitive articles of peace. While it might be tempting to read Kant’s Perpetual
Peace in this temporal way there are some problems with this interpretation.

The

preliminary articles for perpetual peace need not all obtain in order for countries not to be
at war with one another. In other words, it is possible for countries to be coexisting
without an outbreak of war even if they have not moved towards removing the likely
causes of war between them. It is of course more plausible that they would remain at
peace for a longer period of time if these conditions obtained. Moreover, the definitive
articles do not necessarily come “after” the preliminary articles in the sense that they are
solidifying the preliminary articles. If anything, the empirical data that serves to justify
the democratic peace thesis today shows that it is possible to have the definitive articles
without the preliminary articles being fulfilled.
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The current global system has vastly more capable militaries than any Kant could
have fathomed at his time, and democratic nations are at the forefront of military
armament. The definitive articles taken together seem to suggest that the only form of
government compatible with perpetual peace is republican and that only republican
governments will enter the federation of free states and be engaged in “universal
hospitality”. However, this reading requires that we be able to carefully distinguish
republican from non-republican forms of government. Republicanism for Kant tells us
only how the state makes use of its power, and Kant divides governmental forms into two
types based on how they make use of power. Kant defines “republicanism”, as “the
political principle of separation of the executive power (the government) from the
legislative power” and “despotism” is “that of the high-handed management of the state
by the laws the regent has himself given, inasmuch as he handles the public will as his
198

private will.”

The transition between despotism and republicanism is something that

Kant says can happen “by gradual reform”

199

so there is the possibility of a state being in

transition from despotism to republicanism. The consequences of this on DA 1 is that all
states being republican may not require them all to have achieved perfection on this score.
It may be enough for them to tend towards republicanism but not to have gotten there
perfectly. If this is the case, then one would expect many imperfect republics to be
joining in the voluntary league of nations and that they would do this because it is rational
to do so and not because they share some overarching culture with the other nations doing
likewise. The transition from the state of nature to the civil condition does not pretend to
require that the inhabitants of an area share a common culture and that this is the basis for
their coming together. They institute the rightful civil condition on the basis that it is
rational to do so that each may guarantee his right not to be interfered with. Nations are
in a similar situation, and they will agree to enter into voluntary association because it is
rational, not because they hold the others with whom they negotiate in high esteem. If
there were some cultural norms keeping people from going to war against one another we
would be living in a better world than the one we live in, one in which the chances of
198
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achieving perpetual peace would be greatly increased. We do not, however, live in this
world and so people do not all want to cooperate and it is because of this refusal to
cooperate that we live under the “constant danger of war breaking out.”

200

Kant says that we have the duty to try to achieve the conditions that would be
favourable for achieving perpetual peace, but this does not mean that he thought that this
was a realizable condition given the nature of the world in which we happen to find
ourselves. We may today be living in slightly better circumstances for the achieving of
perpetual peace because some nations have come together and agreed not to fight against
one another in the future.

But this fact alone cannot justify the optimism of the

democratic peace theorists to predict that democratic nations will not fight one another in
the future. In fact, the very thing that Kant thought was most indicative of the desire to
maintain peaceful relations in the future, the entering into of the league of nations, is not
even mentioned as a factor in support of the democratic peace thesis. Whether or not a
democracy has entered into the league of nations does nothing to the prediction that it will
not fight another democracy. If the democratic peace theorists allowed this to play a role
then they would have to predict that all nations entering these international organizations
were less likely to go to war against one another, which is clearly not the case. The
United Nations, for example, comprises many nations that are not democratic and the
theory does not want to conclude that these nations are less likely to fight one another.

4.3 Why Kant is not a Democratic Peace Theorist
Because of the structure of Kant’s program for perpetual peace and the way in
which it is tied to his larger political and legal philosophies he held a much more robust
account than democratic peace theorists of how to go about creating a more stable world
order. Democratic peace theorists hold that there is something about democracies that
makes them less likely to fight but when pushed to state what this feature is their answers
point to either institutions, which one would expect to make them more peaceful
generally, or to the less well defined “norms and culture”. Even with a more robust
account of how to achieve perpetual peace Kant does not authorize politicians in more
200
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perfected versions of republicanism to influence the internal workings of other states,
even if this would predictably make the achievement of perpetual peace more likely. It
would go against the autonomy of these groups, which is at the base what Kant is
concerned with, and so it would be contrary to the goals of politics to impose upon
another political unit a better form of government. Whatever form of government is in
place it is a departure from the state of nature and so a civil condition that is to some
degree rightful and capable of securing the rights of its citizens. To interfere in this
process would be to place yourself in the position of judge where there cannot be a higher
authority. Perhaps in the case of a total breakdown back to the state of nature Kant would
authorize that force could be used to promote the return to a rightful condition but he is
not clear on this point.
As a final point of comparison between Kant and the democratic peace theorists,
consider the difference between their respective condemnations of spreading
republicanism or democracy by force. Whereas Kant’s condemnation is a logical one, it
would go against the logic of the perpetual peace as well as of political sovereignty more
generally, democratic peace theory tends logically towards the conversion of nondemocracies and democratization by force is contested on practical grounds. Russett, for
example, does not condone the use of violence to spread democracy to those countries
that are not yet democratic. However, this is not for some principled reasons but because
it “probably would not work”.

To elaborate Russett’s view, he recognizes that “a

misunderstanding of [democratic peace theory] could encourage war making against
201

authoritarian regimes, and efforts to overturn them”
him as promoting this kind of action.

but that we should not interpret

This is a far cry from Kant’s principled

condemnation of the use of violence outside of self-defence. Although the democratic
peace may seem consistent with Kant’s argument for perpetual peace what I hope to have
shown is that Kant’s positive program is far more robust than that of the democratic
peace. Most importantly, Kant’s perpetual peace is based on the gradual adoption of
articles that are clearly linked to fewer hostilities, disarmament, limits on legitimate
takeover of sovereign territories, etc. and he is against the use of force to achieve
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supposed future benefits.

In terms of approach and conclusions Kant’s position is

compatible with a full-fledged just war theory.

Because defensive wars must be

legitimate for Kant, he also has to elaborate a jus in bello detailing what is allowed in the
case that a country finds itself in the situation of defending itself against outside
aggression. While Kant does not mention any explicit rule of jus in bello proportionality
in conducting military operations he does, as Brian Orend argues, mention a principle of
202

discrimination that must obtain between combatants and non-combatants.

Moreover,

it is clear that Kant deplores the use of “intrinsically heinous means” which would either
make the citizens performing the heinous acts unfit to be citizens or would threaten the
goal of perpetual peace. Democratic peace theorists have generally been reluctant to
elaborate on the prescriptive side of their theory apart from a general hostility to the idea
of spreading democracy by force. However, since the theory purports to be both an
explanation of the data and to provide guidance on issues of public policy, this failure to
provide an account of what is wrong with spreading democracy by force, not just
practically but also theoretically, is necessary. I believe that I have shown that Kant’s
political theory is inconsistent with democratic peace theory and that he provides an
alternate account of how to promote a lasting peace between nations.

4.4 The Democratic Peace in Theory
While Kant may have been at odds with the thinking behind the democratic peace
at a theoretical level, after the apparent 200 years of successful non-intervention by
democratic states with respect to one another, are there independent empirical reasons for
taking seriously the idea that the spread of democracy, through whatever means, will lead
eventually to a more peaceful international order? This section will examine the
arguments for and against the democratic peace thesis both from the point of view of its
fit with the empirical data as well as its coherence as a theoretical model.
Democratic peace theorists are quick to point out that “the finding that democracies
do not fight other democracies” is “a law-like cornerstone of knowledge about
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international politics”

203

but as Rasler and Thompson remark, “findings are one thing,

explanations of this ‘law’ represent something else entirely.”

204

With democratic peace

theory, or the explanations offered for why it is the case that democracies tend not to fight
against one another, there are as many explanations as there are theorists.

Many

criticisms of democratic peace theory focus on whether the data set that generates the
claim that no (or almost no) democracies have gone to war with one another is reliable or
on whether it is statistically significant, or both. One popular method of argument against
the democratic peace data has been to challenge the assertion that no democracies have
gone to war against one another. For example, David E. Spiro has claimed that the data
used to confirm the democratic peace hypothesis depends on omitting certain conflicts
from consideration as well as minimising the significance of these so called exceptions.
Some of the examples used to counter the claim that no democracies have fought one
another are: the American Civil War, which is explained away owing to the fact that this
was a civil war and not interstate violence by some, or by others because the confederacy
had not had time to properly elect its officials.

The Second Philippine War of 1899

between the US and the Philippines is likewise not counted, owing to the fact that the
Philippines did not hold elections before losing the war to the US. The Second World
War doesn’t count as a war between democracies on two counts. First because Hitler had
suspended the constitution rendering Nazi Germany no longer democratic when the war
was initiated,
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and also the Finns bound with the Axis powers in 1944 to avoid

surrendering to the USSR, but the decision to join the Axis was repealed at the next
election cycle.
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These various exceptions and others are minimized or not counted on

the grounds that they do not correspond to the correct definition of democracy, or because
the effects of democracy could not yet expected to be pacifying. Different authors use
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different data sets to get the result that there have been no, or virtually no, wars between
democracies and in spite of the disagreement with respect to the definition of democracy
given primacy or the list of who should count under the definition as democratic there is
still widespread agreement on the result that there have been no wars between
democracies and that if there are “borderline cases” as Russett and Moaz allow, then they
are not significant and the pacifying effects of democratization remain in place. This may
well be the case but Spiro points to at least one reason to be sceptical. If different
theorists have different definitions of democracy and then they choose the data set that
best matches their preferred definition. Without widespread agreement among scholars
then we are getting the individual subjective judgments of a number of theorists not some
consensus that can be verified easily by third parties to get the so called immutable fact of
the democratic peace. Moreover, even if the fact of the democratic peace were selfevident, Spiro point to a further reason to be critical of the statistic that no democracies
have gone to war.
While the assertion that no democracies have ever gone to war against one
another is compelling, it may not be of any real statistical significance, given the number
of democracies that have historically existed in combination with the likelihood of their
207

coming to blows.

Wars are relatively rare occurrences overall, with wars being far

more likely to occur between countries that are in close proximity to one another.
Certainly one part of the explanation for why no two democracies have historically gone
to war is that many of the world’s democracies are located so far from one another that
the chances of their fighting a war against one another are minimal or nonexistent (think
of the chances of Australia and Canada fighting, for example). So, you do not need to
claim that democratic norms or institutions have any role to play in an explanation of the
fact that democracies have not fought one another; random chance predicts the same
result without the complication of having to account for some feature of democracy that
must be doing some work. That is not to say that random chance is the best possible
explanation, but merely to show that the democratic peace hypothesis is not better suited
than realism to explaining why it is that certain countries go to war against one another
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and not others. We have seen some other reasons above why we might prefer a realist
explanation to the democratic peace in the cases of near misses argued for by Layne.

4.5 The Democratic Peace in Practice
Even if it turns out that the democratic peace thesis is the best explanation for why
it is that democracies do not fight one another, there are further theoretical reasons put
forward in the literature as to why this is a dangerous idea from the point of view of its
applicability in guiding policy decisions. In the hands of politicians democratic peace
theory has been used to justify foreign intervention on the preventive grounds of “making
the world safe for democracy”. The attempts at spreading democracy by force that have
been tried in recent decades have been far from successful. However, even if there were
overwhelming successes, like the transformations of Germany and Japan after the Second
World War, there are independent reasons for rejecting the spread of democracy by
force.
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R. William Ayres has suggested that apart from the feasibility of promoting
democracy by force abroad, it is contrary to democracy at home to promote it in this way.
Ayres examines the democratic norms and institutions that are present in the American
context and how they developed historically, he then goes on to examine the implications
of fighting wars in order to promote democracy on these same institutions and values at
home. What he argues is that given the nature of American democracy, it is contrary to
the values of freedom and pursuit of the common good to violently promote these goals
abroad. For Ayres the fundamental goals of democracy are to have a government strong
enough to provide for the common good of all its citizens while at the same time placing
limits on the power of government such that it does not go against the freedom of each
citizen to decide how to live their own lives. In Ayres’ words: The “challenge of the
‘first wave’ of democracy was to design a government strong enough to provide for the
common good (defense against enemies, ordered society, etc.) while not giving it power
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to undermine the freedom of its citizens.”

209

There is an obvious tension between these

two goals and it is not clear that the American case marks a successful attempt to deal
with this tension, but these are the values that animated the founding fathers and continue
to be at issue in American politics today.
Ayres goes on to elaborate three reasons why promoting democracy
abroad by force undermines democracy at home: 1. The threat and burden of a strong
standing army 2. The weakening of the separation of powers and 3. Stifling honest
debate. As Ayres puts it:
Forceful democratization efforts thus require the United States government
to undergo at least three institutional transformations contrary to basic
principles of American democracy. First, the government must bring in
significant tax revenues to support a standing army, which poses a double
threat (fiscal and coercive) to citizens’ liberty. Second, power and decisionmaking authority must be concentrated in the executive branch, in violation
of the separation of powers. And third, the government must find means
other than reason (i.e., passion or false information) to persuade citizens to
210
support positions they would not otherwise find in their interest.
On the first point Ayres notes that the US requires a strong professional armed forces
with an army, navy and air force in order to carry out wars far from home. Having this
strong military force is a threat for two reasons: a. the military could be used against
citizens at home (coercive threat) and b. the taxes required to finance the military put an
economic burden on the population restricting their freedom (fiscal threat). The second
and third threats to the ideals of democracy are related in that they rest on the assumption
that wars are generally unpopular with citizens, regardless of their justifications. Because
it is unlikely that the population will support a war effort for the purpose of spreading
democracy (at least before it has been declared) the ability to declare a war has been
moved from the congress, which is directly responsible to the population, to the
president. When the president can unilaterally declare a war without the support of
congress and the people more generally we are not in the situation being described by
209
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democratic peace theory, in which the population has the ability to even indirectly
influence the resort to war. Instead the institutions of democracy that are supposed to
guarantee that the population is being represented look a lot more like the structure of
monarchy or authoritarian regimes in which one can decide the fate of the many.
Regarding the third point, Ayres notes that the government must find some way to
motivate the population to support the war effort once a war has been declared. In the
case of the wars that have been waged by the US at least since the end of WWII the
strategy adopted has been to frame the lack of democracy in a foreign state as a threat to
security at home. In some cases, (the war in Iraq provides a striking example) the causes
for going to war were falsified in order to galvanize support for the war effort at home.
Democratic governance rests on the assumption that the people will come to the best
possible decision regarding what is in their interests given access to correct information.
If information is being falsified in order to produce results desired by those in power,
then the basic value of free discourse leading to rational decision-making has been
undermined. From a Kantian perspective the United States fails to meet many of the
ideals that would lead republics to have peaceful relations with their neighbours.
Practically speaking the spread of democracy by force has not led to a more peaceful
world, and it seems to move nations further from the conditions that would lead to a
lasting peace. In the following paragraphs I will show why democracy promotion by
outside influences is not likely to meet with success regardless of whether
democratization was achieved using lethal force or not.
Andrea Kathryn Talentino presents a convincing argument as to why we should
not put our hopes for a lasting peace in the democratization of nations that are currently
undemocratic.

211

Her scepticism with regards to democratic peace theory applies to the

prescriptive element of the theory, which states that we should actively promote the
adoption of democracy as a mode of government in currently undemocratic nations in
order to secure a lasting peace. It may well be the case that current democracies are
unlikely to go to war with one another owing to factors pointed out by democratic peace
theorists.
211
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historical time and those that are adopting democracy today are not in the same position
as those earlier democracies. Talentino’s paper tracks the failures of new democracies to
develop robust and stable institutions that effectively achieve the ideals of safeguarding
human rights against abuse. She attributes this failure to a lack of citizen participation in
the functioning of the government. To summarize, while the new leaders in countries
like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq and Haiti may have been elected in apparently contested
elections, which satisfies the most basic requirements of democracy, citizens are not often
involved in the process of governing day to day. This is a serious flaw in building a
transition from other forms of government to democracy because, as Talentino notes:
“From the point of view of democratic theory, citizen involvement in political life is a
necessary means of inculcating the values that support democratic behaviour.
Participation leads to the broadening and deepening of democratic principles, which
ultimately strengthens democracy through habituation.”

212

In stark contrast with what

would be required to develop strong democracies abroad, international actors engage in
nation building by dealing almost exclusively with political elites. Talentino remarks that
this top-down exercise in nation building “becomes manifest in a sense of imposition, a
belief that international actors are forcing changes that are not reflective of or sensitive to
local interests.”
the people.”

214
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In the end the imposed government “is not viewed as being of or for

The citizens may have formally consented to the power being placed over

them but this is not enough to guarantee the legitimacy of the government. The standard
for legitimacy depends upon the government as being viewed as actually serving the
interests of the citizens.
As we saw in the last chapter, for Kant, this continued test of legitimacy is far
more important than the initial acceptance of the procedure that brought the government
into power. Citizens may not have had much of a choice at the initial time that the
government came to power but it can still pass the test of guaranteeing the safety and
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wellbeing of the citizens. Citizen participation and an ability to freely express political
dissent are necessary for creating a strong democracy that is likely to have the attributes
necessary for democratic peace theory to yield significant results. Recent trends in nation
building that disenfranchise the citizenry are unlikely to produce the desired results of
pacifying international relations. Citizens in these new democracies often do not feel that
the government represents them. Instead, they see the government as exploitative, the
opposite of what one would expect from a government elected by the people and
accountable to them.
For example, Talentino recounts the results of a survey of the citizens of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In the survey, citizens of the DRC were
asked the following question: “If the state was a person how would you interact with
him?” and the most frequent response to the question was “kill him”.

215

In Afghanistan,

introducing democratic voting procedure for selecting the government had the perverse
effect of further strengthening radical organizations.

In the Afghani case “[l]arge,

established, ethnic parties with the capacity to mobilize across a single issue did well,
216

while newer groups that pursued a more complex platform were at a disadvantage.”

Similar problems were felt in Bosnia where “the problem with elections has been their
tendency to enshrine ethnic or sectarian divisions within the political system.”

217

While

nation builders were pushing the need for elections “the compressed time frame did not
allow moderate groups to develop or establish agendas and so rewarded the existing,
ethnically centered, hard-line parties.”

218

Far from contributing to the peaceful world

order that democratic peace theorists hope for, external intervention in nation building
seems to have the effect of relating democracy with violence and instability. Kant
warned that sovereign nations have to progress towards the ideal of republicanism on
their own and cannot be forced to adopt republicanism by force. Perhaps his advice on
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this point should be heeded and we should be less quick to point to democratization as a
panacea for problems of interstate violence.
The perverse effects of trying to promote democracy abroad in order to secure
peace at home are felt not only when states promote these ends by force. A preferred
method of trying to promote regime change is through economic sanctions. Instead of
engaging in all out war with a state that may be viewed as posing a threat to democracy,
economic sanctions are put in place, often with the explicit goal of promoting human
rights abroad. What A. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen have argued is that economic
sanctions placed on a country, even when those sanctions are explicitly tied to promoting
democracy and human rights, have a tendency to reduce the rights and subsequent
opportunities for a grassroots democratic transition to take place. As with the more
forceful promotion of democracy through warfare and regime change, economic
sanctions tend to strengthen those already in power by giving them an external enemy to
combat. Those in power pass the burden of the economic sanctions to citizens and claim
a need to reduce rights and freedoms in order to counter these economic attacks. While
those applying economic sanctions may have the best interests of the citizens in mind
when trying to promote democracy through this tool, Drury and Peksen conclude that:
The desire of decision makers to spread democracy as a means of spreading
peace in the world is problematic when sanctions are involved. Although
economic coercion is one of the most commonly used policy tools for
democracy promotion, as we have demonstrated, it is counterproductive. If
sanctions undermine democracy, they also inhibit the spread of the
219
democratic peace.
Taken together with Talentino’s findings, even if democracy is not being promoted
through warfare, in practice the act of spreading democracy abroad through top-down
interactions with local governments is counter-productive in promoting the democratic
peace.
What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that we have multiple reasons to be
sceptical of democratic peace theory. At the level of the theory’s data analysis, there are
219
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reasons to prefer a realist explanation for the observed peace between democracies. If the
fact of the democratic peace is maintained it does not provide a firm guide for foreign
policy because attempts at spreading democracy, by force or otherwise, have proven to be
unsuccessful. If we were truly interested in achieving a lasting peace between nations
then we would do better to adopt a version of just war theory informed by a Kantian
perspective that attempts to transcend the realist paradigm in international relations. In
the next chapter I will elucidate the version of just war theory that I believe holds the
greatest chance of meeting the task of a more peaceful global order.
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5

In Support of a Modern Conception of Just War Theory

This concluding chapter has two goals. First, I will draw together an argument for nonintervention that finds its support in the Modern conception of just war theory. This
approach begins with Grotius and finds its full expression in Kant. My emphasis will be
on two aspects of what I am calling Modern just war theory; the separation of jus ad
bellum from jus in bello and the focus on the individual as the locus of the right to go to
war in defense of civil rights. This Modern conception, I will suggest, lies in stark
contrast with the earlier Classical conception of just war theory, which locates the right to
go to war in the authority of kings and princes to rule over their subjects and, following
from this, makes concerns of jus ad bellum such as right authority and intention the
central focus of the theory. On this conception concerns of fighting justly are subordinate
to the concern of having the proper authority to go to war. Depending on the type of
enemy that you are facing and the nature of the cause for which you are fighting, the
limits on what is permissible will change accordingly. Contrast this with the Modern
view, which holds the principles of jus in bello constant regardless of the threat being
faced.
In the second half of the chapter, I will address contemporary challenges to the Modern
conception that undermine the separateness of jus ad bellum from jus in bello.
Specifically, I will examine Michael Walzer’s argument for the supreme emergency
exemption, which allows extraordinary measures that would otherwise be impermissible
according to the rules of jus in bello to be used in times of great peril. Finally, I will
present Jeff McMahan’s position on just war theory presented in his 2009 book Killing in
War. In this book and related papers, McMahan argues against what he labels the
“traditional” and what I have been calling the “Modern” position of just war theory,
which maintains that there is moral equality between combatants. In arguing against the
moral equality of combatants, McMahan undermines the foundation of jus in bello, which
requires that combatants on both sides of a conflict be able to satisfy the rules of
engagement regardless of the ultimate justice of their cause. There are a number of
reasons why this moral equality of combatants is normally understood to be a necessary
element of just war theory. For one, there is a great deal of uncertainty in politics and it
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is often very difficult to tell whether the cause for which a country is fighting is in fact
just until after the fact. To complicate matters, sometimes neither side to a conflict has a
just cause at all. It is in the interest of all parties to fight in a way that causes the least
amount of damage regardless of the justness of the cause being fought for. Secondly,
even if you believe one side to be unjust and the other just, soldiers cannot be held
accountable for actions that they took on the orders of their superiors. If this were the
case, and unjust combatants risked being tried and convicted of murder once the war is
over, they will be much more likely to fight to the death and not accept conditions of
surrender. Contrary to this traditional view, McMahan suggests that combatants fighting
on the side of justice can satisfy the demands of jus in bello, while those who do not fight
for a just cause cannot (except for under some unusual circumstances).
Ultimately, what I hope to have shown through these and preceding arguments, is that
best hope for achieving a lasting peace between nations is through policies of nonintervention and the gradual negotiation of a balance of power through the establishment
of effective international organizations committed to peace building and disarmament.
Kant’s vision of a world without war may in fact be unrealizable, as he himself was well
aware. However, his program for moving towards this goal remains inspirational and
applicable in our current context. In arguing against ideological intervention in the
affairs of sovereign nations throughout this work a major puzzle remains. There may be
justifiable ideological reasons for intervening in the affairs of other nations in the case of
the blatant disregard for and abuses of human rights. In these cases, does it then become
possible to use warfare to actually save people from their persecutors? I believe that
looking to Kant again is suggestive of an answer. In the case of the blatant disregard for
human rights and a breakdown of the basic protections of the state, people in these
situations are already living in a state of nature. In the case that they ask for help from
the international community to fight in what amounts to a civil war against their former
rulers, then this is a justifiable use of force where you are going to war on behalf of an
ally already in the throes of war. Absent these conditions, there is no general right to
intervene for humanitarian causes absent a breakdown in the civil condition and a request
for aid.
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5.1 The Modern Turn in Just War Theory
In preceding chapters I discussed the different views of just war theory that were
developed from the time of St Augustine in the 4th century through to Kant’s critique of
the just war concept in the 18th century. While I hope that it is already clear that a
profound shift in thinking occurred with Grotius’ On the Rights of War and Peace I
would like to turn now to a previously unexplored result of Grotius’ rethinking of
international relations. Grotius, as I explained in chapter 2, turned the logic of just war
theory on its head, moving from a top down model of authority to a top up model. Where
the classical model of just war theory gave kings, princes, and religious leaders the right
to declare war in order to pursue their interests against hostile neighbours and their own
subjects, Grotius’ theory gives individuals the rights to defend themselves and then
extends this right to political leaders. If normal conditions apply and one state attacks
another, war is declared by the head of state who has been charged with the task of
defending the interests of his constituents.

If, however, the civil condition is not

instituted for some reason, individual citizens may have no choice but to defend
themselves and their interests, in other words, they must declare war on behalf of their
nation. This is precisely what Grotius argued for in defending the actions of his cousin,
Heemskerck whose ships attacked a Portuguese vessel as it was anchored in a Singapore
harbour. The details of the attack are such that under the codes of conduct for warfare of
the day, Heemskerck did not have the proper authority nor the proper conditions for
declaring war and seizing the spoils of the Portuguese vessel. Scott Shapiro and Oona
Hathaway argue in a forthcoming book that Heemskerck would have been considered a
pirate under the international law of the day and as such he would have been considered
an enemy of all people. Moreover, the prizes he captured would have been considered
the rightful property of the Portuguese. This is:
Because pirates did not have the legal power to go to war, they were not
legally permitted to kill or take property. If they did, they could be
prosecuted for murder and theft. Indeed, a pirate was considered an “enemy
of all mankind” (hostis humani generis) and could be punished severely not
220
only by their victims, but by anyone in the world.
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In order to legitimize the attack that Heemskerck carried out against the Portuguese ship,
Grotius argued that Heemskerck was acting as a soldier in a just war owing to previous
transgressions of the Portuguese and that because his cause was just the prize gained in
the war rightfully belonged to the victor.

221

However, it was far from clear that Heemskerck’s cause was actually just. The
Portuguese had not attacked him, so he was not acting in self-defence. Instead, what
Grotius argued was that the Portuguese were responsible for atrocities against the local
population as well as against the Dutch, who were simply trying to engage in peaceful
trade.

Grotius frames the attack against the Portuguese as an attack against their

inhumanity. He talks of the “savagery” of the Portuguese as well as their:
fierce insistence that so vast a portion of the world…should be dedicated
exclusively to promoting the wealth, not to say the luxury, of a single
people, while lying in great part neglected and useless, although this same
territory would suffice to keep many nations engaged in commerce and
222
supplied with sustenance?
Grotius describes the savagery of the Portuguese by reporting that:
…the Portuguese are regarded in those regions not as merchants but as
foreign robbers, destructive of human liberty and aflame no less with
avarice than with lust for dominion, so that no one associates with them any
more than is absolutely unavoidable. For when they first came to that part
of the world, they established colonies and strongholds, and then (the
natives having been insufficiently perceptive as to the ultimate objective of
these enterprises), they reduced all nearby territories to a state of slavery.
Presently, by participating in the civil wars of the East Indians, wars to a
great extent instigated by the Portuguese themselves, the latter acquired a
share in the victories; whereupon they turned the power that had been
increased through these wiles against the very persons by whose aid they
223
had been rendered victorious.
Furthermore, Grotius reports that the Portuguese engaged in:
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Unparalleled treachery, the mangling of women and children belonging to
the households of native potentates, the disturbance of [East Indian]
kingdoms through the poisonous activities of the Portuguese and
224
abominable cruelty displayed toward both subject and allied peoples.
By characterizing the Portuguese as having engaged in “abominable cruelty”, Grotius is
able to make the case that Heemskerck’s attack of the Portuguese ship was a just war in
defense of the human rights of the native populations and the rights of the Dutch, among
other nations, to engage in free trade. Grotius’ modern conception of individual rights
was central to both the right of the soldier to declare war on behalf of his nation, as well
as the cause for which his war was fought.
Making the individual central to his account of just war theory opened the way for
Grotius to focus on the principles of jus in bello. If individuals are now able, to be the
judges of whether or not they can engage in warfare then the moral burden of fighting
justly also falls to these same individuals. That is not to say that soldiers commissioned
to fight in wars will always be the judges of the justness of the war, in conventional
situations where two nations are at war the declaration of war would still normally come
from the head of state. However, as the Heemskerck example shows, sometimes soldiers
will have to make decisions regarding jus ad bellum categories like just cause, and they
are certainly the correct agents to be making judgments regarding jus in bello, which is
more properly theirs to monitor from their positions on the ground.
We tend, nowadays, to think of wars in extremely negative terms owing to the
huge stakes involved and the efficiency of advanced weaponry. However, warfare in the
past, and especially naval warfare, was far more limited in scope and aim than warfare
today. That is not to say that it could not be extremely costly and bloody. There were
wars in Europe that ravaged whole segments of the continent, like the Thirty Years War,
and brought with them death due to military action and the spread of diseases that would
kill huge segments of the population. However, the general pace of warfare and the
reasons for engaging in it were sometimes less far-reaching than the goals of something
like the 30 or 100 years wars. Disputes arising between differing national interests over
224
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small pieces of disputed territory or access to seaways beneficial for trade were routinely
fought without escalating into total wars for domination over populations necessitating
regime change. We no longer live in the kind of world that Grotius lived in. Notions of
territorial sovereignty and the standards that need to be met for a war to be considered
just have made limited forms of warfare extremely rare. The signing of the KelloggBriand Pact by many of the world’s nations in 1928 changed the political landscape such
that only wars for defensive purposes and defense of allies were considered just. The
parties to the pact agreed to the following articles:
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another.
ARTICLE II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
225
means.
The countries in question adopted these articles, yet they failed miserably at creating
conditions for a lasting peace between one another. However, what this pact did manage
to achieve was a change in the discourse and legal status of the violent use of arms
between nations. While a modern conception of just war theory would have allowed for
disputes between nations to be resolved by armed force if no other methods were proving
viable, since the beginning of the 20th century anything other than self-defence has been
deemed illegitimate and worthy of punishment at war tribunals following acts of
aggression. This has made politicians frame the wars they intend to engage in in terms of
self-defence. Public support for wars has also dwindled unless a reasonable case can be
made that they are necessary for self-defence. Kant, no doubt would have seen this
transition in a positive light. In the next section I turn to where Kant and Grotius would
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have agreed on matters of international relations and examine an alternative to Kant’s
program for perpetual peace, namely a realist balance of power situation with a global
hegemonic power, and finally link this to the democratic peace literature in an attempt to
show how the democratic peace is in fact shaped by realist considerations.

5.2 Kant, Hegemonic World Power and the Democratic
Peace Revisited.
While Kant may have characterized Grotius and other just war theorists as “sorry
comforters” and apologists for war they are in basic agreement regarding the state of the
international political community. States have special rights that individuals do not have
because there is no international body capable of adjudicating disputes that arise between
them. In the individual case, we are all parties to the social contract and must refrain
from seeking damages personally. Instead, we bring our disputes to courts and they act to
remedy conflicts between individuals.

The system is not perfect and interpersonal

conflict still exists in well-organized societies. However, political communities now have
fairly effective ways of dealing with violence between individuals through police and the
court systems. The greatest threats to individual security under social contract theory is
that the government will lose control of the apparatus of social coercion and that society
will become anarchic, or that the government will become so despotic as to threaten the
lives of its own citizens.

While wars between countries cost citizens in terms of

resources and their lives, civil wars and violent political regimes destroy the very fabric
of society and the rights that guarantee the protection of person and property.
Grotius and Kant disagree on one fundamental point. For Grotius, nations have a
right to go to war afforded to them by the natural right of individuals to seek reparation
for damages done. For Kant, trying to talk about rights in war is not possible because
wars occur in a situation where rights cannot hold because there is no rightful condition
to speak of. Kant makes this clear in Metaphysics of Morals § 61 as follows:
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Since a state of nature among nations, like a state of nature among
individual human beings, is a condition that one ought to leave in order to
enter a lawful condition, before this happens and rights of nations, and
anything external that is mine or yours which states can acquire or retain by
war are merely provisional. Only in a universal association of states
(analogous to that by which a people becomes a state) can rights come to
hold conclusively and a true condition of peace come about.226
Since war itself is an unlawful condition, there may be little use in discussing the
provisional rights that hold in this state, yet Kant does remark upon some of the things
that are impermissible in war because they are incommensurate with the goal of exiting
the state of nature among nations and creating a lasting peace.

For example:

Means of defense that are not permitted include: using its own subjects as
spies; using them or even foreigners as assassins or poisoners (among whom
so-called snipers, who lie in wait to ambush individuals, might well be
classed); or using them merely for spreading false reports – in a word, using
such underhanded means as would destroy the trust requisite to establishing
227
a lasting peace in the future.
This focus on the possibility of peace in the future, or a just war theory focused on jus
post bellum, is one of the conditions that separates the ideological justifications for
war from the limited political perspective. That is not to say that proponents of the
ideological reasons for going to war are not seeking peace, but they are not necessarily
seeking peace between nations, but rather the supplanting of these nations or a change
of regime that will alter the characters of the nations not merely their current political
aims. For example, the very same conflict can be described in very different terms and
this characterization will have an effect on the ability of a nation to rally troops to the
cause and what types of military actions are possible. The ongoing war in Iraq is a
case in point. It was, at the beginning of the conflict, promoted as a war against a
violent dictator thought to have weapons of mass destruction. Once it became clear
that there were no such weapons the focus shifted to liberating the people of Iraq from
their unjust oppressors. The war is most plausibly viewed as one for the control of
natural resources, however, this kind of justification for aggression being extremely
226
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unpopular in motivating troops to join in a war where they face great personal risks, it
is not surprising that the United States did not employ this strategy in justifying the
war. Not to mention that the United States has signed a number of international
treaties, which limit the kinds of justifications for war to self-defence and defense of
others.
The logical structures of the two types of defenses of war are very different. The “just
war logic” has the following structure:
P1: Individual nations have a right to go to war against one another in order to
secure their rights.
P2:

The rights of nations to go to war are derived from the rights of

individuals in the state of nature such as: the rights to protect their person and
property, the protection of allies and the right to retrieve stolen property.
P3: Even if you have a just cause for going to war, wars must be waged with
the least amount of violent force necessary to achieving the objective in question.
Moreover, innocent civilians may not be attacked in order to achieve military
objectives, as they are not responsible for the fighting.
Therefore: All actions in war must be undertaken with the goal of securing a
future peace between current enemies.
The “ideological logic” is as follows:
P1: Nations have a duty to protect their citizens against external threats.
P2: External threats include actively hostile nations as well as those who will
likely pose a threat in the future.
P3: Those who are likely to pose a threat in the future are those who already
pose a threat to their own populations by enforcing the wrong values (either through
religion, culture, or institutionally, etc.)
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P4: Because they already hamper their own populations’ ability to prosper, it
is permissible to effect regime change or usurp power from illegitimate rulers.
Therefore: Wars are just when they are defensive or serve the immediate goal
of liberating an oppressed population and the secondary goal of achieving a lasting
peace which will be possible because these possible enemies will now have the correct
religious, or moral or institutional set up and will not attack us in the future.
The “ideological” logic above is ideological in the sense that it rests on a
particular conception of the good, be it couched in religion, culture, governmental
form or some other “right” way of doing things. To put this in Rawlsian terms, those
who promote their particular version of the good over all others have a “thick”
conception of the good. In contrast with the thick conception of the good is a “thin”
version, which Rawls defines as those goods that every rational agent must desire in
order to fulfill his or her particular version of the good life. In other words, whatever
other things I may desire, I must have the things covered in the thin conception of the
good for my life to count as good.

228

Because the goals at stake with ideological warfare are so high, an “ends justify
the means” approach is often taken. It is not surprising, then that the principles of jus in
bello are not the focus of this approach. If the only way of achieving peace is to harm
civilians, or use disproportionate means, then these will likely be justifiable on the
grounds that what it at stake is the end of all wars. There is no driver for restraint when
the stakes are set this high. Moreover, the citizens who might be targeted in order to win
the war and bring about the lasting peace are already under threat from their own
governments. We saw the same kind of arguments running in the case of the religious
crusader. If your goal is to convert the idolatrous to the true religion that will bring their
souls eternal salvation, then the death of a few now is justified on the grounds that many
more will be saved in the future, and for all eternity. To intervene on behalf of a
downtrodden populace is to have their best interests at heart. The big picture justifies
putting aside the normal rules of conduct on behalf of a greater purpose. This is not
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merely a theoretical point. Politicians have often argued for interventionist policies on
the grounds that the current violence will be lead to greater peace at a future time. As
Kenneth Waltz notes, Woodrow Wilson talked about World War I in exactly these kinds
of terms. As Waltz wrote:
Woodrow Wilson, […] was quite capable of speaking as though motivated
primarily by concern for the safety of the state he led. … “Is the present
war,” Wilson once asked, “a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for
a new balance of power?” More frequently as the First World War
progressed he sounded the call to a war of “the Present against the Past,” of
“right against wrong,” a war to bring an end to the baleful power of
autocracies and to establish freedom and justice for the people of the
229
world.
Waltz goes on to note that wars that are fought with the lofty goal of establishing a
lasting peace are better thought of as crusades than as traditional wars. He paraphrases
Collingwood, an English philosopher-historian, who urges that:
It may then be incumbent upon the peace-states to clean up the whole world,
to turn wars from the object of the narrowly defined safety of the state into
crusades to establish the conditions under which all states can coexist in
230
perpetual peace.
However, the historical record is full of seemingly well-meaning pleas for intervention
on the basis that a lasting peace will ensue. So far the one constant in international
relations has been warfare and all the attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of
other nations have not led to a more peaceful world.
Grotius, like Kant, was convinced of the need for restraint in war based on the
same principle of needing to preserve the possibility of a future peace between current
enemies. However, unlike Kant, he fails to provide a coherent model upon which a
lasting peace can be built so as to escape the state of nature on a more permanent basis.
There are, of course, many possible ways that a lasting peace could be constructed. One
possibility that has proven to be fairly effective is to increase the territory of a hegemonic
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superpower that manages to maintain control over its local population. The Pax Romana,
or Roman peace lasted just over 200 hundred years, during which time there were no civil
wars over the entire legal jurisdiction of the Roman Empire. The Empire at this time
covered an impressive area spanning most of Western and Southern Europe, the North
African coast, up around to modern day Turkey. There were wars with foreign powers at
the edges of the Empire but there was a conspicuous lack of civil wars. The lack of civil
unrest is largely attributable to the consolidation of power in the hands of the emperor,
which was achieved under Augustus. Prior to Augustus’ consolidation of power into the
hands of the Emperor, annually elected magistrates had power over their individual
territories. As Paul Burton explains:
This changed with Augustus who, in addition to gathering most of the
constitutional powers of the annually elected Roman magistrates, as well as
the Roman senate and people under his personal control, began to exercise a
monopoly on the imperator title for himself and members of his immediate
family, and indeed perhaps as early as 40 B.C. even transformed the title
into an element of his personal name—Imperator Gaius Caesar. Augustus’
innovation gives some idea of the revolutionary shift in the balance of
power in the Roman domestic, rather than the external imperial order. Under
Imperator Augustus, domestic control shifted from the traditional “senate
and people of Rome,” senatus populusque Romanus (abbreviated to SPQR,
still visible on sewer covers and buses in the modern city of Rome) to a
231
single individual.
In addition to consolidating power into his own hands, Augustus also attempted to make
the borders of the Empire better defined and this led to the era of relative peace that
followed this large-scale political change. With an increased concentration of power
focused on keeping control of the civil population, there were fewer overall wars at the
borders and virtually no civil wars for just over 200 years.
Contrast this situation with the current era of peace being experienced between
democratic nations.

Democracy has become more and more popular as a mode of

governance; meanwhile, there have also been two world wars implicating many of these
same democracies. Since the end of World War II, the United States has become the
231

Paul Burton, "Pax Romana/Pax Americana: Perceptions of Rome in American Political Culture, 20002010," International Journal of the Classical Tradition 18, no. 1 (2011): 72.

149

world’s military leader and has gone to war with countless other nations often with the
explicit “civilizing mission” of spreading and making the world safe for democracy. As
Ali Parchami explains, the United States sees itself as having a “special mission to
restructure the international order.”

232

Just as there was a pacifying effect of living

within the bounds of the Roman Empire, and later of being under the control of the
British, there is a pacifying effect of being under the influence of American power.
While in the case of Rome and Britain the territorial control was more obvious, America
today yields power not through territorial annexation and direct control, but utilizes “soft”
tactics of economic pressure and, when this is not possible, “hard” techniques usually by
placing leaders more favourable to American control in power.

In foreign policy,

American hawks tend to promote these tactics with the rhetoric that America is an
“exceptional nation” that has taken on a burden of “benign imperium” in order to secure
the world against potential threats to the global peace.
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One way of understanding the so-called Pax Americana is through the lens of the
theory of hegemonic stability. “According to the theory,” as Parchami relates, “the US,
as hegemon, set out to promote a liberal international order based upon free trade and
integrated world markets. By presiding over the system, it provided other international
actors with incentives and security guarantees in favour of liberalization, while punishing
‘free-riders’ through positive and negative sanction (i.e. persuasion and coercion).”
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When a global hegemon decides the term of the debate to suit her needs there is a great
risk involved in not complying with her wishes. Moreover, once the system is in place,
seeking to disrupt it in any way seems to be inviting warfare and instability, thereby
reinforcing the hegemon’s self-justification that she holds power benignly in the interests
of all. Putting this into the language of the democratic peace, if there is a lasting
observable peace between democracies, then we should be doing whatever is in our
power to promote the conditions that allow for this peace to continue, even if the peace
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comes at a cost and benefits some more than others, and even if the explanation for why
democracy correlates with peace is insufficient at the present time.
With the view of providing a more comprehensive account of the democratic
peace phenomenon, one that allows a place for realist considerations of power politics,
Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson look at various explanations for the democratic
peace that do not rely exclusively on the pacifying effect of democratic institutions and/or
culture. I believe that their account is helpful because it does not merely dismiss the data
that proves that a democratic peace does exist, while at the same time making room for
the possibility that “democracy” is not doing all the heavy lifting for the theory alone.
While they agree that democratic norms and culture may tell part of the story they offer a
comprehensive view of the multiple geopolitical reasons why we are currently in a period
of peace between democracies.
Rasler and Thompson argue that: “The influence of democratic regime type is
only one of a number of factors encouraging less conflict in contemporary world
politics.” And that: “The emergence and survival of democracies, and any consequences
thereof, is embedded within a larger context of structures and processes that share
responsibility for subsequent reductions in conflict behaviour.”
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In this light they

suggest a number of complementary factors that may influence the democratic peace
thesis. The first is the “reversed causal arrow hypothesis”, which asks us to consider
whether the effect of democracy on peace building runs exactly backwards to the way
suggested by the democratic peace. It may well be the case that democracy and peace are
causally connected, but peaceful periods may be the times under which democracy has a
chance to flourish and not the other way around. This hypothesis is sometimes called the
“reversed causal arrow hypothesis”.
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In support of this reversed causal arrow

hypothesis, Rasler and Thompson make the following claims:
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1. “The greater is the perceived external threat, the more likely is a state to
develop and maintain high levels of domestic power concentration.”
2. “The greater is the level of domestic power concentration, the less likely
a state is to democratize.”
3. “Controlling for external threat and domestic resource concentration, the
greater the level of democratization, the more likely it is that a state’s
foreign conflict behaviour will be constrained, especially with other
democratic states.”237
So, among other things, if you have hostile neighbours who threaten you, you are less
likely to adopt a democratic form of government in the first place. States in this kind of
situation tend towards more autocracy and less democracy. Not only do states under fear
of an external threat concentrate their power, regardless of regime type, they tend to
concentrate their power even more when an actual threat is ongoing. Many democracies
have in place extraordinary measures that temporarily suspend the normal workings of
the government in order to deal with situations like warfare and huge natural disasters.
This temporary suspension of democracy is seen to be legitimate because the external
threat is a greater cause of concern for the continuation of the nation, regardless of regime
type. Democracies are cumbersome in their decision making procedures, and as Kant
made clear, it is a far worse thing to lose the basic functioning of the government,
regardless of regime type, than to temporarily suspend some functions of government that
go beyond the basic function of maintaining the rule of law. So, if a threat can be made
to seem like it challenges the continued survival of the domestic government, then almost
anything is permitted in defense of such an important cause.
If the democratic peace is in fact a reality, but the causal arrow is reversed, as is
suggested by Rasler and Thompson, then clearly the goal of spreading democracy abroad
is helped by doing some of the things suggested by Kant in Perpetual Peace, including,
when possible, reducing military preparations and not posing a threat to others. This goal
has been partially achieved by, among others, the European Union, which has a number
237

Ibid., 44.

152

of member states that no longer maintain standing armies and have significantly reduced
investment in military spending. However, the history of European warfare is certainly
not to be emulated in terms of a strategy for peace building. European nations across the
continent have fought in almost every conceivable combination over the course of
recorded history and have engaged in some of the bloodiest wars of all time in the
twentieth century. Both World Wars were far from runaway victories for democracies
and Rasler and Thompson point out that the fate of the democratic peace would have
been very different had the other side won. The spread of autocracy and fascism was
definitely a live possibility prior to the end of World War II. Since America replaced the
old European powers as world hegemon and democratic watchdog they have gone to war
almost continuously, but each time with non-democracies. The main question that has
remained unchanged for just war theorists since the end of the Middle Ages is how to
achieve peace between current enemies.

Our enemies in the West used to be

characterized by their adherence to the wrong religion, but today the enemy is usually
characterized by regime type, although the old prejudices against “bad religions” seem to
be returning since September 11th.
So far we have looked at one way of securing a zone of peace, by overpowering
or eliminating enemies, annexing their territory and assimilating their native population.
In doing so you no longer have a hostile external threat, although you may have created
238

lasting tensions between minorities within your home population.

A second possibility

lies in negotiating terms of peace with enemies so as to solve future disputes by nonviolent means. Groups more likely to adopt the first strategy are those who can easily
overpower their potential enemies and who have enemies that they view as
untrustworthy. On the flip side, the second strategy of negotiation is more probable the
more the two sides view one another as similar and sharing in values so that the terms of
the agreement are more likely to be respected in the future. In other words, where
profound disagreements for various ideological reasons exist and victory will not be very
costly, nations are very likely to view warfare as a legitimate option.
238

Technically speaking this solution does not create peace between current enemies since one of the sides
involved in the dispute is no longer around. It does, however, eliminate the state of war.
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As we have seen in previous chapters, the view of what was considered just in
war underwent significant changes throughout the Middle Ages. Rome especially saw
itself as the rightful ruler of the world and at various points in the history of the Empire
sought to use the first technique of territorial annexation and population control to
achieve peace. Richard Tuck outlines some of the different ways of expressing this
ideological view of the superiority of Rome over its enemies. As Tuck notes; “Paul
Vayne has pointed out that it was this willingness to attack any potential danger which
made Rome see itself as destined to be mistress of the entire orbis terrarium – any
independent state was in principle a danger.”

239

Furthermore, even if claims of the

Emperor of Rome being lord over the whole world were merely hyperbolic, the claim that
the Pope was prince over the whole world was not a fact that could be verified
empirically. The Christian position at the time held that the Pope was given jurisdiction
over the world directly for God and that he delegated the secular rule of the world to the
Emperor. The Emperor had the divine right to rule over the whole world, but he did not
240

actually achieve this objective, even if claims to the contrary were sometimes made.

Given this worldview there were two different kinds of threats to the Empire and these
different kinds of enemies were not created equally. First, there were enemies who were
fought that had to be completely overcome and rivals who merely had to be subdued and
brought back into line with Roman ambitions. If you are fighting for the survival of the
Empire and not merely over who gets to control a small portion of land then different
means will be available to you. As Cicero recounted:
So with the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians we fought as with deadly
enemies, not to determine which should be supreme, but which should
survive; but with the Latines, Sabines, Samnites, Carthaginians, and Pyrrhus
241
we fought for supremacy.
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And Cicero reasons that the rights we have as individuals to defend ourselves against
violent attack apply equally to the political community as a whole. As he famously
argued:
There is a law not of the statute-book, but of nature, … that should our lives
have fallen into any snare, into the violence and the weapons of robbers or
foes, every method of winning a way to safety would be morally justifiable.
When arms speak, the laws are silent; they bid none to await their word,
since he who chooses to await it must pay an undeserved penalty ere he can
242
exact a deserved one.
It would seem from the two passages above that any means necessary may be used to
counter a threat on your life but that the means employed will depend on the end. For
political communities, if there is a threat to the continued existence of the group, or for
survival, then anything goes. If, on the other hand, the battle is for supremacy, then
restraint is merited.
This was not an unpopular idea in the Middle Ages and into the Modern period,
nor has it fallen out of favour today. Vitoria, for example argued that sins against nature
could be punished by anyone, even if those being harmed did not ask for help. It is
necessary to defend people against sins like cannibalism not only for their own benefit
but also to ensure that these injustices will not continue to happen in the future. Towards
that end, if the only way to ensure an end to the sins against nature is to set up a Christian
prince over the inhabitants, then this is required.

243

Following in this tradition, Locke

argues in the Second Treatise that it is necessary to punish transgressions of the law of
nature in the state of nature, of which the international realm is but one instantiation. On
this necessity to punish transgressions of the law of nature in the state of nature he is
clear:
And that all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights, and from
doing hurt to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth
the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of the Law of
Nature is in that State, put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a
242
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right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may
244
hinder its violation.
The final phrase “…to such a degree, as may hinder its violation” allows the punisher a
great deal of leeway in what would, outside of the state of nature be unavailable to him.
Although it may not go quite as far as saying that “whatever means necessary” can be
employed against transgressions of the law of nature, the vagueness of this final phrase
leaves room for this interpretation. In support of the view that Locke would have
endorsed all out unrestrained war against those with whom no social contract is possible
we have only to look a few sections further in the Second Treatise. Locke characterizes
warfare as a fight against wild beasts, against which no restraint is required.
And one may destroy a Man who makes War upon him, or has discovered
an Enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a Wolf or a
Lyon; because such Men are not under the ties of the Common Law of
Reason, have no other Rule, but that of Force and Violence, and so may be
treated as Beasts of Prey, those dangerous and noxious Creatures, that will
245
be sure to destroy him, whenever he falls into their power.
Equating our enemies with beasts of prey in this analogy implies that anything can be
done in the service of overcoming the enemy and does not leave much room for a
discussion of the principles of jus in bello, specifically of proportionality. There is a
relevant disanalogy between the cases of killing a wild animal and killing another human
being in a war. In the case of the wild animal, Locke is suggesting in the passage above,
that we have a right to kill the wild animal because of the threat that he poses to my
personal security. We know full well, says Locke, that the wild animal will take any
chance to harm me in the future, so any action I take against it now is justified. With men
in a war this is not necessarily the case. I may be involved in a dispute with party x
today, but our dispute may be settled and we may return to a condition of (at least
temporary) peace.
244
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With the wild animals in Locke’s analogy we can have no future

Locke, Two Treatises of Government, §7.
Ibid., §16.

246
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peace. Lions and wolves are not potential parties to the social contract. Locke’s choice
of these two animals is very telling. While it is easy to forget living in industrialized
cities, which are relatively free of wild animals and certainly of large carnivores, Locke’s
contemporaries would have been far more sensitive to the image of the lion or the wolf
threatening human settlements. Even up into the 1930’s in the United States, wolves
were hunted mercilessly and were driven out of the country because of the threat they
posed to livestock. The same was done in throughout Europe, where only a handful of
wolf populations survive today, and lions continue to be hunted whenever they near
human settlements. Characterizing the enemy in terms of the most demonized and feared
carnivores on the planet literally dehumanizes them and makes it seem as though it is
impossible to negotiate and set up conditions of peace in the future.

5.3 Walzer’s Supreme Emergency
Jumping forward to the 20th Century, references to idolatrous barbarians and
characterizing your enemy as a wild animal has become less fashionable. However, the
background assumption that there are some enemies who are not trustworthy and to
whom the regular rules of conduct do not apply remain. Take Michael Walzer’s now
famous depiction of Nazi Germany during World War II, upon which he bases his
247

argument for the supreme emergency exemption.

Like authors before him, he makes a

distinction between different kinds of enemies that we may face in war, those who seek
our total destruction and those who seek some concrete goal, such as a piece of territory.
The two cases, according to Walzer, require different sets of rules. Although he is quick
to caution that we not assume that every enemy is out for our total annihilation and that
we should be careful not to abandon the rules of jus in bello, Walzer in the end argues
that sometimes the suspension of the regular rules of conduct is necessary. Walzer asks:

State of Nature, and the State of War, which however some Men here confounded, are as far distant, as a
State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence,
and Mutual Destruction are from one another. Ibid., §19.
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What is it that defeat entails? Is it some minor territorial adjustment, a loss
of face (for the leaders), the payment of heavy indemnities, political
reconstruction of this or that sort, the surrender of national independence,
the exile or murder of millions of people? In such cases, one’s back is
always to the wall, but the dangers one confronts take very different forms,
and the different forms make a difference.
If we are to adopt or defend the adoption of extreme measures, the danger
must be of an unusual and horrifying kind. Such descriptions, I suppose, are
common enough in time of war. One’s enemies are often thought to be – at
least they are often said to be – unusual and horrifying. Soldiers are
encouraged to fight fiercely if they believe they are fighting for the survival
of their country and their families, that freedom, justice, civilization itself
are at risk. But this sort of thing is only sometimes plausible to the detached
observer, and one suspects that its propagandistic character is also
understood by many of the participants. War is not always a struggle over
ultimate values, where the victory of one side would be a human disaster for
the other. It is necessary to be sceptical about such matters, to cultivate a
wary disbelief of wartime rhetoric, and then to search for some touchstone
against which arguments about extremity might be judged. We need to
make a map of human crises and to mark off the regions of desperation and
disaster. These and only these constitute the realm of necessity, truly
understood. Once again, I am going to use the experience of World War II
in Europe to suggest at least the rough contours of the map. For Nazism lies
at the outer limits of exigency, at a point where we are likely to find
248
ourselves united in fear and abhorrence.
He follows with a description of Nazism:
Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology
and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who
might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally
beyond calculation, immeasurably awful. We see it – and I don’t use the
phrase lightly – as evil objectified in the world, and in a form so potent and
apparent that there could never have been anything to do but fight against it.
I obviously cannot offer an account of Nazism in these pages. But such an
account is hardly necessary. It is enough to point to the historical
experience of Nazi rule. Here was a threat to human values so radical that
its imminence would surely constitute a supreme emergency; and this
249
example can help us understand why lesser threats might not do so.
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While Walzer makes a number of warnings that we should not be quick to judge
something as a supreme emergency, nevertheless, his theory does allow for the
characterization of the enemy in terms that resemble those of his predecessors. Against
“evil objectified in the world”, not only is it necessary to fight, but also the limits on what
is otherwise justifiable are raised and any means of combatting the threat are permissible.
Walzer himself grants that there has only been one instance in which the supreme
emergency has been present and the regular laws of war were justifiably suspended.
However, his admission that there is even such a thing as a supreme emergency has more
profound implications for his just war theory.

250

Walzer’s position with regards to the

supreme emergency is importantly linked with his stance on weapons prohibitions.
According to Walzer, weapons are unjust only in their use in disproportionate and
indiscriminate ways; there are no grounds for banning weapons themselves. We can only
condemn those who use weapons in an unjust manner. So:
…the strategist suggested (rightly) that the crucial distinction in the theory
and practice of war was not between prohibited and acceptable weapons but
251
between prohibited and acceptable targets.
It is informative to contrast Walzer’s position on weapons with Kant’s, which was
outlined above. Kant argues that we must move towards a situation of disarmaments,
decreasing our investment in the weapons of war and condemning the use of prohibited
means of warfare such as poison. Walzer, on the other hand reserves the possibility that
we may require stockpiles of weapons, even if these weapons would otherwise be unable
to be used discriminately or proportionately and although he does not make the link
directly, this is likely because he believes that we should reserve ourselves the possibility
of fighting a threat like that posed by Nazism again in the future.
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Walzer’s stance in general with regards to just war theory as a whole is fairly
conventional. He repeats arguments familiar from the very beginnings of the Western
tradition such as an emphasis on the jus ad bellum principles of just cause and right
intention and this is coupled with a robust defense of the traditional jus in bello categories
of proportionality and discrimination. Moreover, his account does not prioritize one
category over the other but generally argues for the moral equality of combatants, which
translates into an argument for the possibility that both sides in a war fight justly or
unjustly regardless of their satisfaction of the tenets of jus ad bellum. The moral equality
of combatants is a central concern for Walzer, and he bases his argument on the
possibility of epistemic uncertainty that military personnel are likely to have with regards
to the war effort. Regarding soldiers in general he states:
For soldiers, as I have already argued, are not responsible for the overall
justice of the wars they fight; their responsibility is limited by the range of
their own activity and authority. Within that range, however, it is real
enough, and it frequently comes into question. “There wasn’t a single
soldier,” says an Israeli officer who fought in the Six Day War, “who didn’t
at some stage have to decide, to choose, to make a moral decision … quick
and modern though [the war] was, the soldier was not turned into a mere
technician. He had to make decisions that were of real significance.” And
when faced with decisions of that sort, soldiers have clear obligations. They
are bound to apply the criteria of usefulness and proportionality until they
come up against the basic rights of the people they are threatening to kill or
injure, and then they are bound not to kill or injure them. But judgments
about usefulness and proportionality are very difficult for soldiers in the
252
field.
Moreover, they are offered two sorts of defenses, one owing to the mistakes that are
likely in the heat of battle and the second because of the chain of command and the
obedience required of soldiers. In addition:
The defense of superior orders breaks down into two more specific
arguments: the claim of ignorance and the claim of duress. These two are
standard legal and moral claims, and they seem to function in war very
much as they do in domestic society.
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What this means is that soldiers, very often, are not acting of their own accord. Moreover,
they cannot, from their vantage point, know whether the actions they are being instructed
to perform are just or not. On this point Walzer maintains:
Ignorance is the common lot of the soldier, and it makes an easy defense,
especially when calculations of usefulness and proportionality are called for.
The soldier can plausibly say that he does not know and cannot know
whether the campaign in which he is engaged is really required for the sake
of victory, or whether it has been designed so as to hold unintended civilian
deaths within acceptable limits. From his narrow and confined vantage
point, even direct violations of human rights – as in the conduct of a siege,
for example, or in the strategy of an anti-guerrilla campaign – may be
unseen and unseeable. Nor is he bound to seek out information; the moral
like of a combat soldier is not a research assignment. We might say that he
stands to his campaign as to his wars: he is not responsible for their overall
justice.
The epistemic uncertainty that is granted to the soldier is important because it shows a
humility with regards to our general capacity to judge jus ad bellum claims more
generally and allows that warfare is not strictly a good guys vs. bad guys affair where we
can easily be certain that our side is acting justly. The greater the demonization of the
opposing side, the more likely we are to flout the rules of engagement in the supposed
interest of self-preservation. A demonization of the opponent coupled with the claim that
a lasting peace will be achieved if they are defeated and the regime responsible replaced
has been a tactic used for centuries to get otherwise unwilling citizens to participate in
wars of aggression. I would not like to suggest that the actions taken by the Nazis were
not atrocious, or to minimize the evil nature of Hitler’s program for world domination.
However, it is important to note, I think, that even in the case of Nazi Germany once the
war was over the Nazi threat that justified abandoning the rules of jus in bello
immediately disappeared even though the very same people who carried out the atrocities
in question were still alive and running the country. In 1954 Waltz remarked:
We fought against Germany in the Second World War because as a whole it
followed the lead of Hitler and not because so many people in the United
States felt a personal enmity for the people of Germany. The fact that we
opposed not individuals but states made possible a rapid realignment of
states following the war, which is now spectacularly demonstrated by the
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cooperation of the United States with the leaders and people of states that
253
were a short time ago our mortal enemies.
One of the very important reasons for having and abiding by the rules of jus in bello is
precisely because we are not waging wars against individuals but against states. The
people, no matter whether they support the war effort or not, are not the proper targets of
attack, and once the war is over they will be the people who we will have to get along with
to maintain peace in the future. Demonizing the population and then attacking them on the
basis of this characterization undermines our own humanity.

Attacking people

indiscriminately and disproportionately is no guarantee that the war effort will be
successful or less costly to those choosing these methods, think of the Vietnam War, for
example. And in addition, these tactics actually undermine the morality of those who
claim to hold the moral high-ground.
In the case of Nazi Germany the case may be too fresh in our minds and too
personal for many to accept that the Nazis and the German people who supported them
deserved any kind of consideration based on the rules of jus in bello. However, lack of
restraint and a foregoing of these very same principles have been urged by politicians
against many groups throughout history.

One such demonization of the adversary

occurred in the Americas with the conquest of Native populations. These groups were
brutalized and not offered the same protections as Europeans or other peoples because
they were considered to be savages and underserving of legal protections. As John
Fabian Witt recounts:
A century after Grotius, however, jurists began to carve out hard-and-fast
exceptions for Indians who did not follow the European laws of war.
“When we are at war with a savage nation,” Vattel wrote, “who observe no
rules, and never give quarter, we may punish them in the persons of any of
their people.” American jurists took Vattel a step further. Vattel’s approach
treated Indians on the basis of their alleged conduct, not on the basis of their
status. But the early American literature excluded Indians from the
254
protections of the laws of war on the basis of their race and religion.
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Demonizing the opponent based on race or religion and not based on actions was an even
greater threat to the native populations because they were targets of indiscriminate attack
regardless of whether they violated the European laws of war or not. Witt, citing Kent,
continues:
Kent’s Commentaries explained that “the Christian nations of Europe, and
their descendants on this side of the Atlantic” had “established a law of
nations peculiar to themselves,” one rooted in “the brighter light, more
certain truths, and the more definite sanction, which Christianity has
255
communicated.”
A century after Grotius had sought to eliminate religion from the laws of war and peace
Christianity was still being promoted as a prerequisite for being afforded the protection of
the laws of jus in bello. Unfortunately, not much has changed, although today’s preferred
ideology is democracy and not Christianity.

5.4 McMahan on the Separation of jus ad bellum from jus in
bello
Jeff McMahan criticizes just war theory on the grounds that it separates the categories of
jus ad bellum from jus in bello. While I have been arguing throughout this work that the
separation has been a positive development for just war theory, allowing for a more
robust account of jus in bello to be developed and placing the blame for the violence of
warfare on the agents actually responsible for the violence, McMahan is highly critical of
this stance. In this section I will present McMahan’s argument against the separation of
jus ad bellum and jus in bello and I will argue that this position does not take seriously
the epistemic uncertainty related to both our ability as observers to properly judge just
256

cause in the moment, and the epistemic condition of soldiers fighting in wars.

In order to best understand McMahan’s argument against the separation it will be
important to begin from his starting point regarding just war theory as a whole. To begin,
McMahan provides his readers with a definition of just cause. For McMahan:
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Just cause is an aim that satisfies two conditions: (1) that it may permissibly
be pursued by means of war, and (2) that the reason why this is so is at least
in part that those against whom the war is fought have made themselves
257
morally liable to military attack.
From this definition of just cause McMahan is already anticipating the argument against
the moral equality of combatants. Directly following on this definition McMahan makes
a contrast between just and unjust combatants as follows:
With this notion as background, we can now distinguish between “just
combatants,” who fight in a just war, and “unjust combatants,” who fight in
258
a war that lacks a just cause.
The goal of marking a difference between just and unjust combatants is to be able to then
argue that they do not have equal moral standing with regards to one another, something
that traditional versions of just war theory at least since the Modern turn have held. On
the traditional view there is an important difference between civilians, or non-combatants
and combatants, and this has to do with their training, ability and positioning to do harm
to combatants on the opposing side. Normally, it is said of combatants that they have
“lost their right not to be attacked” but that the general population has not put itself into
such a position merely by having a war fought on their territory or on their behalf.
McMahan, in opposition to the moral equality of combatants, states:
I will argue against the moral equality of combatants by arguing against the
view that unjust combatants act permissibly when they fight within the
constraints of the traditional rules of jus in bello. I will argue, indeed, that
with few exceptions, they cannot satisfy the constraints of jus in bello, even
259
in principle, when those constraints are properly understood.
According to McMahan, unjust combatants cannot properly satisfy the demands of jus in
bello, discrimination and proportionality, because there is no just cause for which their
actions could count as proportional and also because the just combatant has not lost his
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right not to be attacked by the unjust combatant. While this view seems intuitively
plausible in the abstract the greatest threat to this view is that whether or not your side has
a just cause both sides will act as though they do have just cause. In this scenario, from a
subjective standpoint each side has a just cause and there will be certain military
campaigns that will serve to move each side towards their goals. These goals can be met
either with a respect for the rules of jus in bello, taking care to use only the force
necessary to achieve objectives and targeting only enemy soldiers, or they can be
achieved in whatever way minimizes costs to your own side. The aim of jus in bello is to
limit the destructiveness of war, which is already a non-ideal scenario in which other
methods of resolving disputes have failed. Jus in bello also has the further aim of
limiting destructiveness to increase the chances that current enemies will be able to
resolve future disputes peacefully and not continuously resort to violence in the future.
McMahan is of the opinion that being subjectively convinced of the justness of your side
in a war is not enough to make the actions of the unjust side morally equivalent to the
actions taken on behalf of the just side.
McMahan’s argument takes into consideration a variety of possibilities related to
the epistemic conditions of the soldiers fighting in war. He considers the possibility that
soldiers are not well placed to judge the justness of the war they are fighting in, as well as
the fact that soldiers are institutionally imbedded in such as way that their personal
judgments regarding jus ad bellum claims are actively discouraged in order to maintain
the military’s efficiency. On the first point, McMahan is sympathetic to the idea that
soldiers may not be ideally placed to judge the justness of war. However, in the end he
argues that this would have to be the case in every situation of war in order for the moral
equality of combatants to hold. He maintains that there are cases in which soldiers can
objectively tell that they are on the unjust side and that they have no grounds for attacking
the opposing forces. The first thing to say about this position is that it rests on a
particular epistemological position regarding objective and subjective knowledge that
McMahan does nothing to support. I am not suggesting that McMahan’s book on just
war theory is the right place for a lengthy discussion of epistemology and a defense of the
objectivity of knowledge claims. However, it is important to note that his position rests
on the assumption that individual agents are capable of holding objectively true opinions
165
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regarding the outside world.

If this assumption is put into question this threatens his

view on the moral equality of combatants. If we only ever hold subjective opinions
regarding the moral/legal status of the wars we are engaged in, and on top of this there are
persuasive media campaigns aiming at convincing citizens and soldiers on both sides of
the conflict into believing that their side has justice on its side, then this puts a significant
strain on the idea that anyone can ever be entirely sure that his position regarding the
justness of war is objectively true. Moreover, if I subjectively believe very strongly that
the war my country is engaging in is unjust it is possible for me to refuse to fight for this
particular cause. The penalties that soldiers face for refusing to fight will depend of
course on the laws of each nation, however, it is at least possible in principle for soldiers
to refuse to fight in a war they believe to be unjust. If instead of McMahan’s objectively
unjust war we can only have relative certainty of our position, this still leaves room for a
consensus to develop among people and for support for the war to be undermined. Under
the traditional principles of just war theory, those who believe themselves to be fighting
in an unjust war have the opportunity to not fight and they are not bearing the moral
blame for declaring the war or issuing commands, for which they are not properly
responsible. “Unjust combatants” are judged based on the moral decisions that they are
actually responsible for, those of jus in bello, and not for those that do not stem from their
personal choices, those of jus ad bellum.
There are certain practical consequences of adopting McMahan’s view regarding
the asymmetrical status of combatants in war that are important for my argument. For
one, if soldiers are indeed not afforded the same moral status in war, then it becomes, at
least in principle, permissible for just combatants to use means that would otherwise be
impermissible in order to expedite victory against the enemy. In the current legal context,
both parties to a war are concerned with the repercussions of their actions against
opposing forces and tend to frame their actions relative to the principles of jus in bello.
If, however, we remove the assumption of the moral equality of combatants from the
260
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picture and instead frame the enemy as consisting of unjust combatants (which both sides
are likely to do), then we will likely increase the violence of warfare, not decrease it.
McMahan is aware of this point and suggests specifically that in the case of asymmetry,
which he suggests is the correct moral characterization of combatants in war, that
additional rights should be granted to just combatants as opposed to the unjust. As he
states:
I believe that there could in principle be circumstances in which it would be
morally permissible for people with a just cause to act in ways now
prohibited by law. It could, for example, be permissible for just combatants
intentionally to harm certain civilians or prisoners of war; it could be
permissible for them to disguise themselves as civilians to facilitate an
attack on unjust combatants participating in an unjust occupation. I concede
that such acts could rarely be permissible in practice, if only because they
would provoke reprisals against the innocent; but what could make them
permissible in principle is that those who would be their intended targets
would have made themselves liable to attack by virtue of responsibility for a
wrong that could be prevented or corrected only by attacking them in a
261
proportionate manner.
There are consequentialist reasons for thinking that adopting the asymmetrical model
of combatant rights in war is a bad idea and McMahan is the first to recognize these,
as he states:
A neutral law that permitted all combatants to attack civilians in certain
specified conditions, or to harm or kill prisoners, or to disguise themselves
as civilians, would be exploited by the unjust and inevitably abused by the
just, leading to greater violence, and in particular to more and worse
violations of the rights of the innocent, than a law that prohibits these forms
262
of action to all.
And he continues:
At present, in other words, when all who fight claim to be just combatants,
and most sincerely believe what they claim, and when their belief cannot be
authoritatively controverted, we must deny them all permission to act in
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certain ways that on occasion might be morally permitted to actual just
263
combatants, or even morally required of them.
So prudentially, at least in the current system, it would be unwise to adopt the
asymmetrical view, according to McMahan himself. However, we do not have to look
very far into military actions to discover the asymmetrical position at work in the world.
Take the way that terrorist groups and other non-military groups are treated differently
from military enemies.
Terrorism poses a problem for just war theory because it deals with interstate
violence but terrorist actors often fail to meet the standards normally required of
combatants. For example, terrorists and other non-military actors often carry out their
actions in secrecy, without exposing themselves to the dangers of full-blown military
conflict. By using civilians as cover, they intentionally disregard the convention derived
from the just war principle of discrimination that requires soldiers to identify themselves
with appropriate insignia to distinguish themselves from the general population.
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They

do not necessarily represent the interests of any one national group, and so their actions
do not get authority from the channels normally permitted by just war theory. And they
use attacks on civilian populations as a means to their ends, which is explicitly prohibited
by jus in bello.

These are just a few of the ways that terrorism breaks down the

categories of just war theory and places itself outside the purview of the traditional rules.
In a way, terrorists are the ultimate “unjust combatants” on McMahan’s model because
they not only fail to meet jus ad bellum criteria but they also, and most importantly,
deliberately go against the rules of jus in bello. Surely, if the reasons for precaution set
out above are already not being met; if the enemy is one that refuses to adopt the rules of
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If we are required to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when engaging in military
attacks, then soldiers must wear uniforms or display other signals that they are not civilians. Prior to the
20th Century it was common for armies to wear colorful uniforms much like sports teams so that they would
not kill their own men in close combat situations. As opposing sides have moved further and further away
from one another with new technologies, the risk of inadvertently killing a member of your own side has
been reduced drastically. Today soldiers tend to wear uniforms designed to camouflage them from the
enemy but they continue to identify themselves in ways that distinguish soldiers from civilians. These
norms are obviously flouted by terrorists and guerrillas who intentionally use civilians as cover in order to
achieve their objectives.
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jus in bello as binding for himself, then there is no longer a reason for soldiers defending
themselves and their citizens to be held to the standards of jus in bello. This stance
regarding terrorists, that they are not afforded the same protections as even unjust
combatants, is already present in our current international relations.
This way of distinguishing terrorists, as our enemies who carry out unjust attacks
without proper authorization, without distinguishing themselves from the general
population, etc. is an agent-focused way of defining terrorists. It focuses on who carried
out the attacks and builds in the injustice of the attack to definition of the enemy. As
Stephen Nathanson points out in his book Terrorism and the Ethics of War, we should be
concerned with the moral quality of the actions carried out and not with defining certain
people or groups as terrorists. As he remarks:
The idea that we should define “terrorism” by who does it leads to absurd
results. If we define a “terrorist act” as an act carried out by terrorists, an
obvious problem is that this definition does not tell us how to identify
someone as a terrorist. But even if we could independently identify some
people as terrorists, we would still need criteria for identifying terrorist acts
because most of the things that terrorists do are not terrorist actions. They
wake up in the morning, eat breakfast, drive cars, make phone calls, etc.
Even if we add that terrorist actions must be violent, not every violent act by
members of a terrorist group is terrorism. If members of a terrorist group
are attacked by a rival terrorist group and kill their attackers in self-defence,
265
these self-defensive killings would not be terrorist acts.
Instead of defining terrorists based on who did the action, or in terms of agents,
Nathanson suggests an act-focused approach that uses the quality of the action in question
to determine whether it was a terrorist action or not. According to Nathanson terrorist
acts:
1. are acts of serious, deliberate violence or credible threats of such acts;
2. are committed in order to promote a political or social agenda;
3. generally target limited numbers of people but aim to influence a larger
group and/or the leaders who make decisions fort he group;
4. intentionally kill or injure innocent people or pose a threat of serious
harm to them.266
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Based on this definition, there are terrorist acts and the people responsible for carrying
these out at any given moment. They are not limited to our enemies and are not defined
by belonging to a particular group. In fact, governments of all kinds can, and have,
committed terrorist acts. Walzer’s famous account of the British carpet-bombing of
German cities in World War II clearly fits the definition, as do many other examples of
acts done by state actors. Clearly then, there are instances where “terrorists” are clearly
identifiable and usually adhere to the rules of jus in bello, which would undermine the
credibility of treating so called “terrorists” differently from other combatants in war, who
should be afforded the protections offered by the moral equality of combatants, regardless
of their failures to uphold jus in bello.
In the above critiques of Walzer and McMahan, I hope to have shown that making
the principles of jus in bello subordinate to those of jus ad bellum, or removing the
separateness of the categories, leads to worse and not better results for just war theory. In
fact, this separation and the neutral definitions that the principles of just war theory are
based upon allow the theory to maintain its view towards improving the conditions
necessary for a future peace. As I have mentioned above, the logic of just war theory
seeks to limit the resort to war and the destructiveness of war in the hopes that current
enemies will one day resolve their disputes in non-violent ways. The introduction of
ideological justifications for suspending or altering the rules of jus in bello into the
theory, such as the supreme emergency exemption, McMahan’s just and unjust
combatants, or different rules for dealing with “terrorist threats” creates various
conditions in which wars are fought not by soldiers who have certain rights afforded
them, but good guys and bad guys, us vs. them, true believers and idolaters, etc. This
way of thinking risks making the goals of winning the war more important than any
temporally limited geo-political goal. The only way for “us” to be safe in a world made
unsafe by “them” is to counter and eliminate the threat once and for all. “They” are not
to be trusted and whatever violence committed now on behalf of our goals will be
justified by the peace that we will have in the future.
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The ends justify the means
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however unjustifiable they would be under “normal” circumstances. If we are sceptical
of the crusaders’ justification that violence now is justified to bring about a lasting peace,
then we should be equally sceptical of those who would seek to protect us today through
the use of violence and the undermining of the rules of war. The lasting peace may never
be achieved, as Kant reminded us, however, gradual progress may be made if we remain
vigilant against ideological attempts to undermine the applicability of the rules of just war
theory.

judged as enemy combatants and afforded the rights of other soldiers in war. If they cannot for some
reason be placed in this category, for example, because they do not identify themselves as soldiers, then an
alternative is to judge that they are not like enemy combatants but more like criminals. If they are
criminals, then they are to be apprehended and tried according to the laws of the country that they have
attacked. In the case of the US this means that they are afforded certain rights not to be held without
charges being brought against them, to be tried by a jury, etc. So-called terrorists are in a grey zone where
they are not afforded the rights of either the combatant group or the criminal.
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Conclusion
Just war theory is referred to as a theory, which is misleading, as it implies that it
is made up of a stable set of principles that are agreed upon by various theorists across
time. However, as I hope I have made clear in the preceding chapters, just war theory is
less like a scientific theory that has set rules and principles and more like a family of
views with a shared history that has undergone important changes over time. Just war
theorists are often lumped together because of the views they do not hold (realism and
pacifism) rather than because they all agree on one set of principles. That having been
said, there are certain categories of principles, as we have seen, (jus ad bellum and jus in
bello) that have been treated by all just war theorists in the Western tradition since its
beginnings. The most important shift in just war thinking, I have argued, happened in the
Early Modern period, when religious justifications for going to war were largely
abandoned, and a full account of jus in bello separate from jus ad bellum was elucidated.
The importance of this shift cannot be overstated. For one, removing religious
justifications for going to war from jus ad bellum was a first necessary step towards
recognizing the shared humanity of participants on both sides of a military conflict.
When it is accepted that your enemy has rights that are owed respect, it becomes
imperative to develop a full jus in bello that will effectively guide military commanders
and soldiers in their on the ground decisions. Once we have a fully developed jus in bello
there are a number of obvious benefits. For one, responsibility is properly attributed to
the agents responsible for the different spheres of just war theory. Political leaders who
decide whether their co-citizens will go to war on behalf of the state or sub-state group
are held responsible for respecting jus ad bellum, while military commanders and
individual soldiers are held responsible for the decisions they make in considering the
principles of jus in bello. A separate account of jus in bello also leads theorists to
consider including new provisions in jus in bello. For example, if the principles of jus in
bello hold regardless of the kind of threat being faced, then it is clear that certain kinds of
weapons that cannot meet the requirements of discrimination and proportionality because
of their inherent destructiveness should be prohibited. Considering the ethical status of
weapons has never been more important than it is in today’s age of technological
innovation. The ways that wars are being waged today were unthinkable a few short
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decades ago and the ethical implications of these changes are still largely unknown. I
believe that it is important for ethicists to become involved in debates surrounding
weapons and their possible ethical use, rather than deferring to the idea that they are not
inherently harmful in their development and stockpiling and that we have to wait to see
how they are used to determine their ethical status.
In addition to these important consequences of separating jus in bello from jus ad
bellum a final benefit of this shift in just war thinking was to open up just war theory
toward the further elaboration of a jus post bellum, which is essential for thinking through
how to establish a lasting peace between current enemies. Treating your opponent as a
bearer of rights also respects them as the responsible moral agents with whom we will
have to get along once present hostilities have ended. I have not had the chance here to
elaborate a full account of jus post bellum but, in line with my support of a Kantian
program for thinking about how we will eventually move towards a more peaceful world
order, I believe that it is essential that a comprehensive jus post bellum be developed. At
the time I am writing a number of theorists are working on this exact task and are leading
a new revolution in just war theory, hopefully one that will be as transformative as the
development of a full jus in bello was in the Early Modern period.
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